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ABSTRACT 
!
 BEAULE, ANDREW    U.S. Immigration: The Origins and Evolution of Contemporary  
     Issues and the Architecture of Future Reform 
 Department of Political Science, May 2014 !
 ADVISOR: Tom Lobe !
 In 1965, the United States Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
attempting to remove racial, religious, and cultural discrimination from the immigration system.  
However, the infamous act and subsequent legislation have caused unintended consequences.  
Illegal immigration has skyrocketed despite a massive increase in border enforcement; and 
Central Americans, particularly Mexicans, have become the target of racial and cultural 
discrimination, much like the Southern European immigrants of the early 1900s.  The current 
immigration system still relies on the framework passed nearly 50 years ago, proving to be 
insufficient for contemporary United States. 
 This thesis investigates the historical patterns in immigration legislation that have led to 
the contemporary issues that remain a subject of intense debate.  The current system’s ineffective 
and increasingly expensive programs have created backlogs of family members, simultaneously 
preventing the inflow of immigrants in specific sectors the U.S. economy and workforce 
desperately need.  The thesis investigates current reform bills and proposals, objective research 
done by the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Research Service, and research 
provided by a host of nongovernmental policy institutes.  There is an objective reform proposal 
presented by the thesis to demonstrate how political bias and the current gridlocked Congress 
have prevented necessary reform.  
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CHAPTER I: An Introduction 
The Philosophical Immigration Debate 
!
 The philosophical debate on immigration is not unique to the United States.  Nonetheless, 
as a nation founded by immigrants and continuously molded by immigrants, the United States is 
the perfect example to explore the relationship between immigration and national identity.  The 
foundation of the United States is based in the Anglo-Protestant culture, which led to the White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant becoming the face of a “true” American.  Immigration laws, such as the 
Chinese Exclusion Act and the Immigration Act of 1924, sought to maintain that identity through 
a series of preventative measures.  Immigrants who entered the United States were subject to 
violence, rejection from jobs, and cultural attacks through newspapers and protests.  Despite the 
eventual assimilation of previous groups that were initially discriminated against, the United 
States is currently embattled in another “culture war,” this time with Hispanics.  These 
“outsiders” are seen as a threat to the established identity of the United States.  They do not 
speak English, are of a different race, and affect the United States economy and workforce. 
 Immigration is ingrained in the political and social history of the United States; and the 
concern over the impact of immigrants on American society and law began with the Founding 
Fathers.  For example, “Thomas Jefferson worried that immigrants from monarchies would fail 
to support a republican system of government.”    Several of the Founding Fathers agreed with 1
Jefferson, thereby demonstrating the link between the concerns about immigration in the United 
   Christopher J. Coyne and Peter J. Boettke, “Institutions, Immigration, and Identities,” NYU Journal of 1
Law and Liberty, 2005. http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_060942.pdf, p.132.
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States since its inception.  Much like today, Benjamin Franklin, while impressed with other 
cultures, feared that “open immigration would erode the unique identity that made America what 
it was.”    This argument is the central apprehension of today, centuries later.  While the United 2
States calls itself “the melting pot,” it was not always this way.  Several attempts have been made 
to reject ethnic diversity. 
 In the 1850s, Chinese workers, much like Hispanics today, migrated to the United States 
to work in low-skilled mining, agriculture, and factory work.  Their greatest impact was helping 
build the railroads during the boom in the American West.  As the importance and success of 
Chinese migrants increased, so did the “anti-Chinese sentiment among other workers in the 
American economy.”    Economic and cultural tensions evolved, which led to social and 3
legislative discrimination.  There were various arguments that “Chinese [immigrants] … lowered 
the cultural and moral standards of American society” because they “visit[ed] prostitutes, 
smoke[d] opium, or gamble[d].”    Similarly, Americans believed Chinese immigrants would 4
compromise the racial composition of the United States.  Therefore, in 1882, Congress passed 
the Chinese Exclusion Act, which “suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers (skilled or 
unskilled) for a period of 10 years.”    The Chinese Exclusion Act was the first bill to restrict 5
immigration in the history of the United States; however, legislation did not stop there.  The Scott 
Act of 1888, the Geary Act of 1892, and amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1902 not 
   Ibid., p.132.2
   “MILESTONES: 1866–1898,” 2014, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, http://3
history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chinese-immigration.
   Ibid., p.1.4
   Ibid., p.1.5
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only extended the prohibition of Chinese immigrants, but strengthened it.  It would take until 
1943 for the Chinese exclusionary policies to be repealed. 
 When the United States declared war against Axis forces and joined in on World War I in 
April of 1917, German-Americans were put under the microscope.  Although they had 
previously been good tax-paying citizens that had learned English, went to school, and worked 
hard, their allegiance to the United States as an immigrant group was suddenly questioned.  
National German-American Alliance (created in 1901) clubs, presumed to have been meeting 
places to discuss American issues and reminisce about memories of Germany, were now 
suspected of being fronts to spy on the United States.  There were allegations against, and 
thousands of arrests of, Germans gathering intelligence for Germany.  Furthermore, President 
Roosevelt rejected “hyphenated Americanism” (i.e. German-American), challenging one’s ability 
to have dual loyalty during a time of war.  Several German-Americans “Americanized” their 
names and numerous businesses changed their names completely.  Similar to anti-German 
passion during World War I, the loyalty of Japanese immigrants was questioned during World 
War II. 
 After the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan, there was fear that Japanese-American citizens 
on the coasts of the United States were helping, or would further help, the efforts of Japan 
through a sense of loyalty to their home country.  Therefore, President Roosevelt issued an 
executive order, calling for all Japanese-Americans to be relocated to federally monitored 
interment camps.  The United States would apologize in 1988 for the egregious discriminatory 
actions; however, the damage of questioning the loyalty of immigrants was evident.  Had these 
Japanese immigrants truly become Americans in their heart?  Would they help the Japanese 
!4
cause, or stick by the United States?  This example demonstrates the difficulties that several 
immigrant cultures have faced.  Italian and Irish immigrants and their ties to Catholicism drew 
inquiry as to their ability to show loyalty to the United States over the Vatican.  Clearly, 
immigrants face serious obstacles to gain legitimacy in their new country.  Today, the United 
States is the most ethnically diverse country in the world, but it took decades and an evolution of 
acceptance to finally integrate various immigrant groups.   
 Currently, there are more immigrants living in the United States than ever before, as an 
incredible “one in every nine U.S. citizens is now an immigrant.”    This number, although 6
reflecting an increase in population, also demonstrates the rising importance of immigrants.  
With the drastic increase in Hispanic immigration and the ideological struggle of accepting 
immigrants, one can understand why immigration remains a hot topic.  Immigration has many 
layers — economic, political, etc. — therefore, past discrimination and difficulties with 
integration provide a backdrop for the continued struggle for Hispanics.  The increased cultural 
and economic impact by Hispanics on American society has resulted in stronger resentment.  The 
effect of the Hispanic immigrant wave is debated by several experts in many different 
disciplines. 
 Samuel P. Huntington, an influential Political Scientist, wrote a book entitled: Who Are 
We? The Challenges to America's National Identity.  Huntington focuses on the clash between 
Hispanics and the American identity.  He asserts that American national identity is rooted in the 
Anglo-Protestant culture; and that the United States has based several government institutions 
and functions on it.  The adherence to one language, English, and the emphasis on law and 
   Christopher J. Coyne and Peter J. Boettke, “Institutions, Immigration, and Identities,” NYU Journal of 6
Law and Liberty, 2005. http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_060942.pdf, p.132.
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justice, “produced the ‘American Creed,’ defined by the principles of liberty, equality before the 
law, individualism, self-reliance, representative government and private property.”    More 7
important to Huntington’s argument is his emphasis on the Anglo-Protestant culture as the base 
of the “American Creed.”  This base, according to Huntington, is being challenged by the great 
influx of Hispanic immigrants.  Huntington posits that their presence in the United States 
endangers the established national identity, and could potentially cause a split in the nation — a 
dual identity.  This duality is problematic, as Huntington fears United States political and social 
institutions would be divided.  !
 Huntington argues today’s immigrant wave is much less diverse than previous ones.  As I 
will present in the next chapter, Hispanic immigrants make up the plurality of immigrants, which 
is much different than the late 1890s and early 1900s when there were a vast number of different 
immigrant groups.  Huntington believes this results in Hispanics having less incentive to learn 
English than the various immigrant groups of over a century ago.  Additionally, Huntington 
asserts there are several other important reasons for the lack of Hispanic assimilation in the 
United States.  The continuous inflow of illegal immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries 
results in less participation in social and political institutions, unlike that of the earlier, for 
instance, Italian and Irish immigrants.  The legal immigration of earlier groups provided 
opportunities to be directly involved, wheres illegal Hispanic immigrants must worry about 
deportation.  Huntington also declares the concentration of the Hispanic immigrant population 
near the Mexican border is an important factor for their continued persistence in maintaining 
social, linguistic, and economic values from their home country.  This is also different than 
   Ibid., p.134. 7
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previous immigration waves, where high diversity in distinct ethnic groups required them to 
interact with each other.  This also provided the key reason to speak one language, English.  
 The argument by Huntington that immigrants from the late 1890s and early 1900s spoke 
English quicker than the Hispanic immigrants of the “third wave,” thereby accelerating their 
integration, has been challenged in other studies.  In “Testing Huntington: Is Hispanic 
Immigration a Threat to American Identity?” by Jack Citrin, Amy Lerman, Michael Murakami, 
and Kathryn Pearson, evidence is provided that Hispanic immigrants are learning English at 
about the same pace as earlier immigrants.  Citrin, Lerman, Murakami, and Pearson use the 1980 
and 2000 censuses to track the trends in immigrants who “speak only English or English very 
well.”    In the censuses, “residents [were] grouped both by their ancestral country of origin and 8
whether they are foreign-born, native-born living with [an] immigrant parent, or native-born 
living outside an immigrant household.”    Additionally, immigrants and their children who were 9
from English-speaking countries were excluded from the research.  Both the 1980 and 2000 
census demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the English language among residents from Mexico.  
Initially, the 24 percent of Mexican immigrants that say they speak only English or speak English 
very well would seem low; however, “in the 2000 census, 50 percent of the native-born [children 
of Mexican immigrants] living in households of Mexican-born immigrants spoke only English or 
spoke English very well.”    This demonstrates the ability of the children of Mexican immigrants 10
to learn English quickly.  The data directly challenges Huntington, as the “intergenerational rate 
   Jack Citrin, Amy Lerman, Michael Murakami, and Kathryn Pearson, “Testing Huntington: Is Hispanic 8
Immigration a Threat to American Identity?” (United States: American Political Science Association, 2007), 
p.35.
   Ibid., p.35.9
   Ibid., p.35.10
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of linguistic assimilation” by Mexican immigrant children was faster than all other immigrant 
groups surveyed.    Furthermore, Citrin, Lerman, Murakami, and Pearson found that recent 11
Mexican immigrants learned English faster than in the past.  The study concludes, most 
importantly, that “the trajectory of [Mexican immigrant] progeny’s assimilation resembles that of 
their European predecessor of a century ago, and their rate of linguistic assimilation is on par 
with or greater than those of other contemporary immigrant groups.”    This assertion by Citrin, 12
Lerman, Murakami, and Pearson contradicts Huntington’s claim that the United States will 
become a bilingual country unless the government acts, while clearly demonstrating subsequent 
generations of immigrants assimilate into American culture.   
 An article by Jean S. Phinney, Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, and Paul Vedder 
entitled “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective” focuses on 
the importance of the “attitudes and characteristics of immigrants and the responses of the 
receiving society, moderated by the particular circumstances of the immigrant group within the 
new society.”    While Huntington grouped Hispanics together as part of a new-formed 13
immigrant attitude toward the host country, Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder 
emphasize the differences among immigrant groups and individual immigrants in terms of 
maintaining their cultural identity and their adaptation to the new society.  The authors assert that 
the degree of acceptance of immigrants through official immigration law — “actual and 
   Ibid., p.35.11
   Ibid., p.35.12
   Jean S. Phinney, Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, and Paul Vedder, “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, 13
and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective,” The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 
2001, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/16666/JSI2001.pdf?sequence=2, p.494.
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perceived” — contributes to the attitudes of the immigrants.    According to the article, ethnic 14
identity is strongest when an immigrant group or individual immigrant strongly favors preserving 
their culture and original identity.  Additionally, this identification with the immigrant’s culture is 
strengthened based on the new country’s lack of pluralistic acceptance.  The opposite is true for a 
heightened sense of national identity.  If the new country’s institutions and culture push for 
assimilation, the immigrant feels it must assimilate to be successful.  Phinnery, Horenczyk, 
Liebkind, and Vedder also add that “in the face of real or perceived hostility toward immigrants 
or toward particular groups, some immigrants may downplay or reject their own ethnic identity; 
others may assert their pride in their cultural group and emphasize solidarity as a way of dealing 
with negative attitudes.”    In this way, the immigrant’s cultural pride and the acceptance, or lack 15
thereof, of the new country, are important in determining the level of assimilation.   
 Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder further delve into the discussion on 
immigration and identity by citing that “most immigrants prefer integration.”    Integration is 16
different than assimilation, and the authors provide an explanation for the key disparity among 
the two.  To distinguish, Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder use two questions that are 
the “means of identifying strategies used by immigrants in dealing with acculturation: Is it 
considered to be of value to maintain one’s cultural heritage?  Is it considered to be of value to 
develop relationships with the larger society?”    According to Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, 17
and Vedder, immigrants that assimilate have not placed value on their cultural heritage and do 
   Ibid., p.494.14
   Ibid., p.494.15
   Ibid., p.505.16
   Ibid., p.495.17
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consider relationships with larger society to be of value.  By contrast, immigrants that have 
integrated not only believe relationships with the larger society are important, but also emphasize 
their cultural heritage.  This distinction, according to the authors, is incredibly important.  The 
assertion that immigrants prefer integration proves that immigrants retain their pride, while 
generally wanting to become part of their new society.  Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and 
Vedder contend integration results in an “integrated identity,” which creates the “feeling that one 
is both part of an ethnic group and part of the larger society.”    This is undoubtedly true about 18
most American immigrant groups.  Italian-Americans, once negatively affected by anti-Papacy 
movements, have been essential to the evolution of American culture.  Their status as Americans 
is unquestioned today, yet they maintain a strong pride for their heritage.  Similarly, German-
Americans hold picnics with traditional German music and food, such as bratwurst and 
bratkartoffeln, to celebrate the importance of their roots in Germany.  While German-American 
loyalty was once put under a microscope, Germans now openly display their pride.  The same 
can be said for Irish-Americans on Saint Patrick’s Day, where fervid devotion for their home 
country is admired by other Americans.  Additionally, several immigrant groups, such as 
Norwegians in some parts of Minnesota, make up the majority of communities.  The local 
grocery shops sell traditional Norwegian food, and an overall sense of pride in Norwegian 
culture is evident.  Therefore, is it not possible that Hispanics will come to have an “integrated 
identity?”  Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder argue “official policies and attitudes of 
members of the host society as well as the local policies actually implemented and the prevailing 
   Ibid., p.505. 18
!10
attitudes in the immediate surroundings of the immigrants” vary.    Therefore, it is the host 19
country that determines the level of integration through policy and its ability to accept new 
cultures.  The authors propose four different levels of immigrant identification: assimilation, 
separation, marginalization, and integration, as a means of demonstrating the differences in 
identification between immigrant groups.    20
 Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder find that the adaptation of immigrants, due to 
ethnic and national identification, is most important.  The authors posit that a society with a large 
number of immigrants that choose the “integrated identity” generally have “higher levels of 
overall well-being.”    This is the result of an acceptance by the new society, rather than 21
pressuring the immigrant to give up their ethnic identity.  When immigrants are pressured to 
assimilate, “anger, depression, and, in some cases, violence” may occur.    Native-Americans, 22
although not an immigrant group, are a perfect example of how forced assimilation can lead to 
such negative outcomes.  When the United States banned Native American languages and 
religions, several tribes rejected the laws in violent fashion.  Additionally, due to the trauma these 
laws had on Native American culture, alcoholism and abuse against women in Native American 
communities are higher than any other group.  Phinnery, Horenczyk, Liebkind, and Vedder also 
claim that if immigrants are subject to discrimination or rejection, their attempt to integrate into 
the host society will be hindered.  This can be adapted to the current situation in the United 
States.  Hispanics, who receive harsh discrimination, are less motivated to integrate themselves 
   Ibid., p.505.19
   Ibid., p.505.20
   Ibid., p.505.21
   Ibid., p.505.22
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under the fear of rejection.  Instead, along with a host of potential factors outlined by Samuel P. 
Huntington, Hispanics choose to concentrate themselves, providing a security blanket.  
Therefore, the United States is currently experiencing a separation by its largest immigrant 
group.  This thesis will present evidence that immigrants are an important part of the future of 
the United States; and consequently, the United States must formulate policy in order to integrate 
those that have been marginalized.  This strategy will help maintain the “American identity,” 
while promoting a more harmonious and prosperous future for the United States.  Huntington 
argues this must come with an emphasis on the “American Creed.”  He contends the United 
States needs to foster an environment in which Americans “participate in American life, learn 
America’s language [English], history, and customs, absorb America’s Anglo-Protestant culture, 
and identify primarily with America rather than their country of birth.”    His emphasis on the 23
Anglo-Protestant culture troubles many critics; however, Huntington believes that America’s 
foundation on religious principles is key to its reinvigoration and continued longevity.  
Huntington asks: 
“Would America be the America it is today if in the 17th and 18th centuries it had been settled 
not by British Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics?  The answer is no.  
It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil.”   24
Huntington illustrates the relationship between Protestantism and the American Creed by 
positing:  
   Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity (United States: 23
Simon & Schuster, 2005), p.339.
   Ibid., p.59.24
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“The Protestant emphasis on the individual conscience and the responsibility of individuals to 
learn God’s truths directly from the Bible promoted American commitment to individualism, 
equality, and the rights to freedom of religion and opinion.  Protestantism stressed the work ethic 
and the responsibility of the individual for his own success or failure in life … With its 
congregational forms of church organization, Protestantism fostered opposition to hierarchy and 
the assumption that similar democratic forms should be employed in government.”   25
The connection between Protestantism and the American values of hard work, responsibility, and 
Democratic values is a compelling argument for the irreversible impact Protestantism has had on 
the United States.  Therefore, is it possible to shift away from these roots and maintain the “true” 
United States?  Huntington believes it would be impossible; however, with a country becoming 
more secularized each year, it may be difficult to preserve the Anglo-Protestant culture.  
 The current situation in the United States is far from unique.  Debates over immigration 
are a global issue.  Several areas, including the European Union, Australia, Canada, Israel, 
Russia, and elsewhere, have experienced the controversial ideological approach to immigration.  
Policies are harshly criticized, violence may ensue, and each country finds it extremely difficult 
to tackle their own immigration problems.  The national character and identity of a nation is held 
most sacred, but Huntington describes a “worse” America rather than simply a “different” one.  
European immigrants changed the United States, yet the ideals the Founding Fathers promoted 
stuck.  It is the duty of the United States to find what is best for the welfare of the country, and to 
integrate those who will make a positive impact in the future. 
   Ibid., p.68.25
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 Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the United States is that it was never truly a single-
ethnic country.  English, French, Dutch, and many other countries had settlers; and with the 
expansion of the United States — through the Louisiana Purchase and the conquest of the 
Southwest — more cultures were added.  Therefore, it is safe to say that the controversial label 
of American identity has been around since the inception of the United States.  The debate over 
immigration and national identity are irreversibly intertwined; and Americans, strong in their 
recognition of self-image and national pride, will not easily accept immigrants.  Such has been 
the history of the United States, and it will only continue in the future.  
!
!
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CHAPTER II: The History of U.S. Immigration 
Discrimination and Unintended Consequences 
!
I.  Immigration and National Identity 
 The history of United States immigration is a debate about values and national identity.  
The controversy over national character — not unique to immigration — has been an integral 
part of the evolution of the United States as a nation.  Since the inception of the United States, its 
citizens have tried to create a national identity; and immigration is a perfect example to 
demonstrate its importance.  In the early 1900s, Irish and Italian Catholics were discriminated 
against because they didn’t fit the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant majority that had became the 
“face” of the United States.  Today, these groups are regarded as two of the most influential 
nationalities to have immigrated to the United States.  Central American immigrants, particularly 
Mexicans, receive the same harsh treatment that many Irish and Italian immigrants were subject 
to when they arrived.  The sentiments toward “outsiders,” those who are different from the 
United States “established identity,” are seen as detrimental to the welfare of the United States.  
There is a perception that immigrants take good jobs from U.S. citizens; and since many don’t 
speak English very well, if it at all, they are believed to not fit the mold of a “true” U.S. citizen.  
The debate over national identity is very contentious and incredibly important to the fabric of the 
United States.  The United States is a country of immigrants in which each person’s ancestry — 
except Native Americans — can be traced to another country.  However, this has not stopped 
U.S. citizens from trying to settle on a single identity.  While an established identity may hold for 
a specific period of time, several changes have occurred that have shifted the demographic 
!15
makeup of the United States.  This chapter details the extraordinary debate over national 
character through the history of immigration, and how immigration reform has played a vital part 
in the evolution of United States culture.  No matter what the issue at hand in immigration, the 
sense of national identity drives legislation and public opinion toward immigrants.  To 
understand how powerful national character is, the Immigration Act of 1924 is an excellent place 
to start.  
!
!
II.  The Quota System: America’s Discriminatory Immigration Rules 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was seen as the solution to growing 
frustration that the quota system (used by the United States as its immigration policy since the 
1920s) was discriminatory and a burden on the country’s welfare and power.  There were two 
reasons opponents to the quota system argued for its removal: First, the system discriminated 
based on nationality.  Politicians as well as scores of Southern and Eastern European Americans 
argued that the system violated the values of fairness and equality the United States was founded 
on.  These claims gained traction as the Civil Rights Movement in the United States was 
peaking.  In the quota system, if an immigration applicant was from a Southern or Eastern 
European country, there was a far slimmer chance that person would be admitted.  Second, 
opponents to the system believed it lacked emphasis on family connections or merit-based labor 
acceptance.  Opponents believed the United States would be better as a whole if those who had 
family already in the United States were admitted and able to set up generational ties.  Similarly, 
other reform proponents contended that merit-based labor shortage immigration would allow the 
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immigration process to be more competitive and increase the talent level of those admitted to the 
United States.  With better talent accepted and introduced into the workforce, the United States 
would benefit from an improved labor pool.  President Lyndon B. Johnson was against the quota 
system, and argued for these merit-based changes:  
“This system [the quota system] violates the basic principle of American democracy — the 
principle that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man.  It has been un-
American in the highest sense, because it has been untrue to the faith that brought thousands to 
these shores even before we were a country.”   26
 In 1924, Congress passed the Immigration Act (IA) which outlined a significant change to 
United States immigration policy.  Congress intended to significantly reduce overall 
immigration, preserve American ideals and jobs for citizens, and restore national and personal 
income.  The act limited the annual number of immigrant admissions from each country to two 
percent of the total number of people from that country who were already living in the United 
States (according to the Census of 1890).  The admission percentage system in the IA reduced 
total immigration from 357,803 in 1923-24 to 164,667 in 1924-25.    This reduction varied 27
greatly.  The goal of the bill was to restrict the entry of immigrants from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, while welcoming relatively large numbers of newcomers from Britain, Northern Ireland 
(the Protestant part of Ireland), and other Northern European countries.  The IA cut the quota for 
Northern and Western European countries by 29 percent, whereas Southern and Eastern 
   “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act,” September 1995, 26
Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
   “Who Was Shut Out?: Immigration Quotas, 1925-1927,” April 2002, History Matters, http://27
historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5078/.
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European countries were slashed by 87 percent.    Immigration from Italy, for example, was cut 28
by more than 90 percent, yet immigration from Great Britain and Northern Ireland only dropped 
19 percent.    Over 86 percent of the 165,000 permitted to enter under the IA’s detailed quotas 29
were allotted to Northern European countries.    The IA also outright prohibited the immigration 30
of Middle Easterners, East Asians, and Indians, an even harsher treatment than that of Southern 
and Eastern Europeans.  The IA intended to block “undesirable” immigration from Japan, China, 
the Philippines, Siam (Thailand), French Indochina (Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia), Singapore, 
Korea, Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), Burma, India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Malaya (mainland 
of Malaysia).  The 1924 bill went further to restrict immigration.  Section Eleven, Part B detailed 
that total immigration, as of July 1, 1927 (later postponed to July 1, 1929), would be limited to 
150,000, where the proportion of the total people admitted from each country was based on that 
country’s representation in the United States according to the 1920 Census.    31
 Why did the Immigration Act of 1924 go through such lengths to discriminate against 
specific groups?  It was an attempt to “to preserve the ideal of American homogeneity.”    32
Proponents of the law wanted to establish a distinct American identity.  To do this, they favored 
White Anglo-Saxon Protestants over Southern and Eastern Europeans and those from the Asian-
Pacific triangle.  The IA had clearly established a discriminatory practice against Catholics and 
   “The Immigration Act of 1924,” February 2001, Portland State University, http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IMS/28
currentprojects/TAHv3/Content/PDFs/Immigration_Act_1924.pdf.
   “Who Was Shut Out?: Immigration Quotas, 1925-1927,” April 2002, History Matters, http://29
historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5078/.
   Ibid., p.1.30
   Immigration Act of 1924 (Pub. L. 68-139), § 11(b)31
   “Milestones: 1921–1936,” July 2007, U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/32
1921-1936/immigration-act.
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Jews, or anyone that did not fit the racial, ethnic, or religious makeup of America.  There were 
fears over the Catholic Papacy, and the overwhelming majority of Italians who practiced 
Catholicism.  Catholicism was seen by many White Anglo-Saxon Protestants as “anti-
democracy;” and thus, Catholics were harshly discriminated against.  The democratic character 
of the United States has always been important to U.S. citizens, and immigrants who were 
“ruled” by a single man (the Pope) were perceived as anti-democratic.  Similarly, racial 
discrimination “maintained the racial preponderance of the basic strain on our people thereby to 
stabilize the ethnic composition of the population.”    The view at the time was that Southern and 33
Eastern Europeans were poor, dirty, sick, and hungry, and therefore less capable to contribute to 
a growing capitalist U.S. economy or adapt to a predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
American society.   
 The word “family” is mentioned once in The Immigration Act of 1924, and the word 
“merit” is never mentioned.  Family reunification and merit-based labor shortage immigration 
were not emphasized in the IA, nor would they be until 1965.  The IA was a clear attempt to 
curtail the national identity of the United States to favor White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.  
Likewise, since race was the predominant factor when considering an immigration application, 
those who were better qualified for a job to fill a gap in the workforce, but were not of the 
preferred racial, ethnic, or religious profile, would be disfavored for a worker that was.  In 1965, 
during the height of the Civil Rights Movement, Congress corrected this 41 year-old policy by 
passing the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
!
   Maldwyn A. Jones, American Immigration, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), p.277.33
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!
III.  The Great Change: The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
 In 1964, Congress debated a bill that would dramatically change U.S. immigration.  By 
that time, the Civil Rights Movement had gained significant traction nationwide.  The Supreme 
Court decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with 
influential figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcom X, had profoundly affected the 
United States.  The proposed immigration bill, named the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 (or the Hart-Celler Act), would contribute to this evolution, and many people were against 
it.  Politicians argued that the proposed act would alter the national identity, and presented 
evidence that the new system would create a flood of immigrants that would negatively affect the 
United States.  Those who opposed the Hart-Celler Act expressed concerns that are still relevant 
today: overpopulation, labor issues, education, and healthcare.  As Republican Vice Presidential 
candidate William Miller (NY) said:  
“We estimate that if the President gets his way, and the current immigration laws are repealed, 
the number of immigrants next year will increase threefold and in subsequent years will increase 
even more ... Shall we, instead, look at this situation realistically and begin solving our own 
unemployment problems before we start tackling the world's?”    34
William Miller contended that this bill, while not only causing U.S. overpopulation, would 
ignore U.S. citizens fighting for jobs and prosperity who already resided in the United States.  
This sentiment is echoed today by many U.S. citizens.  There is a growing frustration that too 
many immigrants are being admitted into the U.S. and that U.S. citizens are not being put first.  
   “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act,” September 1995, 34
Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
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 Although opposition to the bill stressed economic and societal concerns over high 
immigration numbers, those who supported the bill answered with strong, and successful, 
arguments.  Representative Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York who co-sponsored the 
bill, confidently stated:  
“With the end of discrimination due to place of birth, there will be shifts in countries other than 
those of Northern and Western Europe.  Immigrants from Asia and Africa will have to compete 
and qualify in order to get in, quantitatively and qualitatively, which, itself will hold the numbers 
down.  There will not be, comparatively, many Asians or Africans entering this country ... Since 
the people of Africa and Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate 
from those countries because they have no family ties in the U.S.”    35
Effectively, Representative Celler assured Congress and the American people that the country 
would not be overtaken by immigrants, and that the bill enhanced the effectiveness of the United 
States by fostering strong family ties that would last generations.  Proponents of the bill also 
argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 had a deep connection with the Civil 
Rights Movement.  The revolutionary act would not have passed, maybe not even been proposed, 
without the positive tide of support from the movement.  Those in favor of the bill saw it as an 
extension of the Civil Rights Movement, a further step toward equality.  As Philip Burton (D-
CA) stated in Congress:  
   Ibid., p.2.35
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“Just as we sought to eliminate discrimination in our land through the Civil Rights Act, today we 
seek by phasing out the national origins quota system to eliminate discrimination in immigration 
to this nation composed of the descendants of immigrants.”   36
Other Representatives, such as Robert Sweeney (D-OH), agreed.  His comparison between the 
Civil Rights Movement and the abolishment of the quota system was bold, yet resonated through 
Congress:  
“Mr. Chairman, I would consider the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act to be 
as important as the landmark legislation of this Congress relating to the Civil Rights Act. The 
central purpose of the administration’s immigration bill is to once again undo discrimination 
and to revise the standards by which we choose potential Americans in order to be fairer to them 
and which will certainly be more beneficial to us.”   37
However, the end of discrimination was not the only issue.  Opponents to the 1965 bill warned of 
overpopulation, yet supporters such as Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) assured: 
“Contrary to the opinions of some of the misinformed, this legislation does not open the 
floodgates.”   38
Opponents such as Myra C. Hacker, Vice President of the New Jersey Coalition, testified before 
the Senate in an immigration subcommittee hearing on grave concerns over the effects the new 
immigration system would have on U.S. society:  
   Ibid., p.2.36
   Ibid., p.2.37
   Ibid., p.4.38
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 “In light of our 5 percent unemployment rate, our worries over the so called population 
explosion, and our menacingly mounting welfare costs, are we prepared to embrace so great a 
horde of the world's unfortunates?  At the very least, the hidden mathematics of the bill should be 
made clear to the public so that they may tell their Congressmen how they feel about providing 
jobs, schools, homes, security against want, citizen education, and a brotherly welcome ... for an 
indeterminately enormous number of aliens from underprivileged lands ... Whatever may be our 
benevolent intent toward many people, [the bill] fails to give due consideration to the economic 
needs, the cultural traditions, and the public sentiment of the citizens of the United States.”   39
As Myra C. Hacker details, overpopulation was but one of the concerns.  Opponents presented 
much deeper issues that included the possibility of detrimental effects to education, national 
security, and jobs.  However, her opposition and that of others, was ineffective and the bill was 
passed.  Although she was defeated, the words of Myra C. Hacker mirror arguments made today.  
There are concerns over the effects of immigration on the U.S. economy and workforce, and a 
growing sentiment that immigration should be halted until, as Myra Hacker put it in 1965, “due 
consideration to the economic needs ... of the citizens of the United States” are put first and 
improved to a standard where immigration can begin again. !
 As the opposition to the Immigration and Nationality Act predicted, the bill created a 
flood of immigrants from Asia and Latin America.  How could President Lyndon B. Johnson and 
the supporters of the INA be so off the mark?  The answer is that they could never have foreseen 
the future “push factors” of Latin America or a United States loss in Vietnam.  Even when 
today’s Congress considers immigration reform, they cannot envision without a doubt that 
   Ibid., p.5.39
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Mexico’s economy, for example, will remain at the status quo.  Therefore, reform is subject to 
unforeseen historical events; and a provision that might have been beneficial when the bill was 
passed, could end up causing several unintended consequences.   
!
A. The Passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
 “This bill that we will sign today is not a revolutionary bill.  It does not affect the lives of 
millions.  It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives, or really add importantly to either 
our wealth or our power ...”    40
        - President Lyndon B. Johnson 
!
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 was an extraordinary reversal of an 
immigration system passed 41 years earlier.  Congress did not merely tweak provisions or amend 
what was missing in the Immigration Act of 1924; they started from scratch, challenging and 
eliminating earlier racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination.  The White Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant view of the American character had not been eliminated, but it was removed from U.S. 
immigration law.  The significant changes marked a new chapter in the nation’s immigration 
history as priority was now given to “family reunification” and a new merit-based “labor force 
needs” system.  The door was opened to Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans; and those once 
restricted could now enter contingent on their family network and the level that their abilities — 
not their race, ethnicity, or religion — demonstrated.  The melting pot of America was about to 
change. 
   Ibid., p.1.40
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 In the year 2014, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 continues its revolutionary 
impact on the United States of America and its millions of citizens.  President Lyndon B. 
Johnson did not predict the future correctly, and the Congress that wrote the INA bill did not 
foresee its incredible significance for the United States.  Before the Hart-Celler Act, immigration 
totaled 10 percent of the population increase of U.S. ethnic and racial minorities, as defined by 
the U.S. Census Bureau; however, by 2010 it was 36.6 percent.    Similarly, the non-Hispanic 41
White population in the United States had decreased from 75 percent in 1965 to 63.4 percent in 
2011.    Evidently, immigration has played a major role in the cultural structures of the United 42
States, and its significance has continued to grow.  Contemporary U.S. immigration issues can be 
traced back to the Hart-Celler Act and decisions made after its passage.  Why was the Hart-
Celler Act shaped in the way it was?  The United States had to correct discriminatory practices 
and improve family-based immigration. 
!
B.  The Changes 
 The 1965 INA was intended to purge U.S. immigration of its racist intent by replacing the 
old quotas with a new system that allocated visas according to a neutral preference system based 
on family reunification and workforce needs.  There were several important changes from the 
quota system that constituted the new, family connection and merit-based labor shortage system.  
The bill emphasized that reuniting immigrants with their families would mean a better family 
structure in the United States, therefore promoting generations of workers and economic 
   “USA QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau,” June 2013, U.S. Census Bureau, http://41
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
   Ibid., p.1.42
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stability.  The family reunification system has two parts (still used today): a non-quota preference 
and a quota preference.  Spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens, non-quota immigrants, are 
not counted against the overall immigration cap, yet those who fall under the quota-preference 
are.  The four tiers based on quota preferences that make up family reunification applicants are: 
(1) unmarried adult children of U.S. Citizens (cap of 23,400);  (2) spouses and unmarried 
children of Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) (114,200); (3) children of U.S. Citizens (23,400); 
(4) siblings of U.S. citizens (65,000).  U.S. citizens or LPRs must “initiate the sponsorship of 
their qualifying family member by filing an immigrant visa petition on their behalf by mail with 
the appropriate Service Center of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS).”    The 43
bill also created a merit-based workforce shortage system to create competition in areas which 
labor was needed, thereby increasing the level of those accepted.  This was intended to lead to a 
better contribution by immigrants in the workforce, a raise in the level of the workforce as a 
whole, and an advancement in the U.S. economy. 
 The act allocated 170,000 visas to countries in the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 to 
countries in the Western Hemisphere.    Therefore, the total immigration ceiling was 290,000 44
immigrants per year, almost doubling the quota system ceiling of 150,000 set forth by the 
Immigration Act of 1924.  Furthermore, each country in the Eastern Hemisphere was allotted 
20,000 visas.  In contrast, Western Hemisphere countries had no per-country limit.  The act also 
dictated that non-quota immigrants and immediate relatives (i.e., the relatives of U.S. citizens 
   Patricia Hatch, U.S. Immigration Policy: Family Reunification, (Washington, D.C.: League of !43
Women Voters, 2007), p.2.
   “The Immigration Act of 1965,” April 2008, U.S. Department of State, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/44
english/publication/2008/04/20080423214226eaifas0.9637982.html#axzz2uoxVzlhT.
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include the non-native spouses of U.S. citizens, unmarried minor children under the age of 21 of 
U.S. citizens, orphans adopted by U.S. citizens, and the parents of U.S. citizens over the age of 
21) were not to be counted as part of either the hemispheric or per country ceiling.  These non-
quota immigrants accounted for 443,035 of the 675,178 immigrants admitted in 2001.   45
 The INA created a seven-category preference system for quota immigrant visa admissions 
detailed in the law (modified in 1990) and was as follows  : 46
 1.  Unmarried children of U.S. citizens under the age of 21.   
 2.  Spouses and adult children over the age of 21 of permanent residents. 
 3.  Professionals, scientists, and artists “of exceptional ability” 
 4.  Married children over the age of 21 (and their spouses and children) of U.S. citizens. 
 5.  Siblings over the age of 21 of U.S. citizens (and their spouses and children). 
6.  Skilled and unskilled workers in occupations for which there is insufficient labor 
supply.   
7.  Refugees given conditional entry or adjustment 
!
C.  The Impact of the INA and the Unintended Consequences 
 Over the last five decades, the policies set forth by the INA have dramatically changed the 
demographic makeup of the United States, as immigrants that entered the United States under the 
new provisions came increasingly from Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.  More 
   Ramah McKay, “Family Reunification,” May 2003, Migration Policy Institute, http://45
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/family-reunification/. 
   “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act,” September 1995, 46
Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
!27
than half of all immigrants in the 1950s were Europeans, whereas just six percent were Asian; 
but by the 1990s, 16 percent were Europeans and 31 percent were of Asian descent.    Countries 47
that were once completely shut out from U.S. immigration, such as the Philippines, Korea, India, 
and Vietnam, saw anywhere from 700,000 to 1.4 million immigrants accepted into the United 
States from 1965 to 2000.    From 1900 to 1920, Mexico represented seven percent (1,112,286) 48
of the total number of immigrants; but by 2010, Mexico had the highest percentage for a single 
country to the U.S. at 32 percent.      49 50
!    51
   “U.S. Immigration Since 1965,” 2010, A&E Television Networks, http://www.history.com/topics/us-47
immigration-since-1965.
   Ibid., p.2.48
   John P. Schmal, “Mexican Immigration in the Early Years: Helping to Build America’s Railroads,” 49
February 2005, HispanicVista Columnists, http://www.hispanicvista.com/hvc/Columnist/jschmal/
020705jschmal.htm.
   “Mexican Immigrants in the United States,” April 2009, Pew Hispanic Center, http://pewhispanic.org/50
files/factsheets/47.pdf.
   Ibid., p.2.51
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 In 1976, Congress passed amendments to the INA to slow surging immigration from 
Mexico.  Since the passage of the INA in 1965, Mexico’s percentage of total immigration to the 
U.S. had risen six percent, and Congress believed that this would continue to increase 
dramatically.    There were two major amendments to the INA in 1976 aimed at slowing down 52
Mexican immigration: First, the seven-category preference system, previously applied to Eastern 
Hemisphere countries, was extended to include all Western Hemisphere countries.  Second, there 
was an imposition of an annual ceiling of 20,000 immigrants for each country in the Western 
Hemisphere.    This marked a significant change from the law’s original uncapped visa 53
provision.  Similarly, in 1978, Congress passed an amendment which took the two hemispheric 
ceilings and combined them into one ceiling of 290,000 immigrants per year.    This amendment, 54
which was fair in theory, missed key variables such as: the distance of the country, its population, 
and most importantly, the differences in “push-pull” factors of each country.  For example, the 
immigration demand from Argentina is far less than that of Mexico.  Therefore, due to the 
immigration system amendments passed in 1978, Mexican immigration would begin to have 
long backlogs of people waiting to be granted a visa while countries like Argentina did not fill its 
visa quota.  These amendments made by Congress attempted to stop Mexico, or any other 
country, from creating an imbalance in immigration distribution; nevertheless, the amendments 
only created unintended consequences.  The Hart-Celler Act contributed to increased illegal 
immigration from Latin America, especially Mexico, due to issues with crucial provisions.  The 
   Ibid., p.2. 52
   “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act,” September 1995, 53
Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
   Ibid., p.7.54
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largest problem comes from the system of family-based immigration, the key provision of the 
bill put in place in 1965.   
 The family-based preference system in the Immigration and Nationality Act induced a 
process called “chain migration.”  “Chain migration” causes intensified effects of previous 
arrivals which leads to an overall strong and continuous inflow of immigration streams from 
specific countries.    “Over time ... entire families have reestablished themselves in the United 55
States.”    The family-based immigration provision in the Hart-Celler Act created incentives for 56
immigrants to recruit family members and for that family to establish itself in the United States.  
This in turn eliminated the incentive for migrants to return home.  As Historian Otis Graham 
stated:  
“Family reunification puts the decision of who comes to America in the hands of foreigners.  
Those decisions are out of the hands of the Congress — they just set up a formula and its kinship. 
Frankly, it could be called nepotism.”   57
Otis Graham uses the term nepotism, which refers to the practice by people in power to favor 
relative or friends, to explain the way in which the family reunification system facilitates power 
to foreigners.  As previously stated, non-quota family-based immigrants made up nearly 66 
percent of all immigrants admitted in 2001.    These immigrants decide when they want to 58
emigrate, and the family reunification system gives top priority to them.  Scientists and other 
   Timothy J. Hatton, American Immigration Policy: The 1965 Act and Its Consequences,!55
(Canberra: Australian National University and University of Essex, 2012), p.11.
   Jennifer Ludden, “1965 Immigration Law Changed Face of America,” May 2006, National!56
Public Radio, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5391395.
   Ibid., p.1.57
   Ramah McKay, “Family Reunification,” May 2003, Migration Policy Institute, http://58
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/family-reunification/. 
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well-educated professionals are a lower priority than the first two categories of family 
reunification on the preference list.  This demonstrates that the United States does not control the 
demographic of its immigration system, but that families do. 
 Before the Immigration and Nationality Act was passed, illegal immigration levels were 
low.  Mexico and other Central American countries did not have the same “push factors” that 
cause high immigration levels today; and European immigrants coming to the United States by 
sea had a much harder time illegally entering through a port than passing a border on land.  The 
system has not been adapted to an evolving immigration demand from Latin America.  
Misappropriated visa caps have not been readjusted, long backlogs still exist, and laws and 
enforcement against illegal immigrants have only caused those who immigrate illegally to stay.  
“The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future reports: ‘The system’s 
multiple shortcomings have led to a loss of integrity in legal immigration processes.  These 
shortcomings contribute to unauthorized migration when families choose illegal immigration 
rather than waiting unreasonable periods for legal entry.’”   59
!
!
IV.  Mexican and Central American Migration to the U.S. 
 Migration to the United States from Mexico and Central America has three main periods 
since the beginning of the twentieth-century: First, the limited migration flows that occurred 
prior to World War II.  Second, the increased legal migration flows during and after World War II 
permitted by the government-sponsored guest worker program (The Bracero Program).  Third, 
   Patricia Hatch, U.S. Immigration Policy: Family Reunification, (Washington, D.C.: League of !59
Women Voters, 2007), p.3.
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the mainly illegal migration flows that began in 1965 and accelerated thereafter for the next four 
decades.    
!
A.  Pre-World War II: Limited Migration Flows 
 Before World War II, the majority of migration between Central America and the United 
States consisted of short-term, seasonal flows between central Mexico and the U.S. Southwest.  
About 60,000 Mexicans entered the United States annually at the turn of the 20th century and 
returned home in the winter.    Combined with “pulls” of new agricultural and transportation 60
technology, the Mexican Revolution created a “push” that resulted in migration rates more than 
doubling during the 1910s and again in the 1920s.  In addition, the business sector in the 
Southwest offered strong support for this migration system, which resulted in exemptions from 
tougher restrictions that Asian and European immigrants had to abide by.  However, by the late 
1920s, the increasing anti-immigration movement — fortified by the Immigration Act of 1924 — 
affected Mexican migrants.  Thereafter, U.S. consular officers initiated tougher screenings on 
Mexican visa applications, generating a 75 percent decline in Mexican inflows between 1928 and 
1929.    With the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929, the migration inflow was curtailed, 61
and hundreds of thousands of Mexicans were deported to Mexico.  During the 1930s, reduced 
migration inflows and increased removals caused the Mexican population in the United States to 
fall by 40 percent.    62
   Marc R. Rosenblum and Kate Brick, U.S. Immigration Policy and Mexican/Central American!60
Migration Flows: Then and Now, (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), p.3.
   Ibid., p.3.61
   Ibid., p.4.62
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               63
!
B.  The Bracero Program  
 During the United States’ involvement in World War II (1941-1945) and the Korean War 
(1950-1953), the United States experienced extreme labor shortages due to the large number of 
soldiers fighting abroad.  The lack of men combined with a substantial demand for factory 
workers subsequently increased agricultural workforce gaps.  To combat these issues, the United 
States signed a formal agreement with Mexico in 1942 to establish a migrant guest worker 
program, also known as the Bracero Program.  The program’s terms on contracts were extremely 
favorable for Mexican migrants, as they included: “a guaranteed minimum wage (unlike 
American workers), as well as transportation, housing, and health benefits.  Bracero contracts 
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   Ibid., p.4.63
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were cosigned by U.S. and Mexican officials, and Mexican consuls in the United States helped 
oversee their enforcement.”    64
 With the end of the Korean war and return of American soldiers in 1953, the Eisenhower 
Administration eliminated consular oversight and imposed better contracts for growers, rather 
than the Mexican migrants.  Additionally, a 1959 study by the Department of Labor persuaded 
U.S. government officials that the Bracero Program adversely affected domestic farmworkers.    65
Nevertheless, the Bracero Program remained in place until 1964, when the Kennedy 
Administration dissolved the plan.  By that time, 4.8 million Bracero contracts had been signed; 
and the Bracero Program had completely changed the limited migration flows — commonplace 
before World War II — into an expanded demand for low-wage foreign workers throughout the 
U.S. agriculture sector.    As Marc R. Rosenblum and Kate Brick detail in their report “U.S. 66
Immigration Policy and Mexican/Central American Migration Flows: Then and Now”:  
“As a result, entire communities in Mexico came to rely on emigration as their primary source of 
employment, and an industry of labor contractors emerged on both sides of the border to match 
willing workers with employers. Migration was now structurally embedded in the social and 
economic systems of a growing group of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving communities.”     67
The Immigration and Nationality Act would change social and economic systems created by the 
Bracero Program.  The bill lacked a strong foreign migration worker program; and the emphasis 
   Ibid., p.4.64
   Manuel García, The Bracero Program, (Texas: University of Texas, 2001), p.1219.65
   Marc R. Rosenblum and Kate Brick, U.S. Immigration Policy and Mexican/Central American!66
Migration Flows: Then and Now, (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), p.5.
   Ibid., p.5.67
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on, and priority given to, family reunification had replaced the focus on seasonal migrant labor.  
This shift to family reunification was the main causal factor behind the most important issue 
facing the United States immigration system today: illegal immigration. 
!
C.  The Rise of Illegal Immigration 
 The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in 1965 established the basic 
outline of U.S. immigration policy that remains in place today.  This bill negatively affected the 
structural forces that had already taken hold of the U.S. migration system; and the preference 
given to family members of U.S. citizens left an inadequate system to provide for employers who 
needed foreign workers.  Furthermore, the “Texas Proviso,” a provision in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 that had not been removed by the INA of 1965, exempted businesses 
from being liable under the law for hiring unauthorized immigrants.  Therefore, there was no 
disincentive to prevent these employers from hiring unauthorized migrant workers.  Similarly, 
the inflexibility of the per-country limits set forth by the INA and the inability of the new 
preference system to adapt to evolving employer needs created backlogs in areas with labor 
shortages.  Rosenblum and Brick assert that the INA “failed to anticipate massive economic, 
political, and social changes in Mexico and Central America, along with changes in 
transportation and communications that reduced the costs of international migration.”    68
Economic troubles and Central American civil wars created new “pushes” in the 1970s and 
1980s, yet the U.S. government implemented per-country caps and extended the seven-category 
preference system (detailed on page 26) to Western Hemisphere countries in 1976.  These caps 
   Ibid., p.5.68
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were illogical in that they failed to account for the distance of a country, its population, and most 
importantly, the differences in “push-pull” factors of each country. 
 The reasons noted above all contributed to the illegal immigration problem that the 
United States faces today.  Despite numerous Congressional hearings from 1971 to 1973, three 
consecutive executively-ordered task forces, and a five-fold surge of border patrol personnel 
between 1970 and 1985, the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States 
increased from 3.5 million in 1990 to 11.7 million in 2012.   69
  !    70
   Jeffrey S. Passel, D'vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Population Decline of Unauthorized 69
Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed,” September 2013, Pew Hispanic Center, http://
www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-
reversed/.
   Ibid., p.1.70
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“Mexicans account for about 60 percent of all unauthorized immigrants and Central Americans 
about 12 percent.”      71
!
D.  Immigration Reforms 
 Amidst growing public pressure to act on the increasingly problematic issue of illegal 
immigration, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986.  The bill 
legalized undocumented immigrants who entered before January 1, 1982 and continuously lived 
in the United States so long as the person paid a fine, back taxes due, and admitted guilt.  The 
IRCA also imposed new civil and criminal penalties against employers who hired unauthorized 
workers.  Additionally, new funding was allocated to border enforcement.  The trend of increased 
spending on border enforcement continued with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996.      
 Just days after the productive talks between President George W. Bush and Mexican 
President Vicente Fox on a framework agreement for major bilateral migration reform, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 occurred.  To combat growing fears of national insecurity, the 
U.S. government passed six laws between 2002 and 2006 focused on a more robust immigration 
and border enforcement system: the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Patriot Act of 2002, the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the REAL ID Act of 2005, and the Secure Fence Act of 2006.    72
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990 each 
   Marc R. Rosenblum and Kate Brick, U.S. Immigration Policy and Mexican/Central American!71
Migration Flows: Then and Now, (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), p.6.
   Ibid., p.6.72
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authorized the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (absorbed by the Department 
of Homeland Security in 2003) to double U.S. spending on border enforcement.  In 1986, border 
enforcement was allotted around $700 million, but by 2010 it had swelled to $10.1 billion.    73
Similarly, the number of border patrol agents rose from 3,000 agents in 1986 to 20,000 in 2010.    74
However, augmented border enforcement did not prevent the entry of illegal immigrants.  
Actually, it “accelerated the net inflow.”    The build up of border enforcement caused the cost 75
and risk for illegal immigrants to increase.  Therefore, illegal immigrants minimized their 
movement, essentially staying put in the United States.  This in turn drastically decreased the net 
outflow of illegal immigrants, which led to the acceleration of undocumented immigrants during 
the 1990s and 2000s. 
!!
 V.  Immigration Exceptions 
 Immigration exceptions are an important part of how the U.S. immigration system has 
been influenced by the sense of national identity.  The Pilgrims who left England in search of 
freedom from religious persecution became the foundation for the independence revolution and 
eventual establishment of the United States.  The acceptance of political refugees has always 
been an issue which the United States has been sensitive to.  After the pain of World War II and 
the hatred toward communist and totalitarian governments by U.S. citizens, the United States 
   Ibid., p.8.73
   Ibid., p.8.74
   Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy: 75
Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America,” Population and Development Review, March 21, 
2012, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3407978/, p.9.
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government came to the consensus that it wanted to help those fleeing such governments.  
Cubans were the primary example.  The United States aided many elite Cubans after the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959, and established a streamlined process for their citizenship.  When the 
Vietnam War ended, the United States felt responsible in a different way.  The U.S.’s 
involvement in the war, much like in Iraq and Afghanistan today, created a sense of requirement 
to accept political refugees.  By 1979, there was a growing sentiment that the United States 
needed to fully commit to the modern reality of refugee situations through a clear national policy.  
Senator Ted Kennedy proposed a bill that year to reform U.S. refugee policy.  His proposal 
outlined a system that addressed the need for reformed, non need-based policy that did not 
simply aid people fleeing from communist countries in Eastern Europe or repressive 
governments in the Middle East.  The proposal by Ted Kennedy would eventually be 
transformed into the Refugee Act of 1980.  It provided a flexible mechanism to meet fast-
changing world conditions as well as a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission of 
refugees to the United States for special humanitarian situations.  The act included 
comprehensive and uniform provisions that guided the effective resettlement and absorption of 
those refugees who were admitted. 
 The Refugee Act of 1980 profoundly affected the way that exceptions in U.S. immigration 
policy are handled.  The act established a separate admissions policy for refugees, eliminating 
them from the geographical and ideological criteria set forth by the INA.  The bill also amended 
Section 101(a) of the INA to define a “refugee” as “any person who is outside of any country of 
such person's nationality ... who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
!39
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”    This definition reflected United Nation standards and advanced a 76
more relaxed and open policy for admitting refugees.  The law created a target ceiling for 
refugees of 50,000, which was separate from the worldwide ceiling.    In addition, the Refugee 77
Act of 1980 lowered the annual worldwide immigration ceiling from 290,000 to 270,000.    The 78
bill created the Office of Refugee Resettlement and allowed a refugee to adjust his or her status 
after one year to become a permanent resident, and after four more years, to become a United 
States citizen.  Additionally, there were laws passed to allow the admission of the children of 
American servicemen who fathered children in Vietnam.  Similarly, former political prisoners, 
such as South Vietnamese soldiers, were allowed admittance into the United States. 
 The Refugee Act of 1980 was extremely important for two major groups: Cubans and 
Vietnamese.  The U.S. immigration policy on refugees from Cuba had been relaxed since the 
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966; however, this bill completely reversed a trend in a declining 
number of Cuban admissions to the United States. 
!
!
!
!
!
   The Refugee Act (Pub. L. 96-212) 1980, § 101(a)(42).76
   Edward M. Kennedy, “Refugee Act of 1980,” International Migration Review, 1981, http://77
www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/International%20Migration%20Review,%20Refugee%20Act%20of
%201980%20by%20Edward%20M.%20Kennedy,%20Spring%201981.pdf, p.143.
   Ibid., p.143.78
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Cuban Immigrant Admissions (1920-2008) 
!    79
As the chart above shows, there was a sharp spike in Cuban immigration following the Refugee 
Act of 1980.  Vietnamese refugees showed the same spike in immigration to the United States.   
 The “Fall of Saigon” in 1975 marked the end of the Vietnam War.  The United States 
military was defeated in its attempt to aid South Vietnam in stopping the communist regime from 
taking over South Vietnamese territory.  South Vietnamese soldiers, translators, and spies who 
had aided American forces during the war feared there would be consequences by the communist 
regime.  Over 100,000 Vietnamese refugees departed for the United States as part of “Operation 
New Life” and “Operation Babylift.”  Operation “New Life” was a mass evacuation of Southeast 
Asian refugees; and Operation “Baby Lift” was a large-scale removal of children from South 
Vietnam.  The Ford Administration supported the arrival of these Vietnamese refugees and 
   “Cuban Immigrants,” September 2011, Immigration in America, http://immigrationinamerica.org/453-79
cuban-immigrants.html.
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gathered enough backing from Congress to pass the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance 
Act of 1975.  After the initial influx in admittance of refugees to the United States following the 
“Fall of Saigon” in 1975, Vietnamese refugees had been restricted heavily.  However, with the 
passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, the restrictions on entry were eased by the United States.  In 
total, the United States accepted 531,310 refugees from Vietnam between 1981 and 2000.    80
Vietnamese Refugee Admissions (1975-2002) 
!    81
The Refugee Act of 1980 reduced constraints to permit entry to Vietnamese citizens attempting to 
escape the communist regime over fears of consequences for their aid to the United States during 
the Vietnam War.  This included soldiers, translators, spies, or anyone who aided the United 
States militarily.  Many South Vietnamese, especially former military officers and government 
   Marc Povell, “The History of Vietnamese Immigration,” June 2005, The American Immigration Law 80
Foundation, http://www.ailf.org/awards/benefit2005/vietnamese_essay.shtml.
   Jonathan Bui, “What Will Happen to Undocumented Immigrants if Romney Wins?” September 2012, 81
WordPress.com, http://election2012ucd.wordpress.com/2012/09/16/what-will-happen-to-undocumented-
immigrants-if-romney-wins/.
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employees, were sent to communist “reeducation camps” during this time.  Those that were 
fortunate enough to escape became known as the “boat people.”  Many Vietnamese crowded 
small and unsafe fishing boats in a desperate attempt to escape persecution.  Most of these 
Vietnamese escaping by boat likely ended up in refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Hong Kong, or the Philippines.  However, the 1980 Refugee Act was not the only 
legislation that showed exception in the treatment of refugees.  Cubans have had their own 
refugee policy as part of the U.S. immigration system, and received preferential treatment unlike 
any other group.  
 Both Cuba and Haiti have a history of repressive governments with numerous human 
rights violations.  Asylum seekers have come to the United States from both countries by boat 
and by plane.  Despite these similarities, there have been several factors that have led to different 
policy enactments by the United States toward each country.  There are four main reasons Cuban 
refugees receive different treatment than Haitians: First, the interest groups consisting of Cuban-
Americans in the United States have deep roots in local and national political activity.  Their 
lobbying to members of Congress from Florida have especially important consequences due to 
their extensive influence in Miami.  Second, Castro allowed many of the elites of Cuba to leave 
once his communist government had taken over.  Consequently, many Cubans have family ties in 
the United States that Haitians would not have.  The United States government is more inclined 
to accept a Cuban under its family-based admissions immigration policy than start a lone Haitian 
in a new country.  Third, the United States has shown favor to refugees who are fleeing from 
political persecution (the vast majority are fleeing from communism) over those fleeing due to 
economic issues.  Fourth, the level of education in Cuba is much higher than in Haiti.  Lower 
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education among Haitians creates concern by U.S. politicians that they may not be able to 
support themselves or contribute to U.S. society in a significant way.  This affects the decisions 
by the U.S. government when applying the second most important standard of the immigration 
policy set forth by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965: merit-based labor shortage 
acceptance.  These four factors provide a basis for why Cubans have undoubtedly received 
preferential treatment in admissions to the U.S., while Haitians have been consistently turned 
away. 
 In 1966, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) which guarantees that Cubans 
living in the U.S. after January 1, 1959 for at least one year may move to permanent residence 
status.  This was the first of many attempts by the United States to grant Cubans the opportunity 
to become U.S. citizens.  While attaining lawful permanent residency so quickly as a guarantee is 
an exception in itself, the greatest exception lies in the fast track to U.S. citizenship that Cubans 
are put on.  Once a Cuban has attained permanent residence status, they would be allowed to 
obtain American citizenship five years later.  This path to citizenship is much less difficult than 
the process other immigrants face.   
 The CAA was passed during the Cold War with the rise of communism in the Soviet 
Union and other Soviet-influenced countries.  The United States was committed to fight against 
communism; and the Soviet Union had aided Cuba heavily during the Cold War.  After the 1959 
Cuban revolution, private property, including businesses, were seized by the communist 
government.  The Cuban elite, along with supporters of the fallen Batista government, were 
scared of impending persecution.  These well-established Cuban professionals, including many 
doctors and business executives, fled for Miami and New York City.  This arrival is considered 
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the first of four major waves of Cuban refugees.  The U.S. refugee policy began to mimic the 
anti-communism sentiment and embraced foreign citizens of a communist state seeking asylum.  
The United States sought to streamline its refugee acceptance process and help the 
“humanitarian” fight against political persecution.  Since then, hundreds of thousands of Cubans 
have been given the same fast track opportunity the CAA outlines. 
 The Cuba-United States Migration Agreement of 1995 was created to control the great 
number of Cuban refugees seeking asylum in the United States.  Cuba and the United States 
created a fixed limit to allow 20,000 immigrants each year (not counting relatives of U.S. 
citizens).  In addition, Cubans intercepted at sea would now be repatriated instead of put in safe-
haven camps.  The Cuban Adjustment Act would be amended in 1996 to adopt the “wet foot/dry 
foot” practice.  The policy, using the Migration Agreement of 1995 as a model, states the 
following: if a Cuban is found at sea, they are returned to Cuba unless they profess sufficient 
fears of persecution.  If a Cuban effectively reaches the shore of the United States, they are 
inspected for entry and permitted to stay for one year (under the CAA).  Similarly, if a Cuban 
enters the U.S. by land, usually through Mexico, Customs and Border Protection can give an 
exemption from deportation.   
 These immigration exceptions hurt the entire U.S. refugee policy.  The inconsistent 
treatment of different groups creates problems when deciding how to approach each refugee.  
The United States government has not kept a formal and consistent policy that is fair for all 
parties seeking asylum; and refugee resettlement is one of many parts of United States 
immigration policy that needs reform.  
!
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VI.  Transition to Contemporary: The Issues of the U.S. Immigration Policy 
 “Despite the overall increase in legal immigration channels since the 1970, admissions of 
legal permanent residents (LPRs) and temporary legal immigrants has not kept pace with the 
push factors in Mexico, Central America, and other countries of origin, or with family- and 
employment-based pull factors within the United States.”     82
 This quote depicts the greatest problem of the U.S. immigration system today: inadequate 
visas to cover the push-pull factors between Central America and the United States.  Legal 
immigration channels are misallocated, inefficient, and require reform.  The next chapter will 
detail how the current immigration policy functions, as well as present the statistics for each part 
of the immigration system.  An examination of current policy will help illustrate the issues 
contemporary United States is facing.  Trillions of dollars are at stake as immigration policy 
affects several aspects of America’s culture and economic structure.  An understanding of 
contemporary issues is essential to formulate reform that will positively affect the United States 
for several years in the future.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CHAPTER III: The Current Immigration System 
Policies, Statuses, and Salient Issues 
!
I.  Contemporary Complications 
 Contemporary immigration issues and their causal factors are relevant for the prosperity            
of the United States.  The history of United States immigration has been full of unintended 
consequences.  How did the immigration system allow more than 11 million people to enter 
illegally into the United States?  Clearly immigration reform efforts have missed the mark.  This 
chapter will provide an analysis of the current issues in order to prevent another misguided 
reform effort.  The federal government has expended an exorbitant amount of money to prevent 
unauthorized inflows of immigrants; however, the failure to due so has presented serious issues 
for the United States.   
 In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, over one million aliens became Legal Permanent Residents            
(LPRs).  An LPR is defined as: “any person not a citizen of the United States who is residing the 
in the U.S. under legally recognized and lawfully recorded permanent residence as an 
immigrant.”    Sixty-five percent of the LPRs admitted in FY2011 entered on the basis of family 83
ties.    Employment-based LPRs accounted for 13 percent, refugees totaled 16 percent, and 84
diversity migrants represented 5 percent.      85
   Ruth Ellen Wasem, Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States: Policy Overview, !83
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p.1.
   Ibid., p.1. 84
   Ibid., p.1.85
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 Immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens, defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act of            
1965 to not count against the family-based immigration quota, accounted for 43 percent of all 
LPRs in FY2011.    Immigrants included in this category are: the non-native spouses of U.S. 87
Citizens (57% in FY2011), unmarried minor children under the age of 21 of U.S. Citizens and 
orphans adopted by U.S. Citizens (18% in FY2011), and the parents of U.S. citizens over the age 
of 21 (25% in FY2011).    The remaining percentage of family-based immigrants are those 88
which the INA deems outside the immediate nucleus of the family — i.e. siblings.  Mexico had 
the highest number of its citizens become LPRs in FY2011 (14%).    China (8.2%), India (6.5%), 89
the Philippines (5.4%), and the Dominican Republic (4.3%) were the four other countries with 
Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States: Policy Overview 
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Figure 4. Legal Permanent Residents by Major Category, FY2011 
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Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 
2011, 2012. 
In FY2011, USCIS adjusted 580,092 aliens to LPR status, which was 54.6% of all LPRs. The 
lowest number of foreign nationals adjusted in the United States was in FY2003, when USCIS 
was just standing up as an agency after the creation of DHS. Most (89.3%) of the employment-
based immigrants adjusted to LPR status within the United States in FY2011. Many (53.7%) of 
the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens also did so that year. Only 12.1% of the other family-
preference immigrants adjusted to LPR status within the United States in FY2011.22 
Approved Visa Petitions Pending 
The pool of people who are eligible to immigrate to the United States as LPRs each year typically 
exceeds the worldwide level set by U.S. immigration law. At the end of each fiscal year, the 
Department of State publishes a tabulation of approv d vis  petition  pending with the National 
Visa Center.23 These data do not constitute a backlog of petitions to be processed; rather, these 
data represent persons who have been approved for visas that are not yet available due to the 
numerical limits in the INA. The National Visa Center caseload is the data that drive the priority 
dates published in the Visa Bulletin each month.24 
                                                 
22 DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2011, Table 7, http://www.dhs.gov/
yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-1. 
23 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-Sponsored and Employment-
Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2011; available at the Department of State 
website: http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/WaitingListItem.pdf  
24 For further specifications of the data that DOS factors into the visa priority dates, see U.S. Department of State, Visa 
Office, Annual Numerical Limits for Fiscal Year 2013, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/
Web_Annual_Numerical_Limits.pdf. 
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the highest population becoming LPRs.    China, Mexico, and India exceeded the per-country 90
ceiling for preference immigrants due to provisional exceptions outlined in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965.  Mexico, for example, eclipsed its cap as a result of a provision that 
permits 75 percent of the family second preference (spouses and adult children over the age of 21 
of permanent residents) to exceed the per-country ceiling.
!
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 II.  The Current System 
 Four major principles guide the United States immigration system on permanent            
immigration: First, reunify families.  Since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 (INA), the United States government has put an emphasis on family reunification as a 
means to build generational benefits for the country.  Second, admit immigrants with needed 
skills. Immigrants with doctorates and masters, or those who fill needed areas in the U.S. labor 
force are welcomed in an attempt to improve the overall workforce and the economy.  Third, 
protect refugees.  The INA provided conditional entry or adjustment, and the emphasis on 
accepting refugees has continued.  Fourth, diversify the admission of immigrants by country of 
origin.  When Congress passed the INA in 1965, the congresspeople who wrote and voted for the 
bill did not understand the impact immigration would have over time.  As written in the previous 
chapter, Republican Vice Presidential candidate William Miller (NY) — amongst others — 
contended:  
“We estimate that if the President gets his way, and the current immigration laws are repealed, 
the number of immigrants next year will increase threefold and in subsequent years will increase 
even more ... Shall we, instead, look at this situation realistically and begin solving our own 
unemployment problems before we start tackling the world's?”    92
Although William Miller was incorrect in terms of immigrants increasing “threefold,” he was 
accurate in his prediction that the INA would cause a flood of immigrants.  William Miller’s 
concern that the United States should not focus on immigration but on its own employment 
issues first is not as simple today as it was in 1964.  Immigration has become a significant factor 
   “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act,” September 1995, 92
Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/1965ImmigrationAct-MassImmigration.
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in the U.S. economy and workforce, and reform is needed to modernize the immigration process.  
The preference shown to family members in the current system — created by the INA over 40 
years ago — has caused enormous backlogs due to misappropriated visa caps, and more 
importantly contributed to an enormous inflow of illegal immigrants.  Due to the non-quota 
family-based visa (Non-native spouses of U.S. citizens, unmarried minor children under the age 
of 21 of U.S. citizens, orphans adopted by U.S. citizens, and the parents of U.S. citizens over the 
age of 21), entire families have migrated to the United States without counting against any 
family-based visa caps. 
 There are two types of legal aliens: immigrants and nonimmigrants.  Immigrants are            
defined in the INA as: “synonymous with legal permanent residents (LPRs) and refer to foreign 
nationals who come to live lawfully and permanently in the United States.”    Nonimmigrants 93
include: tourists, foreign students, diplomats, temporary agricultural workers, exchange visitors, 
or intracompany business personnel who are “admitted for a specific purpose and a temporary 
period of time.”    They are required to leave the country when their visas expire, but some 94
classes of nonimmigrants may adjust to LPR status if they otherwise qualify.  Those who acquire 
LPR status may apply to become a U.S. citizen through the process of “naturalization.”  Persons 
who have held LPR status based on marriage generally wait for three years before they can 
become a U.S. citizen.  If LPR status was gained based on any other reason, that person must 
wait for about five years.  If a LPR wishes to begin the process of “naturalization,” they may 
begin the process one year before their three-year or five-year date.  While a LPR may decide to 
   Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, (Washington, D.C.: !93
Congressional Research Service, 2012), p.1.
   Ibid., p.1.94
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go through the process of “naturalization,” it is not required of them; and they may change their 
mind at any point in the process.   
!
!
III.  Family-Based Immigration 
 According to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, family reunification is the top            
priority.  The INA created a single non-quota category of family-based immigration and a seven-
category preference system for all quota immigrant visa admissions.  Non-native spouses of U.S. 
citizens, unmarried minor children under the age of 21 of U.S. citizens, orphans adopted by U.S. 
citizens, and the parents of U.S. citizens over the age of 21 were not to be counted as part of 
either the hemispheric or per country ceiling.  The quota-based preference list was as follows:  
• First preference: Unmarried children of U.S. citizens under the age of 21. 
• Second preference: Spouses and adult children over the age of 21 of permanent residents. 
• Third preference: Married children over the age of 21 (and their spouses and children) of 
U.S. citizens. 
• Fourth preference: Siblings over the age of 21 of U.S. citizens (and their spouses and 
children). 
As stated before, the INA established a policy of putting family-based immigration first.  The 
spouses and children of prospective LPRs receive the same status and the same order of 
consideration as the principal applicant, if accompanying or following to join.  However, the 
high number of applications due to an emphasis on family-based immigration has exceeded the 
allotted visa numbers, creating extensive backlogs.   
!52
 Relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs are caught in visa backlogs for several years.  In the            
2013 report by the Department of State, brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens had been waiting 
over eleven years; and in the case of those from Mexico and the Philippines, it was even longer.    95
The following table demonstrates the long wait for family members.  “Priority date” refers to the 
day the petition was filed; and for the unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens from 
the Philippines who filed petitions on October 8, 1997, their processing date was in 2012.  
!    96
Those wishing to immigrate from the Philippines must wait longer than those from China 
because more applications are received over the visa cap from the Philippines set by Congress 
each year through the INA.  The number of applicants to become LPRs who meet the eligibility 
requirements typically exceed the worldwide level determined by U.S. immigration law.  The 
backlogs formed at the end of each fiscal year are published by the Department of State with the 
National Visa Center.  To emphasize the effect family-based immigration has had on the 
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derivative status). When visa demand exceeds the per-country limit, visas are prorated according 
to the preference system allocations (detailed in Table 1) for the oversubscribed foreign state or 
dependent area.27 
Family-Based Visa Priority Dates 
As Table 3 evidences, relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs are waiting in backlogs for a visa to 
become available. Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens now can expect to wait over 11 years, with 
even longer waits for siblings from Mexico and the Philippines. “Priority date” means that 
unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens who filed petitions on December 1, 2005, are 
now being processed for visas (with older priority dates for certain countries as noted in Table 3). 
Married adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens who filed petitions over 10 years ago (June 8, 
2002) are n w being processed f r visas. Prospective family-spo sored immigrants from the 
Philippines have the most substantial waiting times before a visa is scheduled to become available 
to them; consular officers are now considering the petitions of the brothers and sisters of U.S. 
citizens from the Philippines who filed almost 24 years ago. 
Table 3. Priority Dates for Family Preference Visas, as of December 2012 
Category Worldwide China India Mexico Philippines 
Unmarried sons 
and daughters of 
citizens 
Dec. 1, 2005 Dec. 1, 2005 Dec. 1, 2005 July 1, 1993 Oct. 8, 1997 
Spouses and 
children of LPRs 
Aug. 22, 2010 Aug. 22, 2010 Aug. 22, 2010 Aug. 1, 2010 Aug. 22, 2010 
Unmarried sons 
and daughters of 
LPRs 
Nov. 15, 2004 Nov. 15, 2004 Nov. 15, 2004 Nov. 1, 1992 Mar. 22, 2002 
Married sons and 
daughters of 
citizens 
June 8, 2002 June 8, 2002 June 8, 2002 Mar. 1, 1993 Aug. 1, 1992 
Siblings of citizens 
age 21 and over 
April 1, 2001 April 1, 2001 April 1, 2001 July 22, 1996 Mar. 22, 1989 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin for December 2012. 
Employment-Based Visa Priority Dates 
As of December 2012, the priority workers (i.e., extraordinary ability) visa category is current, as 
Table 4 presents. The advanced degree visa category is current worldwide, but those seeking 
advanced degree visas from China have an October 22, 2007, priority and from India have a 
September 1, 2004 priority date. Visas for professional and skilled workers have a worldwide 
priority date of December 22, 2006, except for those workers from China, India, and the 
Philippi es, who have longer waits. Unskille  workers with approved petitions as of December 
22, 2006, are now being issued visas, with those from China, India, and the Philippines again 
having longer waits. 
                                                 
27 Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin For December 2012, U.S. Department of State, No. 51, Vol. IX, 2012, 
http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_5803.html. 
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immigration system as a whole, family-based preference categories constituted 97 percent of the 
visa petitions pending at the end of FY2011.   97
  !    
98
In 2013, Section 201 of the INA limits family-sponsored immigrant visas to 226,000.    Under 99
Section 202 of the INA, the per-country limit on preference visas for FY2013 was 26,660.     100
This is where family-based immigrations becomes problematic.  A country such as Argentina is 
given the same visa cap as Mexico.  Therefore, when Mexico exceeds its limit and Argentina 
does not come close to the cap, there is no way to shift those leftover visas to Mexican 
applicants.  This is the origin of extremely long backlogs.   
Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States: Policy Overview 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
Figure 5. Approved LPR Visa Petitions Pending November 2011 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-Sponsored and 
Employment-Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2011.  
The family-based preference categories dominate the approved visa petitions pending. Figure 5 
presents approved petitions for the 4.5 million LPR visas pending with the National Visa Center 
at the end of FY2011, by pr ference category.25 Over half (55%) of all approved petitions pending 
were 5th preference (i.e., brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens). Children of U.S. citizens with 
approved LPR visas pending totaled 24% (i.e., 6% unmarried and 18% married). Family 
members of LPRs totaled 18% of the 4.5 million approved visa petitions pending. 
As Figure 5 indicates, the employment-based preferences account for only 3% (123,333) of the 
4.5 million LPR visas pending with the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2011. This figure 
of 123,333 reflects persons registered under each respective numerical limitation (i.e., the totals 
represent not only principal applicants or petition beneficiaries, but their spouses and children 
entitled to derivative status under the INA).26 
Visa Processing Dates 
According to the INA, family-sponsored and employment-based preference visas are issued to 
eligible immigrants in the order in which a petition has been filed. Spouses and children of 
prospective LPRs are entitled to the same status, and the same order of consideration as the 
person qualifying as principal LPR, if accompanying or following to join (referred to as 
                                                 
25 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-Sponsored and Employment-
Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2011.  
26 For further discussion and analysis on numerical limits and backlogs, see CRS Report R42048, Numerical Limits on 
Employment-Based Immigration: Analysis of the Per-Country Ceilings, by Ruth Ellen Wasem; and congressional 
distribution memorandum, Approved Legal Permanent Resident Petitions Pending for 2012, by Ruth Ellen Wasem, 
May 2, 2012, available upon request. 
   Ibid., p.10.97
   Ibid., p.10.98
   Ibid., p.3.99
   Ibid., p.3.100
!54
 Although the applicants that are placed in backlogs are put in the back of the line, the 
consular procedures require the removal of visas that are determined to be unlikely to see further 
action.  This is done to prevent unreasonably inflated numbers.  “If, for example, a consular post 
receives no response within one year from an applicant to whom the visa application instruction 
letter (i.e., the consular Instruction Package) is sent when the movement of the visa availability 
cut-off date indicates a visa may become available within a reasonable time frame, the case is 
considered ‘inactive’ under the consular procedures and is no longer included in waiting list 
totals.”    The following list details the twelve countries with the highest number of waiting list 101
registrants in FY2013.  In total, these countries represent 77 percent of all applicants waiting to 
be admitted into the United States.  
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Mexico continues to have the highest percentage on this waiting list at 32.3 percent.  Therefore, 
the worldwide total is 265,305 above the allotted cap.  The overwhelming amount of applications 
  
Immigrant Waiting List 
By Country 
  
Immigrant visa issuances during fiscal year 2013 are limited by the terms of INA 201 to no more 
than 226,000 in the family-sponsored preferences and approximately 154,000 in the 
employment-based preferences. (Visas for "Immediate Relatives" - i.e., spouses, unmarried 
children under the age of 21 years, and parents - of U.S. citizens are not subject to numerical 
limitation, however.)  
  
It should by no means be assumed that once an applicant is registered, the case is then 
continually included in the waiting list totals unless and until a visa is issued. The consular 
procedures mandate a regular culling of visa cases to remove from the count those unlikely to see 
further action, so that totals are not unreasonably inflated. If, for example, a consular post 
receives no response within one year from an applicant to whom the visa application instruction 
letter (i.e., the consular Instruction Package) is sent when the movement of the visa availability 
cut-off date indicates a visa may become available within a reasonable time frame, the case is 
considered "inactive" under the consular procedures and is no longer included in waiting list 
totals.  
  
The twelve countr es with the hig es  number of waiting lis  r gistrants in FY 2013 are listed 
below; together these represent 77% of the total. This list includes all countries with at least 
60,000 persons on the waiting list. The per-country limit in INA 202 sets an annual maximum on 
the amount of preference visas which may be issued to applicants from any one country; the 
2013 per-country limit will be approximately 26,600.  
 
  
Country Applicants 
Mexico 1,316,118 
Philippines 462,145 
India 332,846  
Vietnam 267,281  
China-mainland born 240,637  
Dominican Republic 169,422  
Bangladesh 161,896  
Pakistan 115,903 
Haiti 106,312  
Cuba 87,485  
El Salvador 77,107  
Jamaica 61,204  
All Others 1,014,337  
Worldwide Total 4,412,693   
   
  
   Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-sponsored and Employment-based !101
Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center, (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 2013), p.3.
   Ibid., p.3.102
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stems from an over 40 year-old system that puts family-based immigration first.  The issue of 
backlogs also causes problems with illegal immigration, but is more prominent in Central 
American countries.  This is due to their close proximity to the United States, whereas 
immigrants from India or China are much farther away.  The issue of illegal immigration will be 
discussed in further detail later in this chapter.  The following chart breaks down the top 
countries with the highest first-preference percent on the waiting list for family-based 
immigration.   
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For second preference family applicants (Spouses and adult children over the age of 21 of 
permanent residents), there are 114,200 visas available for FY2013.  Family 2A applicants are 
the spouses and children of permanent residents of the United States and 2B applicants are adult 
unmarried sons or daughters of permanent residents.  Once again, Mexico’s percentage is vastly 
higher than any other country.  This trend is apparent throughout the family-based backlog 
  
Immigrant Waiting List 
By Preference Category 
  
FAMILY-SPONSORED PREFERENCES 
  
  
Family FIRST Preference: 
  
The worldwide Family FIRST preference numerical limitation is 23,400.  The top ten countries 
with the highest F1 waiting list totals are:  
  
        Family First   Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country Total    Waiting List  
Mexico 93,431 32.3% 
Philippines 23,723 8.2% 
Dominican Republic 21,670 7.5% 
Jamaica 18,689 6.5% 
Haiti 16,119 5.6% 
El Salvador 8,307 2.9% 
Guyana 8,231 2.8%  
Cuba 7,677 2.6% 
Vietnam 7,140 2.5%  
Colombia 6,013 2.1%  
All Others 77,705 27.0%  
Total 288,705                          100%  
  
Cases are being added to the waiting list in this category not only by the approval of new FIRST 
preference p titions, but also through automatic conversion of pending 2B cases into FIRST 
preference upon the naturalization of the petitioner.  
  
Given the 486,597 Family 2B waiting list and the several years' interval between 2B petition 
filing and visa issuance, it is likely that increasing numbers of petitioners will be naturalized and 
the petitions converted to Family FIRST preference long before 2B visas become available. The 
prospect for increasing future demand in the FIRST preference could result in slower advances in 
the worldwide cut-off date as a consequence. Only two countries, Mexico and the Philippines, 
have FIRST preference cut-off dates which are earlier than the worldwide date.  
   Ibid., p.11.103
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analysis.  This category is over 500,000 applicants above the cap.  Each preference going down 
the list has more of a backlog than the previous category.   
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The third preference category (Married children over the age of 21 (and their spouses and 
children) of U.S. citizens) has an annual cap of 23,400 for FY2013. 
  
Family SECOND Preference:  
  
The total Family SECOND preference waiting list figure is 706,910. Of these, 220,313 (31.2%) 
are spouses and children of permanent residents of the United States (the 2A class), and 486,597 
(68.8%) are adult unmarried sons/daughters of permanent residents (the 2B class). The Family 
SECOND preference represents 16.4% of the total Family preference waiting list. It will receive 
114,200 visa numbers for FY 2013, just over half of the 226,000 family preference total; 77% of 
SECOND preference numbers are provided to 2A applicants, while the remaining 23% go to the 
2B class.   
  
2A: About 88,000 visa numbers are expected to be available during FY 2013. The top five 
countries with the highest 2A waiting list totals are: 
 
        Family 2A   Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country Total    Waiting List  
Mexico          88,054        40.0%  
Dominican Republic         25,053       11.4%  
Cuba           13,801         6.3%  
Haiti           11,715         5.3%  
Philippines            9,615         4.3%  
All Others          72,075       32.7%  
Total         220,313       100%  
 
   
Upon naturalization of the petitioner, a pending 2A case is converted automatically into the 
"Immediate Relative" visa category, which is not subject to numerical limit and therefore 
has no visa waiting period. As a result, the amount of cases being processed in the 
"Immediate Relative" category may increase and partially offset new F2A filings. 
  
2B: Visa numbers for this class of adult sons and daughters will be approximately 26,250 during 
FY 2013. The waiting list far exceeds the annual limit. The top ten countries with the highest 2B 
waiting list totals are:  
 
        Family 2B   Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country Total    Waiting List  
Mexico        201,225       41.4%  
Dominican Republic         56,223       11.6%  
Philippines          50,099       10.3%  
Haiti           22,845         4.7%  
Cuba           15,715         3.2%  
China-mainland born         15,701         3.2%  
El Salvador          15,563         3.2%  
Vietnam            8,765         1.8%  
Jamaica            7,153         1.5%  
Guatemala            7,033         1.4%  
All Others          86,275       17.7%  
Total         486,597       100%    
  
As noted earlier, some of the 2B cases are applicants converted from the 2A class upon their 
turning 21.    
  
Family THIRD Preference:  
  
The annual visa limit is 23,400. Two oversubscribed countries (Mexico and Philippines) have 
sufficiently heavy demand in this preference to require a cut-off date substantially earlier than 
the worldwide date. The top ten countries with the highest F3 waiting list totals are:  
  
        Family Third   Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country    Total    Waiting List  
Mexico         183,113       22.0%  
  Philippines        151,491       18.2%  
Vietnam           72,227         8.7%  
India           65,134         7.8%  
China-mainland born         32,712         4.0%  
Cuba           22,606         2.7%  
Pakistan          16,752         2.0%  
Dominican Republic         16,016         1.9%  
Poland           14,728         1.8%  
Jamaica          14,564         1.8%  
All Others        241,563       29.1%  
Total         830,906       100%  
 
   Ibid., p.5.104
   Ibid., p.6.105
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The family fourth preference (Siblings over the age of 21 of U.S. citizens and their spouses and 
children) had the highest number of applicants on the waiting list (2,473,114).  
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 The family-based immigrant system is plagued by insufficient visa appropriations.  The            
argument is whether family-based immigration should be the focus of the U.S. immigration 
  
2B: Visa numbers for this class of adult sons and daughters will be approximately 26,250 during 
FY 2013. The waiting list far exceeds the annual limit. The top ten countries with the highest 2B 
waiting list totals are:  
 
        Family 2B   Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country Total    Waiting List  
Mexico        201,225       41.4%  
Dominican Republic         56,223       11.6%  
Philippines          50,099       10.3%  
Haiti           22,845         4.7%  
Cuba           15,715         3.2%  
China-mainland born         15,701         3.2%  
El Salvador          15,563         3.2%  
Vietnam            8,765         1.8%  
Jamaica            7,153         1.5%  
Guatemala            7,033         1.4%  
All Others          86,275       17.7%  
Total         486,597       100%    
  
As noted earlier, some of the 2B cases are applicants converted from the 2A class upon their 
turning 21.    
  
Family THIRD Preference:  
  
The annual visa limit is 23,400. Two oversubscribed countries (Mexico and Philippines) have 
sufficiently heavy demand in this preference to require a cut-off date substantially earlier than 
the worldwide date. The top ten countries with the highest F3 waiting list totals are:  
  
        Family Third   Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country    Total    Waiting List  
Mexico         183,113       22.0%  
  Philippines        151,491       18.2%  
Vietnam           72,227         8.7%  
India           65,134         7.8%  
China-mainland born         32,712         4.0%  
Cuba           22,606         2.7%  
Pakistan          16,752         2.0%  
Dominican Republic         16,016         1.9%  
Poland           14,728         1.8%  
Jamaica          14,564         1.8%  
All Others        241,563       29.1%  
Total         830,906       100%  
 
  
   
Family FOURTH Preference: 
  
Applicants registered in the Family FOURTH preference total 2,473,114. Annual visa issuances 
are limited to 65,000. The waiting period for the Family FOURTH preference is longer than any 
other category because the demand severely exceeds the number of available visas. The countries 
listed below have the largest number of FOURTH preference applicants: 
 
        Family Fourth  Percent of  
Preference   Category  
Country    Total    Waiting List  
Mexico        746,137       30.2%  
India         230,799         9.3%  
Philippines        188,521         7.6%  
Vietnam        174,841         7.1%  
China-mainland born       171,057         6.9%  
Bangladesh        150,747         6.1%  
Pakistan          91,286         3.7%  
Dominican Republic         50,397         2.0%  
Haiti           44,433         1.8%  
South Korea          36,361         1.5%  
All Others        588,535        23.8%  
Total      2,473,114       100%   
  
  
The steadily growing waiting period in this preference is now more than eleven years for 
countries of most favorable visa availability and even longer for some oversubscribed countries.  
  
   Ibid., p.6.106
   Ibid., p.7.107
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system.  These arguments, heavily debated with statistical analysis that paint different pictures, 
will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter on reform.   
 Immigrants are job-producers and contribute to the U.S. economy through their role in            
filling gaps in the workforce.  Many of these immigrants were granted visas through family-
based immigration.  As a “country of immigrants,” accepting on the basis of family will continue 
to be important.  However, the issues at hand must be addressed to curb illegal immigration, and 
to provide adequate visas in employment-based areas that help the United States significantly 
more than some family-based categories.  Nonetheless, there are aspects that must be maintained.  
Family-based immigration fosters an emotional and psychological bond for immigrants, who 
would otherwise feel isolated in a foreign country.  To an extent, accepting family members helps 
immigrants positively impact the United States and makes them want to stay.  Employment-
based immigration is as, if not more, complicated and contentiously debated.  Strong anti-
immigration sentiments have resurfaced amidst an economic recession where “American jobs” 
and the U.S. economy were important points of debate.  An investigation of current employment-
based immigration is essential to understand the balance between it and family-based 
immigration.  
!
!
 IV.  Employment-Based Immigration 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies numerical limits and preference            
categories for employment-based immigration.  The INA allocates 140,000 visas annually for 
legal permanent residents (LPRs) on the basis of employment.  In FY2010, 14.2 percent of the 
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total one million LPRs who were admitted were employment-based.    A provision in the INA 108
details that one country is permitted to account for seven percent of the worldwide level of U.S. 
immigrant admissions.  This provision limits specific countries from dominating immigration 
levels and promotes diversity in the United States immigration admission process.  Additionally, 
“the INA bars the admission of any alien who seeks to enter as a 2nd (advanced degree) or 3rd 
(professional and skilled) preference LPR to perform skilled or unskilled labor, unless it is 
determined that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and 
available; and (2) the employment of the alien will not adversely affect the wages and working 
conditions of similarly employed workers in the United States.”    To determine this, the 109
Foreign Labor Certification Program in the U.S. Department of Labor must be assured the wages 
and working conditions of U.S. workers will not be adversely affected.   
 The employment-based admission process of the immigration system is used to fill gaps            
in the U.S. workforce and to recruit the best and brightest in their fields to help the United States 
maintain its worldwide dominance in important sectors.  An increase in admission of immigrants 
based on employment receives arguments for and against.  The claim against an increase in 
employment-based immigration is that it could hurt economic conditions by providing jobs to 
immigrants over U.S. workers.  The opposition cites the high rate of unemployment and a lack of 
evidence of labor shortages as evidence that an increase in employment based LPRs would 
hinder the U.S. economy and workforce.  Those in favor of the increase in employment-based 
immigration visas argue eliminating the per-country caps in conjunction with the addition would 
   Ruth Ellen Wasem, Numerical Limits on Employment-Based Immigration: Analysis of the Per-Country 108
Ceilings, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), p.5.
   Ibid., p.4.109
!60
promote economic growth for the United States.  Eliminating the caps would increase the flow of 
high-skilled immigrants that could help the shortage of engineers or computer scientists.  For 
example, applicants from India and China with coveted skills in engineering or medicine who are 
currently in backlogs would move closer to the front of the line.   
!
A. LPR Employment-Based Visa Caps and Backlogs 
 Immigrants are admitted or adjusted to LPR status based on numerical limits and            
preference categories set forth in the INA.  The employment based-preference categories are as 
follows: 
• First preference: 40,040 for priority workers who are persons of extraordinary ability in the 
arts, sciences, education, business, or athletics; outstanding professors and researchers; and 
certain multinational executives and managers. 
• Second preference: 40,040 for members of the professions holding advanced degrees or 
persons of exceptional ability. 
• Third preference: 40,040 skilled workers with at least two years training, professionals with 
baccalaureate degrees, and unskilled workers in occupations in which U.S. workers are in 
short supply. 
• Fourth preference: 10,000 for special immigrants who largely consist of religious workers, 
certain former employees of the U.S. government, and undocumented juveniles who 
become wards of the court. 
!61
• Fifth preference: 10,000 for investors who invest at least $1 million (or less money in rural 
areas or areas of high unemployment) to create at least 10 new jobs.    110
!  
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There are two sides to the per-country visa cap debate: First, opposition to the current cap system 
argues the caps are arbitrary and that employability is not reflected through country of birth.  
Second, support asserts that per-country ceilings restrict a few high-demand countries from 
dominating the visa numbers, thereby maintaining diverse immigration inflows.  The attempt by 
the per-country ceilings to restrict China and India from flooding employment-based 
immigration is successful.  In the following table, China and India are the only two countries in 
Numerical Limits on Employment-Based Immigration 
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Background on Numerical Limits 
The INA provides for a permanent annual worldwide level of 675,000 LPRs, but this level is 
flexible and certain categories of LPRs are permitted to exceed the limits.3 The permanent 
worldwide immigrant level consists of the following components: family-sponsored immigrants, 
including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and family-sponsored preference immigrants 
(480,000 plus certain unused employment-based preference numbers from the prior year); 
employment-based preference immigrants (140,000 plus certain unused family preference 
numbers from the prior year); and diversity immigrants (55,000). Immediate relatives4 of U.S. 
citizens as well as refugees and asylees who are adjusting to LPR status are exempt from direct 
numerical limits.5 As a result, roughly 1 million LPRs are admitted or adjusted annually. 
The INA specifies that each year countries are held to a numerical limit of 7% of the worldwide 
level of U.S. immigrant admissions, known as per-country limits or country caps.6 The actual 
number of immigrants that may be approved from a given country, however, is not a simple 
percentage calculation, as certain types of LPRs (such as immediate relatives) are exempt from 
the country caps.  
Employment-Based Immigrants 
In accordance with the INA, employment-based preference visas (and family-sponsored visas) are 
issued to eligible immigrants in the order in which petitions have been filed under that specific 
preference category for that specific country. Spouses and children of prospective LPRs are 
entitled to th  same status, and the same order of c nsid ration as the person qualifying as the 
principal LPR, if accompanying or following to join the LPR (referred to as derivative status). 
When visa demand exceeds the per-country limit, visas are prorated according to the preference 
system allocations (detailed in Table 1) for the oversubscribed foreign state or dependent area. 
Table 1. Employment-Based Immigration Preference System 
Category Numerical limit 
Employment-Based Preference Immigrants Worldwide Level 140,000 
1st preference Priority workers: persons of extraordinary ability in the 
arts, science, education, business, or athletics; outstanding 
professors and researchers; and certain multinational 
executives and managers 
28.6% of worldwide limit (37,520) 
plus unused 4th and 5th preference 
2nd preference Members of the professions holding advanced degrees or 
persons of exceptional abilities in the sciences, art, or 
business 
28.6% of worldwide limit (37,520) 
plus unused 1st preference 
                                                 
3 §201 of INA; 8 U.S.C. §1151. 
4 “Immediate relatives” are defined by the INA to include the spouses and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens, 
and the parents of adult U.S. citizens. 
5 CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, by Andorra Bruno. 
6 Immigrants are aliens who are admitted as LPRs or who adjust to LPR status within the United States. 
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Category Numerical limit 
3rd preference—
professional & 
skilled
Skilled shortage workers with at least two years training 
o  experience; professionals with baccala r ate egrees 
28.6% of worldwide limit (37,520) 
plus unused 1st or 2nd pref rence 
3rd preference—
“other” 
Unskilled shortage workers 10,000 (taken from the total 
available for 3rd preference) 
4th preference “Special immigrants,” including ministers of religion, 
religious workers other than ministers, certain employees 
of the U.S. government abroad, and others 
7.1% of worldwide limit (9,940); 
religious workers limited to 5,000 
5th pr ference Employment creation investors who invest at least $1 
million (amount may vary in rural areas or areas of high 
unemployment) that will create at least 10 new jobs 
7.1% of worldwide limit (9,940); 
3,000 minimum reserved for 
investors in rural or high 
unemployment areas 
Source: CRS summary of §§203(a), 203(b), and 204 of INA; 8 U.S.C. §1153.  
Note: Employment-based allocations are further affected by §203(e) of the Nicaraguan and Central American 
Relief Act (NACARA), as amended by §1(e) of P.L. 105-139. This provision states that the employment 3rd 
preference “other worker” allocation is to be reduced by up to 5,000 annually for as long as necessary to offset 
adjustments under NACARA. 
The INA bars the admission of any alien who seeks to enter as a 2nd (advanced degree) or 3rd 
(professional and skilled) preference LPR to perform skilled or unskilled labor, unless it is 
determined that (1) there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and 
available; and (2) the employment of the alien will not adversely affect the wages and working 
conditions of similarly employed workers in the United States. The foreign labor certification 
program in the U.S. Department of Labor is responsible for ensuring that foreign workers do not 
displa e or adversely affect wages or working co itions of U.S. workers.7 
Per-Country Ceiling 
As previously mentioned, the INA establishes per-country levels, or country caps, at 7% of the 
worldwide level.8 For a dependent foreign state, the per-country ceiling is 2%.9 The per-country 
level is not a “quota” set aside for individual countries, as each country in the world could not 
receive 7% of the overall limit. As the State Department describes it, the per-country level “is not 
an entitlement but a barrier against monopolization.”  
In addition to being a worldwide ceiling of 7% per country, the 7% per-country ceiling applies 
within the family-based preference system and did apply within the employment-based 
preference system prior to FY2001. The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century 
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-313) enabled the per-country ceilings for employment-based immigrants to 
be surpassed for individual countries that are oversubscribed as long as visas are available within 
the worldwide limit for employment-based preferences. Now employment-based preference 
allocations may exceed the 7% per-country limit within the overall level of 140,000 annually.  
                                                 
7 For further discussion of labor certification, see CRS Report RL33977, Immigration of Foreign Workers: Labor 
Market Tests and Protections, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
8 §202(a)(2) of the INA; 8 U.S.C. §1151. 
9 The term “dependent area” includes any colony, component, or dependent area of a foreign state. Examples are the 
Azores and Madeira Islands of Portugal and Macau of the People’s Republic of China. 
   Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration of Foreign Nationals with Science, Technology, Engineering, and 110
Mathematics (STEM) Degrees, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p.13.
   Ibid., p.3.111
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the world where “advanced degrees/exceptional ability” are waiting to be admitted into the 
United States.  The wait isn’t short either.  Chinese and Indians within this category had already 
been in line for four years when the report was filed.     112
"    113
On November 1, 2010, there were 128,882 visas pending at the National Visa Center that were in 
the 1st through 3rd employment-based LPR preference categories.  Of that, 2,961 approved were 
in the first preference “extraordinary” category, 6,738 from the 2nd preference of advanced 
degrees, 16,788 for unskilled workers, and an overwhelming majority of 102,395 for 
professional and skilled workers.  !114
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authorizations in response to requests for Employment-based preference cases.”16 Visas in the 
employment-based categories were unavailable until the beginning of FY2008.  
Employment-Based Priority Dates for November 2011 
As of November 2011, the priority workers (i.e., extraordinary ability) visa category was current, 
as Table 3 presents. The advanced degree visa category was current worldwide, but those seeking 
advanced degree visas from China and India had a November 1, 2007, priority date. Visas for 
professional and skilled workers had a worldwide priority date of December 22, 2005, except for 
those workers from China and India who have priority dates of August 22, 2004, and July 22, 
2002, respectively. Worldwide unskilled workers with approved petitions as of November 15, 
2005, were being issued visas, but again workers from China and India have longer waits. 
Table 3. Priority Dates for Employment Preference Visas for November 2011 
Category Worldwide China India Mexico Philippines 
Priority workers current current current current current 
Advanced degrees/ 
exceptional ability 
current Nov. 1,  
2007 
Nov. 1,  
2007 
current current 
Skilled and professional Dec. 22,  
2005 
Aug. 22,  
2004 
July 22,  
2002 
Dec. 22,  
2005 
Dec. 22,  
2005 
Unskilled Nov. 15,  
2005 
April 22,  
2003 
June 15,  
2002 
Nov. 15, 
2005 
Nov. 15,  
2005 
Special immigrants current current current current current 
Investors current current current current current 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin for November 2011. 
Approved Visa Petitions Pending 
At the end of each fiscal year, the Department of State publishes a tabulation of approved visa 
petitions pending with the National Visa Center.17 These data do not constitute a backlog of 
p titions to b  pro ss d; ther, these data rep esent persons who have been approved for isas 
that are not yet available due to the numerical limits in the INA. As apparent from the visa 
retrogression discussion above, these data offer a potentially incomplete account of all 
prospective employment-based LPRs. While it is possible that USCIS may be holding on to some 
approved I-485 petitions, the National Visa Center caseload is the data that drive the priority dates 
published in the Visa Bulletin each month.18 
                                                 
16 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin, No. 108, http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/
bulletin/bulletin_3266.html. 
17 See the Department of State website: http://www.travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/ivstats/ivstats_4581.html.  
18 For further specifications of the data that DOS factors into the visa priority dates, see U.S. Department of State, Visa 
Office, Monthly Determination of Employment Preference Cut-Off Dates, October 5, 2011, http://www.travel.state.gov/
pdf/EmploymentDemandUsedForCutOffDates.pdf. 
   Ibid., p.6.112
   Ibid., p.8.113
   Ibid., p.9.114
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The sharp decline in approvals after 2007 is due to the visa retrogression that took place that 
year.  Additionally, the economic recession contributed to the smaller number of accepted 
petitions because there were fewer employers who petitioned due to less of a need for 
employment. 
!
B. Trends in Employment-Based LPR Admissions  
! Since FY1994, the number of employment-based LPRs has increased from 100,000 to 
over 148,343 in 2010.    The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 requires that 86 percent 116
of employment-based visas are allotted for the first three preference categories.  Most notably, 
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There were 130,619 approved petitions for employment-based LPR visas pending with the 
National Visa Center as of November 1, 2010.19 This figure of 130,619 reflects persons registered 
under each respective numerical limitation (i.e., the totals represent not only principal applicants 
or petition beneficiaries, but their spouses and children entitled to derivative status under the 
INA). Of those approved petitions, there were 128,882 that were in the 1st through 3rd 
employment-based LPR preference categories. 
The overwhelming number of approved employment-based LPR visas pending at the National 
Visa Center as of November 1, 2010, were those of 3rd preference professional and skilled 
workers—102,395—as shown in Figure 3. There were also 16,788 approved 3rd preference visas 
pending for unskilled workers. In terms of the 2nd preference—those with advanced degrees—
another 6,738 visas were pending. There were also 2,961 approved 1st preference “extraordinary” 
visas pending. 
Figure 3. Approved Employment-Based Visa Petitions Pending November 2010 by 
Date of Submission and by Preference Category 
 
Source: CRS analysis of data from the Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-sponsored and 
Employment-Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2010. 
Note: There were 128,882 total cases in the 1st through 3rd preference categories. *Some pre-date 2000. 
Most of the 3rd preference cases pending were approved several years ago. The 1st and 2nd 
preference approved cases pending are more recent. Figure 3 presents the 128,882 approved 
employment-based visa petitions pending as of November 1, 2010, by date of submission and by 
                                                 
19 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report of Immigrant Visa Applicants in the Family-Sponsored and Employment-
Based Preferences Registered at the National Visa Center as of November 1, 2010.  
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the United States has increased “extraordinary” LPRs by 49 percent and “advanced degree” 
LPRs by 73 percent.   !117
!    118
These increases help promote employment-based immigration to fill sectors the United States 
will need in the future.  The United States, as the world leader, wants to be at the forefront of the 
technological future of the world.  The acceptance of STEM immigrants is widely seen as an 
important step in the progress of filling gaps in the most important sectors of the U.S. workforce. 
!
!
!
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Admission Trends 
The number of employment-based LPRs notably increased in all five preference categories, from 
under 100,000 in FY1994 to over 250,000 in FY2005.10 Employment-based LPRs dipped to 
126,874 in 2009 and rose to 148,343 in FY2010. They comprised 14.2% of the 1.0 million LPRs 
in FY2010. As noted in Table 1 above, the INA allocates the bulk of the employment-based 
visas—almost 86%—to the 1st through 3rd preference categories.  
Figure 2 presents the trends from 1994 to 2010 for the 1st (extraordinary), 2nd (advanced degrees), 
and 3rd (professional, skilled, and unskilled) preferences. In the earlier years, many of the visas 
allocated to the 1st and 2nd preferences “rolled down” to the 3rd preference. Over this period, 
however, the “extraordi ary” LPRs have incre sed by 49% and the “advanced degree” LPRs hav  
increased by 73%. The admission of 3rd preference professional, skilled, and unskilled workers 
has dropped by 40% from FY1994 through FY2010. Now all three employment-based preference 
categories typically use their full 28.6% of the 140,000 level. 
Figure 2. Permanent Employment-Based Admissions for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Preferences, 
1994-2010 
 
Source: CRS analysis of data from the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics and the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. 
Notes: The 4th and 5th preferences are too small to depict. The 25,911 Chinese who adjusted under the 
Chinese Student Protection Act from 1994 to 1996 are not depicted even though they were counted under the 
“Skilled and Unskilled” category. The dip in 2003 and subsequent spike in 2004 are due in large part to 
                                                 
10 The Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649) substantially rewrote employment-based preference categories and 
raised the numerical limits. These amendments were fully implemented by 1994. 
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V.  STEM Immigrants 
 With technology booming, medicine constantly advancing, and infrastructure issues, the            
United States needs students in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) more 
than ever.  The United States must compete with other countries who have also intensified their 
recruitment for young minds and skills.  The United States remains the leading host country for 
international students, and there is a reinvigorated focus on creating additional immigration 
pathways for immigrants who specialize in STEM fields.  President Obama called on Congress 
in his 2013 State of the Union address to pass reform that could help fix problems with current 
STEM legislation: 
“Our journey is not complete until we find a better way to welcome the striving, hopeful 
immigrants who still see America as a land of opportunity; until bright young students and 
engineers are enlisted in our workforce rather than expelled from our country.”   119
Several political leaders have echoed President Obama’s call.  Congresswoman Suzan DelBene 
(D-WA), expressed her belief that STEM immigration needed to be reformed:  
“It's a broken system, I think everyone acknowledges that … I think it's very important to make 
sure our companies are competitive, globally competitive, to make sure they have the talent 
moving forward.”   120
The current immigration system outlined by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) 
allows 140,000 visas on the basis of employment (which includes the spouses and children in 
   Alex Wilhelm, “President Obama Calls for STEM Immigration Reform, Nudging Congress to Return to 119
the Issue.,” January 2013, The Next Web, http://thenextweb.com/us/2013/01/21/obama-calls-for-stem-
immigration-reform-prompting-congress-to-return-to-the-issue/#!xWCEG.
   Tracy Vedder, “Immigration reform: STEM visa program a 'broken system,’” February 2014, Sinclair 120
Interactive Media, http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Immigration-reform-STEM-visa-program-a-
broken-system-244171401.html.
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addition to the visa cap).  Several members of Congress believe a higher percentage of the 
allotted visas under employment-based immigration should be given to STEM immigrants.  
There are additional obstacles in STEM immigration that Congress must solve going forward in 
order to create an effective policy.     
!
A. Problems with the Universal STEM Definition 
 There is no strict definition on what constitutes a specific “STEM”  academic discipline.  
“The National Science Foundation (NSF) studies the fields broadly and includes biological, 
agricultural, and environmental life sciences; computer and information sciences; mathematics 
and statistics; the physical sciences; psychology; the social sciences; engineering; and health 
fields.”    The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Immigration and Customs 121
Enforcement (ICE) — the law enforcement agency in charge of identifying and dismantling 
vulnerabilities in the nation’s border and immigration infrastructure — has a much narrower 
definition.  ICE does not include economics, sociology, and political science.  To make matters 
more complicated, “the National Center for Education Statistics often uses the ICE definition.”    122
The inconsistency in defining what constitutes a STEM degree could have consequences when 
linking it to LPR status.  As a result of revisions in federal Standard Occupational Classification 
(SOC) for STEM occupations, employees were significantly reclassified.  Currently, five percent 
of all jobs in the U.S. labor force are considered STEM positions.    A broader definition, some 123
   Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration of Foreign Nationals with Science, Technology, Engineering, and 121
Mathematics (STEM) Degrees, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p.2.
   Ibid., p.2.122
   Ibid., p.25.123
!67
contend, would create increased manipulation and abuse.  However, proponents for an  
expansive definition argue that even a narrow definition would be subject to varied labor market 
conditions.  Engineering is used by Ruth Ellen Wasem in her report Immigration of Foreign 
Nationals with Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Degrees (2012) to 
demonstrate how a discipline can evolve and splinter:  
“Civil engineers had more specialized training as structural engineers, dam engineers, water- 
power engineers, bridge engineers; mechanical engineers as machine-design engineers, 
industrial engineers, motive-power engineers; electrical engineers as power and communication 
engineers (and the latter divided eventually into telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and 
radar engineers, whereas the power engineers divided into fossil-fuel and nuclear engineers); 
mining engineers as metallic-ore mining engineers and fossil-fuel mining engineers (the latter 
divided into coal and petroleum engineers) … Today, engineering also encompasses such 
professions as computer engineers designing micro-chips that use light pulses and biomedical 
engineers researching the structure of human cells to foster tissue growth.”     124
In order to fix confusion and create a clear definition of a STEM field, Wasem cites a 2011 
House hearing in which “one witness … recommended first clarifying the policy motivations for 
the immigration benefit and then assigning the task of enumerating eligible fields to an agency or 
inter-agency work-group.”    Therefore, it would be most effective to look at each sub-field 125
under the STEM categories — i.e. computer versus electrical engineering — and discern if it will 
be listed under the official definition of a STEM discipline. 
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B. Statuses Under STEM 
1. Temporary Foreign Students 
 The United States has a long tradition of welcoming foreign students to study at its 
institutions of higher education.  The Immigration Act of 1924, while it was discriminatory, did 
open the door to this policy.  Although these foreign students are nonimmigrants, their presence 
is generally viewed as positive.  These students are admitted in large part by the F-1 visa.  The 
F-1 visa is allocated to those who wish to have a full-time education in the United States.  F-1 
visa holders may bring their spouses and children with them using the F-2 visa; however, F-2 
visa holders are barred from working in the United States.  Students with F-1 visas also cannot 
work unless it is in practical training which relates to their degree program.  For example, if a 
student is in medical school, they may work at a local hospital to help with medical research.  In 
FY2010, there were 512,884 F-1 visa holders with an active status in the United States.    Of the 126
total F-1 visa holders, 148,923 (32.7%) were in science, engineering, and health fields.    127
Despite the increase in foreign students, the percentage of STEM graduate students to the total 
number of F-1 visa holders has remained almost the same.  In 1990, 91,150 foreign students 
were enrolled in STEM fields, which made up 31.1 percent of the total.     128
   Ibid., p.3.126
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129
According to the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS), 10,000 foreign students earned doctoral degrees in STEM fields in 2009 
and nearly 30,000 foreign students earned masters degrees.    Engineering is the leading field 130
for masters and doctoral recipients in 2010.  India had the greatest representation of STEM 
graduates in masters programs at 56% of all STEM students in 2009.    China had the second-131
highest representation, and their students were spread more evenly across all of the STEM 
disciplines.  China also had the highest number of students enrolled in doctoral programs at 35% 
Immigration of Foreign Nationals with STEM Degrees 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
10,000 foreign students earned doctoral degrees in STEM fields in 2009 and almost 30,000 
foreign students earned masters degrees in STEM fields in 2009.15 
Figure 1. Full-Time Graduate Students with Temporary Visas in Science, 
Engineering, and Health Fields, 1990-2010  
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Source: National Science Foundation/National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, NSF-NIH Survey of 
Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering. 
A snapsh t of degrees grant d o foreign students by broad categories in icates that engineering is 
leading field for both MA and Ph.D. recipients in 2010 (Figure 2). Computer science fields 
follow for MA degrees; while mathematics and physical sciences place second for Ph.D. degrees. 
Although based upon data from ICE, the STEM fields presented in Figure 2 use the broader NSF 
definition of STEM, which includes economics, sociology, psychology, and political science as 
well as agricultural and life sciences, computer sciences, mathematics, and the physical sciences. 
                                                 
15 To access the IPEDS data, go to http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ on the National Center for Education Statistics website. 
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in 2009.    More impressively is that China’s doctoral students made up almost half of all 132
foreign nationals in mathematics and physical sciences and almost one third of all foreign 
nationals in other STEM fields (excluding psychology and social sciences).     133
 F-1 visa holders have two options when they graduate from their degree program: an 
Optional Practical Training (OPT) program or a H-1B visa.  OPT programs are “temporary 
employment that is directly related to an F-1 student’s major area of study.”    U.S. Citizenship 134
and Immigration Service (USCIS) reports that in FY2010 92,465 F-1 visa holders were engaged 
in OPT.    Ten thousand and twenty-two of the 92,465 F-1 students (10.8%) obtained the 17-135
month extension as graduates of STEM disciplines.  These programs run up to 12 months for F-1 
foreign students, but those in STEM fields employed by an employer who is enrolled in E-Verify 
— a controversial employment verification program that requires employers to confirm a 
potential employee is lawfully in the United States and permitted to work — may stay in the 
program for up to 29 months. 
 The other option for F-1 visa holders is to adjust to H-1B visa status.  This visa is not 
limited to F-1 visa holders, as many other immigrants under “nonimmigrant” status adjust from 
another status or directly immigrate to H-1B.  A nonimmigrant can stay a maximum of six years 
on an H-1B visa.  Sixty-five thousand nonimmigrants may be under the H-1B status annually.    136
While the H-1B visa does not consist solely of STEM professionals, they make up the majority 
   Ibid., p.5.132
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of visas allotted for the status.  Any employer wishing to hire an H-1B nonimmigrant must fill 
out the labor attestation form, promising to “pay the nonimmigrant the greater of the actual 
wages paid to other employees in the same job or the prevailing wages for that occupation; that 
the firm will provide working conditions for the nonimmigrants that do not cause the working 
conditions of other employees to be adversely affected; and that there is no applicable strike or 
lockout.”     137
 There were 218,500 H-1B petitions approved in FY2011.  Although the numerical cap is 
65,000, several exceptions to the limit allow for the number to exceed the cap by a large amount 
of petitions.  For example, H-1B nonimmigrants who work in universities are not counted against 
the cap.  Similarly, 20,000 nonimmigrants holding a master’s or higher degree are exempt from 
the H-1B cap due to a provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 
108-447).    From 1992 to 2011, more H-1B workers were approved outside the numerical cap 138
than under it. 
   Ibid., p.9.137
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In FY2010, the vast majority of H-1B workers were employed in STEM occupations.  !
!    140
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employer must attest that the firm will pay the nonimmigrant the greater of the actual wages paid 
to other employees in the same job or the prevailing wages for that occupation; that the firm will 
provide working conditions for the nonimmigrant that do not cause the working conditions of the 
other employees to be adversely affected; and that there is no applicable strike or lockout. The 
firm must provide a copy of the labor attestation to representatives of the bargaining unit or—if 
there is no bargaining representative—must post the labor attestation in conspicuous locations at 
the work site.20 
Figure 4. Total H-1B Petitions Approved, FY1992-FY2011 
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Source: CRS presentation of data from the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) and its predecessor in 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
Notes: Congress increased the H-1B cap to 115,000 for FY1999-FY2000 and to 195,000 for FY2001-FY2003. 
In FY2011, there were 218,500 H-1B professional specialty worker petitions approved, down 
from a high of 288,000 in FY2004. Although the law sets a numerical limit of 65,000 H-1B 
workers each year, only initial grants are counted under the cap. As noted above, there are several 
categorical exceptions to the cap, most notably all H-1B nonimmigrants who work for 
universities and nonprofit research facilities. A provision in P.L. 108-447 also exempts up to 
20,000 aliens holding a master’s or higher degree from the numerical limit on H-1B visas. As 
Figure 4 displays, over the past decade more H-1B workers were approved outside of the 
numerical cap of 65,000 than under the cap. Not all H-1B workers with approved petitions 
actually use the visa. 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649). See CRS Report RL30498, Immigration: Legislative Issues on Nonimmigrant 
Professional Specialty (H-1B) Workers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
20 INA §212(n); 8 C.F.R. §214.2(h)(4). For a further discussion of labor attestations, see CRS Report RL30498, 
Immigration: Legislative Issues on Nonimmigrant Professional Specialty (H-1B) Workers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem. 
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Over the years, a noteworthy portion of H-1B beneficiaries have worked in STEM occupations. 
In FY2010, the most recent year for which detailed data on H-1B beneficiaries (i.e., workers 
renewing their visas as well newly arriving workers) are available, almost 91,000 H-1B workers 
were employed in computer-related occupations, and they made up 47% of all H-1B beneficiaries 
that year, as Figure 5 indicates. Architectural and engineering occupations as well as occupations 
in education were tied at a distant second with 10% each. Administrative occupations followed 
with 9%, and health and medicine occupations were 8% of the 192,990 H-1B beneficiaries. The 
total number of H-1B beneficiaries reported for FY2010 (192,990) and shown in Figure 5 was 
less than the number of approved H-1B petitions approved that year, as depicted in Figure 4.21 
Figure 5. Occupations of H-1B Worker Be eficiaries in FY201  
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Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
Note: H-1B beneficiaries include workers renewing their visas as well as newly arriving workers.  
In terms of the broad trade group categories in which the H-1B beneficiaries were employed in 
FY2010, the leading trade group was computer systems design, which employed about a third 
(34%) of the H-1B workers (Figure 6). Colleges and universities employed 10% of the H-1B 
beneficiaries. Similar numbers of H-1B beneficiaries were employed in the following 
trade/industry sectors: management and scientific consulting; architecture and engineering; 
hospitals; and, securities, commodities, and brokerages. Each of these groups have hired about 
3% of the H-1B beneficiaries. Figure 6 shows that a noteworthy portion of the H-1B 
                                                 
21 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers, Fiscal Year 
2010 Annual Report, Department of Homeland Security, August 4, 2011. 
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2. LPR-Adjusted STEM Degree Workers 
 Foreign nationals with STEM degrees may qualify under many of the employment-based 
preference categories detailed in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.  Their assignment 
to a specific preference is dependent on their talents, educational degree status, expertise in the 
specific area, and experience.  An employer who wishes to hire an employment-based immigrant 
through the second or third preference categories (detailed on page 61) must petition the 
Department of Labor (DOL) on behalf of the immigrant.  If the DOL approves the petition due to 
a labor shortage in the occupational area, certification will be granted.  In total, foreign nationals 
employed in STEM fields constituted 44% of the total employment-based LPRs in the first, 
second, and third preference categories from FY2000 to FY2009.   141
 A major issue involving employment-based immigration, as well as the United States 
immigration system as a whole, is the wait times for approved applications.  The I-485 
application, or the “Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status,” is the way in 
which aliens can petition to become an employment-based LPR within the United States.  This 
means that in the I-485 inventory of data, those who would be new arrivals from abroad would 
not be included.  For example, an F-1 visa holder may fill out the I-485 form to become an LPR.  
This person has attended a college or university in the United States, rather than a new arrival 
with no experience in the United States education system or workforce.  Therefore, the fact that 
there is a large volume of approved I-485 candidates in STEM fields pending is a critical issue.     
   Ibid., p.14.141
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As demonstrated in the figure above, STEM graduates applying for LPR status will wait even if 
they are of extraordinary ability.  However, the number of visas pending is underestimated in the 
figure above.  The graph illustrates how many applications there were as of January 2012; 
however, according to Ruth Ellen Wasem, since “there are no third preference I-485 applications 
filed after August 2007 in the I-485 Inventory, [it] suggests that USCIS has not been approving 
many since the 2007 visa retrogression pushed back the visa priority dates.”    Therefore, the 143
chart does not depict the applications filed since August 2007, drastically under representing the 
total number pending.     
 In 2011, Stuart Anderson of the National Foundation for American Policy released a 
study entitled Keeping Talent in America.  The study investigated prospective LPRs who had 
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Employment-Based I-485 Applications Pending 
The volume of employment-based immigration cases pending is an important factor in the STEM 
debate. The USCIS maintains a system of approved employment-based I-485 applications (i.e., 
the Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status) that are pending, which 
provides another source of data on the number of approved employment-based LPRs. Known as 
the I-485 Inventory, these data are available by preference category and by top countries. These I-
485 data include the employment-based applicants who plan to adjust their immigration status 
within the United States. The prospective employment-based LPRs who would be new arrivals 
from abroad are not included in the I-485 inventory, because they would not need to file I-485 
petitions.  
Figure 8. Employment-Based I-485 Applications Pending January 2012 
by Preference and Top Countries 
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Source: USCIS I-485 Inventory of pending cases, as of January 5, 2012. 
Note: There were 140,245 cases; however, no “Professional and Skilled” (3rd) preference applications filed after 
August 2007 are included in the I-485 Inventory thus far.  
As Figure 8 shows, STEM graduates seeking LPR status are likely to wait in line to obtain LPR 
status, but those who meet the criteria of the extraordinary ability or advanced degrees preference 
categories have a much shorter wait. That there are no third preference I-485 applications filed 
after August 2007 in the I-485 Inventory suggests that USCIS has not been approving many since 
the 2007 visa retrogression pushed back the visa priority dates. These data likely understate the 
number of cases pending.32 
                                                 
32 A substantial visa retrogression occurred in July 2007. The Visa Bulletin for July 2007 listed the visa priority dates as 
“current” for the employment-based preferences (except for the unskilled other worker category). On July 2, 2007, 
however, the State Department issued an Update to July Visa Availability that retrogressed the dates to “unavailable.” 
(continued...) 
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been approved to immigrate but were caught in backlogs due to numerically limited visas.  
Anderson concluded that a professional worker from India who applied for third preference visa 
status under the employment-based provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
would have to wait approximately 70 years to obtain LPR status.    The following figure 144
demonstrates how prospective LPRs have been waiting for a long time and will continue to wait.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
            145
Anderson’s study purports that if 50,000 visas were exempt for advanced STEM degrees, the 
second-preference category could be made current in two years and the third-preference category 
could be made current in ten years.  The allocation of the separate visas for advanced STEM 
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Figure 9 presents the NFAP estimates for the upper end (i.e., maximum number of years) that 
prospective LPRs have been waiting and might continue to wait for an LPR visa according to 
when they filed their petitions.  
Figure 9. Projected Wait Times for Third Preference LPRs 
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Source: Waiting and More Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-based Immigration System, Table 2, National 
Foundation for American Policy (NFAP), October, 2011. 
Notes: Bars depict the upper end (i.e., maximum number of years) of the NFAP estimates. 
The NFAP study of the pending caseload also estimated that a professional worker from China 
who applies for a third preference visa would wait approximately 24 years to obtain LPR status.47 
As Figure 9 shows, the NFAP projected further that countries other than India and China would 
have wait times for a third preference of four to six years. Anderson concluded “America would 
lose uch talent as U.S.-based businesses would need to hire or place such skilled individuals 
abroad, rather than invest in a green card process likely to last decades.”48 
The NFAP study indicates that foreign nationals holding advanced degrees (second preference) 
face far shorter wait times. Only India and China are mentioned as having a noteworthy number 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
worker preference queue. That estimate yielded a total of 210,000 Indians in the third preference caseload. Stuart 
Anderson, Waiting and More Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-based Immigration System, National 
Foundation for American Policy, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2011. (Hereinafter Anderson, Waiting and More 
Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-based Immigration System, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2011.) 
47 The study assumed that 55,000 Chinese were already in the third preference caseload. Anderson, Waiting and More 
Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-based Immigration System, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2011. 
48 Anderson, Waiting and More Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-based Immigration System, NFAP Policy 
Brief, October 2011. 
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degrees, in Anderson’s estimation, would increase the overall efficiency of the employment-
based part of the immigration system while allowing immigrants with important skills in STEM 
fields to be admitted faster.  
!
C. Statistics on the Positive Effects of STEM Graduates 
 An important factor for the United States is its ability to foster an environment in which 
foreign STEM graduates want to stay to work in the United States for several years.  Michael G. 
Finn, a researcher for the National Science Foundation (NSF), has investigated the amount of 
years foreign nationals with doctorates have stayed.  In 2009, his latest report detailed that the 
“stay rate” for foreign doctorate recipients who graduated five years earlier was only 64 percent 
and 66 percent for those who graduated ten years earlier.     146
 There is a growing concern by many business, academic, and policy leaders that the 
United States will have STEM workforce shortages in the near future.  If a shortage occurred, the  
global economic competitiveness of the United States would decrease.  According to Wasem, 
“Some analysts warn that without retaining more STEM graduates, the United States would 
suffer a loss of entrepreneurship, would decline in the knowledge economy, and would lose its 
premier place in the world of innovation.”    In 2006, 25.6 percent of international patents in the 147
United States were created by foreign-born residents.    Similarly, in the U.S. Patent and 148
Trademark Office’s public online database, of the 1,466 patents from the top ten patent-
producing universities in 2011 (the University of California system, Stanford University, 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Wisconsin, the University of Texas system, 
California Institute of Technology, the University of Illinois system, University of Michigan, 
Cornell University and Georgia Institute of Technology), 76 percent of the patents had a foreign-
born inventor.    Additionally, 54 percent of these patents were awarded to the group of foreign 149
inventors most likely to face visa hurdles in the current U.S. immigration system: students, 
postdoctoral fellows, or staff researchers.    The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office also records 150
extraordinary roles played by foreign-born inventors in the fields of semiconductor device 
manufacturing (87 percent), information technology (84 percent), pulse or digital 
communications (83 percent), pharmaceutical drugs or drug compounds (79 percent), and optics 
(77 percent).    “‘The simple fact is that foreign-born STEM graduates of U.S. universities are 151
job creators,’ said Nick Schulz of the American Enterprise Institute. ‘Every graduate with an 
advanced degree working in a STEM-related field in the United States has been shown to create 
on average 2.62 additional jobs for native-born workers. Sending those people away doesn’t 
protect American jobs, it jeopardizes them.’”    Another argument is that foreign-born residents 152
educated in U.S. universities and institutions contribute to retaining companies in the United 
States.  As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Tom Donohue said, “companies have a 
simple choice: If we can't get them here and they go somewhere else, we send the work to where 
   “Immigrants Behind 76% of Patents from Top American Universities,” June 2012, MikeBloomberg.com, 149
http://www.mikebloomberg.com/index.cfm?objectid=C2A5A8A8-C29C-7CA2-FB8F424CDC92F580.
   Ibid., p.1.150
   Ibid., p.1.151
   Ibid., p.1.152
!78
they are.”    Similarly, advocates for reformed STEM visa legislation argue that the United 153
States should make it easier for foreign-born STEM graduates educated by United States 
universities to attain LPR status, rather than inducing an outflow of the brightest minds to 
competing countries.  However, “the chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary warned 
that establishment of STEM visas would create an incentive for some schools to recruit tuition-
paying foreign students with the lure of LPR status upon graduation and cited reports from 
Australia, where some institutions of higher education were deemed to be ‘selling education for 
visas.’”    Furthermore, incentives of STEM visas could create displacement of American 154
students or lead to an over-production of advanced STEM degrees.  These concerns, however, 
can be closely monitored to avoid such a system.  One possible solution would be to limit “the 
eligible institutions to those requiring residency at the institution or receiving funding from NSF 
or the National Institutes of Health.”    This task would be up to Congress and immigration and 155
education experts to define in a way that promoted a strong and balanced U.S. economy and 
labor force.   
!
D. Legislation Proposed in Congress   
 The issue over how to create an effective STEM visa program has gained traction in 
recent Congresses.  The 112th Congress introduced various bills with regards to STEM visas 
(H.R. 399, H.R. 2161, H.R. 3146, H.R. 5893, H.R. 6412, S. 1965, S. 1986, S. 3185, S. 3192, and 
   Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration of Foreign Nationals with Science, Technology, Engineering, and 153
Mathematics (STEM) Degrees, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p.24.
   Ibid., p.26.154
   Ibid., p.27.155
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S. 3217), in hopes that changes could help the U.S. economy and workforce.  The 113th 
Congress has continued the push for improving STEM provisions by introducing H.R. 459 and 
S. 303.  While neither bill has made it past the floor of their respective house, both express 
Congress’s desire to make STEM degree holders LPRs in a more efficient manner.  It is clear that 
any reform to STEM programs should have its own separate bill from general immigration.  The 
complexity and importance of attracting and retaining those with high degrees that can contribute 
in the most important areas of the U.S. economy cannot be understated: Congress must pass 
effective reform that addresses serious issues and promotes economic growth.   
!
!
VI.  Low-Skilled Workers 
 The high percentage of illegal immigrants that work in low-skilled sectors drives the            
immigration debate for many Americans.  There is a perception that Mexicans have illegally 
immigrated in extraordinary numbers and negatively affected the United States.  Low-skilled 
immigrants fill gaps in many industries, mainly agriculture.  Many U.S. employers in several 
industries argue there is a shortage of U.S. workers willing to work in low-skilled areas; and 
therefore, they need to hire foreign workers to fill gaps.  Opposition to this theory contend that 
U.S. workers can and should fill these positions.  In the current immigration system, lower-
skilled foreign workers may be admitted to the United States temporarily under the two 
temporary worker visas: the H-2A visa (for agricultural workers) and the H-2B visa (for 
nonagricultural workers).  The H-2A and H-2B programs, also known as guest worker programs, 
involve multiple agencies including the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of 
!80
Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of State.  Both programs are monitored by U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the DOL’s Employment and Training 
Administration.  Both programs attempt to respond to employer needs for labor while providing 
sufficient protections for both U.S. workers and the foreign temporary workers.  
!
A. Guest Worker Programs 
 The first step, the DOL labor certification application, is completed by employers who            
ensure the department that U.S. workers are not available for the jobs in question and that foreign 
workers hired would not negatively affect U.S. workers.  The certification process has yielded 
inadequate responses for employers and concerns over worker protection.  The H-2A program 
and foreign agricultural workers in general have attracted the attention of Congress due to these 
concerns.  Future reform proposals will most likely include provisions that solve a labor market-
tested availability of U.S. workers for positions and wages, while lessening the burden on 
employers willing to hire immigrants in the guest worker programs. 
 The assertion by U.S. employers that they need to hire foreign workers to perform low-           
skilled jobs is uncertain.  With the recent economic collapse in 2008 and high U.S. 
unemployment, opposition to admitting foreign-born workers was high.  Nonetheless, various 
factors make it extremely difficult to define the existence of a labor shortage industry and 
occupation.  Labor shortages in seasonal agriculture has regained significant attention due to the 
drastic increase in illegal immigration since 1990.  However, even if there is a labor shortage, it 
does not answer all the questions surrounding the issue.  Andorra Bruno, in his 2012 report 
Immigration of Temporary Lower-Skilled Workers: Current Policy and Related Issues, asks the 
!81
following questions to demonstrate the complexity in formulating an adequate guest worker 
program:  
“Would more U.S. workers be willing to become farm workers if wages were raised and the terms 
of work were changed?  If so, would such wage and other changes make the U.S. agricultural 
industry uncompetitive in the world marketplace?  Alternatively, would there be an adequate 
supply of authorized U.S. farm workers if new technologies were developed and 
implemented?”     156
As detailed in Chapter II of this thesis (“The History of U.S. Immigration”), guest worker 
programs have been used to address U.S. workforce shortages in the past.  Tens of thousands of 
Mexicans worked in agriculture during World War I and the United States created the Bracero 
program during World War II which imported millions of Mexican agricultural workers until it 
was dissolved in 1964.  H-2A and H-2B are significantly less in size than previous programs like 
the Bracero Program; however, they have a significant impact on the United States.  Whether one 
is favor of expansion or no expansion of the guest worker programs, there is an overwhelming 
majority of lawmakers and policy experts who believe that significant reforms, if not a complete 
overhaul, is necessary.   
!
B. Unauthorized Employment 
 The key issue with guest worker programs is that they do not adequately prevent            
unauthorized aliens from circumventing the system, working in low-skilled industries, and 
remaining in the United States to work.  In March 2010, the Pew Hispanic Research Center 
   Andorra Bruno, Immigration of Temporary Lower-Skilled Workers: Current Policy and Related Issues, 156
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), p.1.
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reported that there were eight million unauthorized workers in the United States civilian labor 
force (5.2% of the total labor force).    To prevent this number from increasing, and hopefully 157
cause a decline, Congress implemented systems that verify employment eligibility of workers.  
All U.S. employers must verify the identity and work authorization of new hires; and can choose, 
but are not required, to participate in the E-Verify electronic verification system administered by 
the USCIS.  Recent reform proposals, which will be discussed in the following chapter, detail a 
requirement for all employers to follow such a system.  The hope is that a verification system 
will demonstrate the areas where there are true labor shortages.   
 The H-2B program is not viewed as administratively or economically inefficient and            
ineffective as the H-2A program.  Recent criticism by employers and reform efforts have instead 
focused on expanding the visa limit of 66,000 and to create the ability for employers to hire 
workers to meet temporary labor needs that are ongoing in the industry.  Much like the H-2A visa 
program, concerns over protections have led to reform proposals detailing increased federal labor 
law enforcement, recruitment of U.S. workers, wage fairness, and labor recruiter accountability.  
Providing evidence of labor shortages is a primary goal before reforms can be made to the H-2A 
and H-2B programs. 
 As previously stated, the current guest worker programs have a reputation of being slow            
and ineffective in protecting U.S. workers.  While policymakers wish to fill labor shortages with 
U.S. citizens first, the method of attaining this goal is widely debated.  The DOL complains that 
the labor certification process is overly complicated, time-consuming, and is far too expensive 
for employers.  Similarly, the DOL has expressed concerns that employers do not demonstrate 
   Jeffrey S. Passel, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, (Washington, !157
D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010), p.1. 
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the performance of labor market tests in accordance with regulations that proves U.S. workers 
are protected. 
!
!!
 VII.  Illegal Immigration and Federal Enforcement 
 For over two decades, the U.S. government has attempted to solve the growing illegal          
immigration problem through enhanced border enforcement.  No matter what the legislation 
passed, there have been unintended consequences.  The U.S. immigration system has allowed 
high numbers of unauthorized immigration, as it neglects to balance the pull of valuable U.S. 
jobs with circularity.  Circularity refers to the consistent inflow and outflow of immigrants.  For 
example, the Bracero program created a continuous and efficient circularity by providing jobs for 
a period of time to agricultural workers and then allowing them to return home once the season 
was over.  The pinnacle of the waste in immigration spending is the misguided, inefficient, and 
ineffective border enforcement Congress has continued to increase in funding.   
!
A. Federal Law Enforcement of Immigration 
 Since 1990, the number of undocumented immigrants has increased from 3.5 million to            
11.7 million in 2012.     158
   “Key Data Points from Pew Research,” September 2013, Pew Research Center, ! !158
www.pewresearch.org/, p.1.
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“Furthermore, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that between 25% and 40% of all unauthorized 
immigrants do not sneak across the border, but come to the United States on valid visas and then 
stay after their visas expire, meaning that border enforcement is irrelevant to a large portion of 
unauthorized population.”    Despite this ineffectiveness, the annual budget of the U.S. Border 160
   Ibid., p.1.159
   Breaking Down the Problems: What's Wrong with Our Immigration System? (Washington, D.C.: !160
Immigration Policy Center, 2009), p.12.
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Patrol has skyrocketed from $326.2 million in FY1992 to an astounding $2.7 billion in 
FY2009.    This increase is a surge of 714%.  161
!  
                          162
Similarly, since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the budget 
of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) — the law enforcement agency in charge of 
regulating trade, customs, and immigration policies across borders — has increased 92% ($6.0 
billion in FY2003 to $11.3 billion in FY2009).    Furthermore, the budget of U.S. Immigration 163
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the DHS program that enforces the interior of the United 
States, rose from $3.3 billion in FY2003 to $5.9 billion in FY2009.     164
!"#$%&'()'*+,+'-.%/&%'-01%.2'-$/#&13'!4'566787996
!"#$
!#%&
!'('
!()*##
!()("%
!()#$#
!$)((#
!$)%#%
!+$% !+%+ !"**
!&''
!,('
!()"(% !()"*,
!$)$"#!$)$'&
!()#(#
!*
!#**
!()***
!()#**
!$)***
!$)#**
!+)***
(,,$ (,,+ (,," (,,# (,,% (,,' (,,& (,,, $*** $**( $**$ $**+ $**" $**# $**% $**' $**& $**,
:
"22
".
;<
!"<=02'4&0%
-./.012345306783290:574;<73853=)0>??@A502?06<B9@A0C??7@3=)0/5D85EB530$#)0$**,. 

!"#$%&'>)'*+,+'-.%/&%'?01%.2'@#&;1<',101".;&/'@2.;#',.$1AB&<1'-.%/&%3'!4'
566787996
+)### +)'"'
")+&&
%)+(#
')'*%
,)&"* ,)#*% ,)&,(
&)#&*
+)"""
(()*+$
(#)""$
(')"(#
(+)$,'
,)$+,
,)("'
')+#'
#)+++
*
$)***
")***
%)***
&)***
(*)***
($)***
(")***
(%)***
(&)***
$*)***
(,,$ (,,+ (,," (,,# (,,% (,,' (,,& (,,, $*** $**( $**$ $**+ $**" $**# $**% $**' $**& $**,
!"<=02'4&0%
-./.012345306783290:574;<73853=)0>??@A502?06<B9@A0C??7@3=)0/5D85EB530$#)0$**,. 
!"#$% &'% $(%)&"*#*+,-! "#.//01 &'%2345%&*+67!7839&*:9)#4;*(4%(<(*&%$&"*# =8;<>1 &'%
?)(%#&)5%#$@*+&'%;*(4%(<)&(*AB"&'"#,-!1')9"#$(%)9%42@C.?%($%#&D+(*:EF7/2"AA"*#"#GH
.//0&*EII702"AA"*# "#GH.//C7J'%2345%&*+67!7 K::"5()&"*#)#4839&*:9L#+*($%:%#& =K8L>1
&'%,-!"#&%("*(%#+*($%:%#&$*3#&%(?)(&&*8;<1')9"#$(%)9%42@M.?%($%#&D+(*:E0702"AA"*#"#
GH.//0&*EN7C2"AA"*#"#GH.//COG"53(%NP7.I,%9?"&%)AA&'"9)44"&"*#)A9?%#4"#51&'%#3:2%(*+
"::"5()#&9 %#&%("#5 &'% 6#"&%4 !&)&%9 B"&'*3& )3&'*("Q)&"*# ')9 #*& 4%$(%)9%4 )9 ) (%93A& *+
)44"&"*#)A%#+*($%:%#&7
!"#$%&'C)'D-?'E'FDG'-$/#&1<3'!4'799(87996
H55+7I
H59+6>
H6+(5
HI+IC
HI+55
HJ+(>HJ+99 HC+6(
HC+JK
HC+9C
H(+JI
H(+5(
H(+KI
H>+I9
!*
!$
!"
!%
!&
!(*
!($
799( 799> 799C 799J 799I 799K 7996
-"
22"
.;
<'
!"<=02'4&0%
/2<3A5F0-./.0G5D738E5H802?0:2E597H40/5A<3@8I)0!"#$%&'()'!*(%+ 0?230J@=A790K573=0$**#08L32<ML0$*(*.
N16 ONP


0 I0
   Ibid., p.12.161
   Ibid., p.13.162
   Ibid., p.13.163
   Ibid., p.13.164
!86
!    165
Additionally, Congress has authorized the augmentation of border enforcement in terms of 
Border Patrol agents.  In FY1992, there were 3,555 agents stationed along the southwest border, 
but by FY2009, there were 17,415.     166
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Furthermore, as technology has advanced, so has the ways in which the United States has 
protected its borders.  Better fences, cameras, and sensors along with unmanned aircrafts have 
been implemented in what many opponents call a “militarization” of the border.  Despite this 
“militarization” and increased border patrol efforts, illegal immigration has only increased.   
 In 1993 and 1994, CBP initiated two efforts to stop illegal immigration.  The result was a            
more dangerous border than ever with reduced circularity of immigration.  Operation Blockade, 
the militarization of the El Paso Sector, and Operation Gatekeeper, the militarization of the San 
Diego sector, have caused immigrants to be cut off from traditional entry points and funneled 
into dangerous desert land in Arizona.  “According to the Government Accountability Office, 
between 1995 and 2005 the number of border deaths had more than doubled due to new entry 
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points causing an increase in heat exhaustion, exposure, suffocation, or drowning.”    With 168
enhanced border enforcement initiatives causing illegal migration to be more difficult and 
dangerous, migrants were trapped in the United States.  The average stay of an unauthorized 
immigrant tripled from three years in the 1980s to nine years in 1990.    These illegal 169
immigrants preferred to risk being deported rather than return home and find themselves unable 
to return to the United States.  
!
B. Employer abuse of Illegal Immigrants 
  The dangers of being an illegal immigrant do not stop with crossing the border.  Many            
employers hire unauthorized workers in order to maximize profits, resulting in lower-than native-
born wages.  The illegality of the immigrants makes them susceptible to abuse by employers, and 
simultaneously negatively affects employers who follow immigration laws and do not hire illegal 
immigrants.  On-the-job death rates for Latino workers are much higher than that of native-born 
workers.  Unable to assert rights or join unions, they cannot fight for themselves and therefore 
are subject to dangerous conditions.  The lack of rights protections is coupled with the fact that 
immigrants tend to work in risky industries such as construction and agriculture where sufficient 
safety equipment may not be provided.  Nine hundred and ninety Latinos died on-the-job in 
2006.    In 2008, Mexican-born workers accounted for 42 percent of fatal injuries while 170
working.   171
   Ibid., p.14.168
   Ibid., p.15.169
   Ibid., p.9.170
   Ibid., p.9.171
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 Even with these statistics detailing an incomplete, misguided, and inefficient border            
enforcement strategy that causes illegal immigration, dangerous conditions for illegal 
immigrants, and problems for native-born workers, Congress has failed to produce legislation 
that will combat and solve these issues.  The “pulls” by the United States have remained, and it is 
clear that border enforcement does not deter, but in fact worsens the illegal immigration problem 
for the United States.   
!
!
VIII. Refugee Admissions  
 The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) to            
define a “refugee” as “any person who is outside of any country of such person's nationality ... 
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”    The annual number of refugees permitted to enter the United States is split into 172
specific regions; and the President, with advice from Congress, sets the caps that begin at the 
start of each fiscal year.  In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the worldwide ceiling was 76,000.    Ninety-173
six percent of the worldwide limit is given to the five major regions, while the remaining four 
percent is assigned for reserve in case of a situation causing an excess in any region.  For 
   The Refugee Act (Pub. L. 96-212) 1980, § 101(a)(42)172
   Andorra Bruno, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 173
Research Service, 2012), p.4.
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FY2012, the regional caps were: Africa (12,000), East Asia (18,000), Europe and Central Asia 
(2,000), Latin America/Caribbean (5,500), and Near East/South Asia (35,500).     174
             
A. Statistics on Refugees  
 Refugee admissions are an important part of the U.S. immigration system.  From FY2001            
to FY2011, over 500,000 refugees were granted asylum in the United States under the U.S. 
refugee policy.  However, the U.S. refugee program has changed during this time period.  After 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the number of refugees admitted in FY2002 showed 
a sharp drop.  This was the result of a suspension of the program, and the eventual heightened 
security procedures by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (absorbed by the Department 
of Homeland Security).  From FY2001 to FY2002, the number of refugees granted asylum 
dropped from 69,304 to 27,131.    FY2003 did not show much of an increase, as only 28,404 175
refugees were accepted.    The following table demonstrates the drop in refugees admitted and 176
the eventual increase from FY2003 to FY2004.  
!
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               177
Refugee admissions again dropped dramatically from FY2010 to FY2011 due to enhanced 
security requirements.  According to the Congressional Research Service, “Admission total[s] 
will be lower ... due largely to the introduction of additional security checks during the year, 
Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy 
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Appendix. Refugee Admissions by Region, 
FY1987-FY2011 
FY Africa 
East  
Asia 
Eastern  
Europe 
Former  
Soviet  
Union 
Latin  
America/  
Caribbean 
Near East/  
South Asia Total 
1987 1,990 40,099 8,396 3,699 323 10,021 64,528 
1988 1,593 35,371 7,510 20,411 3,230a 8,368 76,483 
1989 1,902 45,722 8,752 39,602 4,116a 6,976a 107,070 
1990 3,453 51,604a 6,094 50,628 5,308a 4,979 122,066 
1991 4,420 53,522 6,837 39,226 4,042a 5,342 113,389 
1992 5,470 51,899 2,915 61,397 3,947a 6,903 132,531 
1993 6,967 49,817 2,582 48,773 4,322a 6,987 119,448 
1994 5,860 43,564 7,707 43,854 6,156 5,840 112,981 
1995 4,827 36,987 10,070 35,951 7,629 4,510 99,974 
1996 7,604 19,321 12,145 29,816 3,550 3,967 76,403 
1997 6,065 8,594 21,401 27,331 2,996 4,101 70,488 
1998 6,887 10,854 30,842 23,557 1,627 3,313 77,080 
1999 13,043 10,206 38,658 17,410 2,110 4,098 85,525 
2000 17,561 4,561 22,561 15,103 3,232 10,129 73,147 
2001 19,021 3,725 15,777 15,748 2,973 12,060 69,304 
2002 2,551 3,512 5,459 9,969 1,934 3,706 27,131 
2003 10,715 1,724 2,506 8,744 455 4,260 28,404 
2004 29,104 8,084 9,254b  3,577 2,854 52,873 
2005 20,745 12,076 11,316b  6,699 2,977 53,813 
2006 18,126 5,659 10,456b  3,264 3,718 41,223 
2007 17,483 15,643 4,560b  2,976 7,620 48,282 
2008 8,935 19,489 2,343b  4,277 25,147 60,191 
2009 9,670 19,850 1,997b  4,857 38,280 74,654 
2010 13,305 17,716 1,526b  4,982 35,782 73,311 
2011 7,685 17,367 1,228b  2,976 27,168 56,424 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.  
Notes: Data for 2002-2011 are as of February 29, 2012. Data for earlier years may not reflect all subsequent  
adjustments.  
a. Includes refugees admitted under the Private Sector Initiative (PSI), most of whom were Cuban. 
b. Beginning in FY2004, the categories of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union were combined into a 
single category, Europe and Central Asia. These are the total admissions under that category. 
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including pre-departure checks shortly before refugees travel to the U.S., instituted mid-year, that 
enhance the vetting of applicants against intelligence and law enforcement information.  While 
these checks caused a slowdown in refugee arrivals, the checks reflect the Administration’s 
commitment to conduct the most thorough checks possible to prevent dangerous individuals 
from gaining access to the United States through the refugee program.  Arrival numbers began to 
rebound in June and July [of 2011] and we expect arrivals in FY2012 approaching the proposed 
ceiling.”    The improved security on refugee resettlement attempts to better weed out those who 178
wish to harm the United States, while creating a verification process that better allows the 
entrance of those who are truly in need of asylum. 
!
B. The Process of Admitting a Refugee 
 The U.S. Department of State is in charge of processing refugee applications; however, 
the department usually seeks the aid of a non-governmental organization (NGO) or an 
international organization in managing a Resettlement Support Center (RSC).  An RSC pre-
screens refugees through an interview process and prepares each case to be submitted to the 
United States Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS).  Once the case is given to USCIS, they 
must adjudicate.  To do this, there is a two-priority system that has “separate and distinct” levels 
in order to determine if a person qualifies for refugee status under the INA.  Priority One 
refugees are those referred to the U.S. refugee program by the United Nations Refugee Agency, a 
U.S. embassy, or specific NGOs.  These refugees are extraordinary cases where protection is 
undoubtedly required due to impending danger or attack unless admitted.  Refugees from all 
   Ibid., p.2. 178
!93
nationalities qualify to be granted asylum under this priority.  Priority Two deals with refugees 
who require special humanitarian focus.  For example, there were Iranian religious minorities 
that were in refugee camps in Austria and Turkey.  These refugees need not be referred by the 
United Nations Refugee Agency, a U.S. embassy, or specific NGOs.  
 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates refugee 
applications.  There two major reasons a prospective refugee is deemed inadmissible: health and 
national security.  If the Department of Health and Human Services finds there is a disease that 
could cause significant public health issues, the refugee applicant will be denied.  Additionally, 
the process to determine if a refugee has participated, or will participate, in any groups that have 
threatened the national security of the United States has been made much stricter in order to 
prevent the admission of a terrorist.    
!
!
IX. The Need for Reform 
 U.S. immigration policies have failed.  Despite restrictions on opportunities for legal            
entry and surging border enforcement funding, the U.S. population of people born in Latin 
America has increased significantly.  The intentions of Congress and federal initiatives have only 
made matters worse.  Congress has clearly not put the essential care and thought in immigration 
legislation to account for underlying dynamics of evolving social and economic change.  In the 
1960s and 1970s, Congress began a history of failing to create legislation that adjusted to the 
demand of migration, and the strong momentum it creates.  Stated earlier in Chapter Two of the 
thesis (“History of U.S. Immigration”), Congress failed to see that immigration had a far-
!94
reaching impact on the economy, workforce, and society.  As in other areas of society and 
economies, Congressional intervention without complete understanding of dynamic shifts tends 
to cause unintended consequences.  Immigration, maybe now more than ever, is a salient issue in 
the national spotlight.  Even though recent economic troubles for the United States have diverted 
attention of the American people, immigration is undoubtedly in need of robust reform.  The next 
chapter of this thesis will present several reform arguments for all parts of immigration and 
attempt to discern what is best for U.S. immigration and economy in the long-run.  
!
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CHAPTER IV: Necessary Change 
Immigration Reform and the Challenge Ahead 
“Finally, if we're serious about economic growth, it is time to heed the call of business leaders, 
labor leaders, faith leaders, law enforcement — and fix our broken immigration system.  
Republicans and Democrats in the Senate have acted, and I know that members of both parties 
in the House want to do the same.  Independent economists say immigration reform will grow 
our economy and shrink our deficits by almost $1 trillion in the next two decades.  And for good 
reason: When people come here to fulfill their dreams — to study, invent, contribute to our 
culture — they make our country a more attractive place for businesses to locate and create jobs 
for everybody.  So let's get immigration reform done this year.”   179
       - President Barack Obama !
I.  The Debate on Reform 
 Immigration reform is necessary.  The government and its constituents understand the 
current system is broken.  A gridlocked Congress has blocked meaningful reform, and the United 
States has paid the price.  In 2013, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
and Immigration Modernization Act (S.744).  This bill, while not perfect, was an encouraging 
start to reshape immigration.  The Senate addressed and attempted to encompass each issue in a 
way that was sensitive to dynamic change.  An analysis of S.744 is useful to begin the process of 
reform.  However, policy institutes and experts have their own opinions, which carry influence in 
Congress.  
 Senate Democrats made a compromise to receive amnesty for illegal immigrants in S.744 
in order for Senate Republicans to implement a robust immigration enforcement strategy.  This 
accord has yet to be struck by the House of Representatives.  A Republican-controlled House 
rejects amnesty with a path to citizenship, and puts securing the nation’s borders as the top 
   Barack Obama, “State of the Union Address” (speech, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2014), The 179
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priority.  On January 30, 2014, the Grand Old Party (GOP) released its set of principles moving 
forward on immigration.  The party’s leadership stated “border security and interior enforcement 
must come first.”    Similarly, Republican leadership detailed the necessity for an “entry-exit 180
visa tracking system,” “employment verification and workplace enforcement,” “reforms to the 
legal immigration system,” and a solution for “individuals living outside the rule of law.”    181
These principles are similar to those outlined in S.744; however, how to approach them is the 
key issue.  For example, Republicans are calling for a bill-by-bill approach rather than a 
comprehensive bill such as S.744.  Similarly, Republicans put border security and interior 
enforcement as the top priority, while Democrats put amnesty and improved legal immigration 
methods at the forefront.  Republicans will not allow amnesty or legal immigration methods until 
the “triggers” of completely secure borders and interior enforcement are met.  As the text of the 
principles released on January 30, 2014 assert, “none of this can happen before specific 
enforcement triggers have been implemented to fulfill our promise to the American people that 
from here on, our immigration laws will indeed be enforced.”    Despite the GOP following 182
principles many conservatives agree on, several “conservative hard-liners inside Congress and 
out are already stepping up resistance to anything that could be deemed ‘amnesty.’”    In a 183
different way, immigration advocates reject the GOP principles for the omission of a path to 
citizenship for illegal immigrants.   
   “Text of Republicans’ Principles on Immigration,” The New York Times, January 30, 2014, ! !180
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 Several conservative institutes — i.e. American Action Forum and Americans for Tax 
Reform — disagree with the GOP’s approach to immigration reform, urging them to compromise 
on a bill that mirrors S.744.  H.R.15, proposed by House Democrats, is the form in which these 
groups argue reform is most possible.  The institutes argue that increased immigration will lead 
to accelerated growth and a significant cut to the federal budget deficit.  As previously stated, the 
American Action Forum (AAF) has asserted that comprehensive immigration reform would 
reduce the national debt by $2.5 trillion over the next decade.  Groups such as AAF, believe 
immigrants are an important part of the country’s future.  Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the president of 
AAF, said in an interview that we must “acknowledge the value” of immigrants.  Other 
conservative and libertarian groups concur, including the Cato Institute and Americans for Tax 
Reform (ATR).  Despite consistent arguments by Republicans and other conservative groups (i.e. 
the Heritage Foundation) that immigrants would hurt the American workforce and wages while 
increasing the national debt, ATR, Cato, and AAF are charging right back.  AAF has produced 
positive analysis of an increase in workforce participation.  Expanding immigration, according to 
Holtz-Eakin, would “raise GDP [Gross Domestic Product] growth from an average of three 
percent annually to 3.9 percent over the course of a decade.”  The increase in GDP is due to “a 
difference of $64,700 per capita versus $62,900 per capita … [which is] a core benefit [from] 
immigration reform.”  This is where dynamic scoring becomes important.  Several conservative 
groups have argued that Republicans ignore dynamic scorings for immigration and that the 
Heritage Foundation has completely abandoned such scoring methods in their analysis of S.744.  
Republicans have called on the CBO to score tax-cut bills with dynamic estimates; however, do 
not do the same for immigration.  This is the fundamental debate amongst conservatives: to use 
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dynamic scoring or not to use dynamic scoring.  Different methods have yielded significantly 
contrasting stories about the effects of S.744 on the United States. 
 The core issues that Republicans and Democrats disagree on are not the only roadblocks.  
There is an enormous divide in the Republican Party between its more conservative members 
(Tea Partiers) and its moderate members.  While Republicans control the House, compromise 
must first come within the party before working with Democrats.  Thereafter, where there is an 
accord between Republicans and Democrats, accepted forms of implementation and language for 
the bill will cause problems.  The biggest examples are a work verification system, such as E-
Verify from S.744, and legal immigration.  While both sides agree reform is necessary in these 
areas, lengthy compromise will be needed to solve disputes such as: privacy concerns with 
providing extensive data to the government, and how to overhaul current legal immigration visa 
programs and laws to protect U.S. workers while providing necessary channels for skilled and 
unskilled workers. 
 Several policy institutes and experts have shared their thoughts on the Corker-Hoeven 
amendment — named after the authors of the amendment Senators Bob Corker (R-TN) and John 
Hoeven (R-ND) — and S.744’s attempt at securing the border.  Bill Ong Hing, a Professor of 
Law at the University of San Francisco, wrote an article for the Huffington Post warning how S.
744 would “exacerbate the immigration death trap.”    According to Hing, “as many as six 184
thousand people have died trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border since the institution of 
Operation Gatekeeper under the Clinton administration.”    Operation Gatekeeper was a 185
   Bill Ong Hing, “Corker-Hoeven Provision Would Exacerbate the Immigration Death Trap,” The 184
Huffington Post, November 11, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com.
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measure implemented in 1994 to prevent illegal immigration and encourage safety near the San 
Diego, California border.  However, the plan did not increase safety; and the incredibly high 
number of border crossing deaths is a moral issue, one that the United States has failed to 
address.  Hing says the fatalities are “avoidable” and that the operation did not deter immigrant 
inflows as intended.  Instead, Operation Gatekeeper funneled the immigrants through the most 
dangerous areas of the desert and mountains, resulting in an increase of less than 30 migrant 
deaths in 1994, to 477 in 2012.    Despite the dangers, migrants continued to attempt illegal 186
entry due to a deeply broken economy in Mexico.  This incredibly important issue is one that 
politicians are aware of; yet, Hing asserts that Congress did nothing to fix it with S.744.  He 
writes that the Corker-Hoeven amendment would not only “expand Operation Gatekeeper,” “the 
militarization of the border” would do nothing to address the “socio-economic phenomenon” that 
causes “travel patterns between Mexico and the United States.”    Hing contends that Congress 187
should assess push-pull factors and implement a solution that addresses the economic situations 
of both Mexico and the United States. 
 Alex Nowrasteh of The Cato Institute, an American libertarian think tank, agrees with 
Hing.  In the article “The Border Security Obsession,” Nowrasteh argues “immigration is mainly 
an economic phenomenon,” but that Congress is fixated on throwing money at border security.    188
As evidence, he cites the Corker-Hoeven amendment, which would “double the size of border 
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www.cato.org   
!100
patrol and place an absurd array of technology and fencing on the southern border.”    189
Nowrasteh asserts an amplified legal low-skilled guest worker program would provide incentives 
to migrate legally and discourage dangerous illegal inflows.  Additionally, putting this system in 
place would allow Border Patrol to “weed out the criminals, national security threats, and sick 
people from the vast majority of willing peaceful workers.”    Nowrasteh cites the Bracero 190
Program as evidence that such a program is possible.  “In the early 1950s … after arresting 
unlawful immigrants, Border Patrol drove them down to the Souther border and immediately let 
them enroll in the Bracero Program, allowing them to return to their jobs.”    Nowrasteh argues 191
that since “unlawful immigration dropped by more than 90 percent in the following years,” a 
guest-worker program (for more sectors than simply agriculture) would “overwhelmingly” help 
the illegal inflows that are the focus of many Americans.    The Cato Institute maintains that a 192
guest worker program would be more effective than the proposed $5 billion per year in border 
security spending, and allow for border enforcement agencies to focus on more important efforts. 
 In an article entitled “The Corker-Hoeven Amendment is a Mirage” by Julie Kirchner of 
the Federation of American Immigration Reform, Kircher argues the Corker-Hoeven amendment 
“does little to improve the border security provisions in the bill and also includes provisions that 
would seriously undermine immigration enforcement.    She provides several examples of how 193
the Corker-Hoeven amendment is weak, and hinders other provisions.  For instance, the 
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amendment requires a plan that deploys specific technologies “for each Border Patrol sector 
along the Southern border” without mandating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “to 
deploy the technologies and resources listed.”    The bill leaves the implementation and 194
allocation of such technologies up to the judgement of the Secretary of DHS.  There are several 
instances where provisions do not explicitly require DHS to enforce such laws. 
 Senator Bob Corker wrote an article on his website called “The Hoeven-Corker 
Amendment: Myth vs. Fact” in response to each criticism of the amendment and to clear the air 
on the “myths” opposers of the amendment had spoke of.  Corker argues that the amendment 
“contains tangible, concrete triggers which ensure that Registered Provisional Immigrants (RPIs) 
cannot receive green cards until at least 10 years after the enactment of the bill, AND the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Inspector General, and GAO [Government Accountability Office], certifies that” all 
provisions are enacted to the full extent the law provides.    Similarly, Corker wanted to dispel 195
the notion that S.744 allows for instant amnesty.  He explains that “ALL FIVE” of the “triggers” 
in the Corker-Hoeven amendment would need to be implemented “AND at least 10 years have 
passed” until RPIs would be allowed to apply for a green card.    Among his claims to backup 196
the amendment, he cites the Washington Post Fact Checker and PolitiFact.com as sources that 
have confirmed the bill could be strict in requiring exercise of provisions.   
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 Ronald W. Mortensen of the Center for Immigration Studies wrote a response to Corker’s 
article about the “myths” experts such as Hing, Nowrasteh, and Kirchner had argued.  The 
column, entitled “Hoeven-Corker Amendment: Long on Amnesty, Short on Everything Else,” 
was another criticism of the bill’s inability to require tight language on provisions and 
meaningful border security.  Mortensen asserts that S.744 is similar to the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act in that it promised future strict and extensive border security and better 
mechanisms to prevent employment of illegal aliens in order to grant amnesty to illegals already 
in the country.  However, Mortensen details the flaws in these promises.  For example, 
Mortensen argues “the bill grants amnesty to 11 million illegal aliens … [and that] the borders 
will never be secured because once illegal aliens have legal status, they and their supporters 
know that citizenship will eventually be granted whether the border is secured or not.”    Similar 197
to concerns by Democrats, the bill doesn’t implement any metrics to gauge the success — or lack 
thereof — of the significant inputs allotted.  Another instance Mortensen uses is the E-Verify 
program.  The bill allows illegal immigrants to gain RPI status “almost immediately,” while E-
Verify is not fully implemented for five years.    This discrepancy in years creates a new wave 198
of immigrants that will not be screened under the E-Verify program.  The issue of nonimmigrants 
receiving federal benefits is not resolved either, according to Mortensen.  S.744 would restrict 
“certain” nonimmigrant visa holders from receiving federal benefits, but as Mortensen argues, 
“certain” does not specify the people eligible or how many.   
   Ronald W. Mortensen, “Hoeven-Corker Amendment – Long on Amnesty, Short on Everything Else,” 197
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 The Heritage Foundation, a prominent conservative think tank in Washington, D.C., 
furthers the arguments against S.744.  In a report on June 21, 2013, Heritage detailed its “Top 10 
Concerns” of BSEOIM.  S.744’s approach to amnesty and border security, the burden for 
taxpayers, and the bill’s “loopholes and ambiguity” were stressed as failures by Heritage.  The 
think tank also cites the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) as another mass-
amnesty bill that failed to provide results.  According to Heritage, while IRCA was presented as 
“a one-time thing,” the “unlawful immigrant population in the United States has nearly 
quadrupled,” leaving Congress poised to provide amnesty once again.    Heritage also says that 199
the December 31, 2011 cut-off date for amnesty will “[create] massive opportunity for fraud, 
since there is no proof required that applicants have been in the U.S.” before that date.    The 200
biggest issue that several conservatives have, including the Heritage Foundation, is that “amnesty 
would teach precisely the wrong lessen to America’s unlawful immigrants and the culture at 
large.  The message of amnesty is: When a group of people who have violated the law grows too 
big to prosecute, the U.S. will simply change the law to accommodate them … undermin[ing] the 
rule of law, particularly since it would be the second blanket amnesty in about a quarter 
century.”    Heritage continues the criticism of the article with the issue in immigration reform 201
that conservatives have at the top of their list: border security.  According to Heritage, Americans 
have seen the same “exchange” of border security for amnesty before.  In 1986, IRCA created a 
similar agreement; however, S.744 “lavishes billions of additional spending on the DHS with no 
   “The Senate’s Comprehensive Immigration Bill: Top 10 Concerns,” June 2013, The Heritage 199
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clear requirements on how the money is to be spent.”    This echoes the sentiments of many 202
skeptics about the bill’s effectiveness due to serious ambiguity and loopholes.  The issue of cost 
to taxpayers is seriously examined by Heritage.  The reports claims that “amnesty will cost 
taxpayers trillions of dollars” due to a higher contribution in taxes than received government 
benefits.   
 In another report entitled “The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty to the 
U.S. Taxpayer,” Heritage authors Robert Rector and Jason Richwine, Ph.D. argue that “amnesty 
would increase net governmental costs by perhaps $6.3 trillion.”    This estimate has been 203
widely rejected by several conservative groups, think tanks, and politicians.  According to the 
Cato Institute, a 2007 Heritage Foundation report entitled “The Fiscal Cost of Low-Skill 
Immigrants to the U.S. Taxpayer” used “flawed methodology [and] produced a grossly 
exaggerated cost to federal taxpayers of legalizing unauthorized immigrants while undercounting 
or discounting their positive tax and economic contributions – greatly affecting the 2007 
immigration reform debate.”    Other conservative groups agree Heritage once again was 204
incorrect with its fiscal predictions.  Grover Norquist of Americans for Tax Reform and the Cato 
Institute wrote in a letter to House and Senate Immigration personnel in April:  
“Robert Rector’s work does not speak for the conservative movement; in fact, it does not even 
speak for the Heritage Foundation.”   205
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Similarly, Josh Culling with Americans for Tax Reform said: 
“Though Heritage is a treasured ally of [Americans for Tax Reform], this report looks only at the 
cost side and ignores the economic benefits.”   206
Other conservative groups believe that Heritage lacked a dynamic scoring of the bill, which 
would have assessed the impact of amnestied immigrants over time.  Mario Lopez, president of 
the Hispanic Heritage Fund, a conservative advocacy group, argued:  
“Not using a dynamic model is a failure to acknowledge that capitalism exists … One part of the 
economy doesn’t stay the same when another changes.”   207
Furthering the argument against Heritage’s negative report on S.744, Doug Holtz-Eakin, 
president of the American Action Form, a conservative policy institute, said:  
“According to this report, there is no American Dream … It’s not realistic —  not all immigrants 
will be eligible for benefits and not all want to be citizens.  It’s basically saying they will all start 
in poverty, end in poverty and their children will live in poverty.”   208
In fact, the American Action Forum estimates S.744 would cut the deficit by as much as $2.5 
trillion dollars.    However, arguments against the Heritage Foundation’s score of the bill are not 209
limited to conservative groups and think tanks.  In a statement released on June 27, 2013 by 
Angela Maria Kelley, Vice President for Immigration Policy at the liberal think tank Center for 
American Progress (CAP), praised the Senate’s version of BSEOIM: 
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“The bill passed today reflects the will of the American people and meets the needs of our nation 
today and in the future by including a path to citizenship for the 11 million undocumented 
immigrants in our country; along with a strategy to address future immigration so we aren’t 
having this debate again in 10 years … This bill will also reap economic benefits whose ripple 
effects will help improve the economic standing of millions of Americans.”   210
 On February 5, 2014, recent optimism over immigration reform in the House of 
Representatives had a setback.  In an article by the Associated Press, conservative Republicans 
stated that immigration legislation in the House would not come in 2014.  The GOP — which 
currently controls the House and feels momentum is on its side going into the mid-term elections 
this upcoming year — believe the party should wait until next year when it could potentially 
control the Senate.  While the Obama Administration has made immigration reform one of its top 
priorities for the second term, conservative Republicans seem unwilling to work with Democrats 
until after the mid-term elections.  Representative Raul Labrador (R-ID) was one of eight House 
members who worked on bipartisan immigration legislation in 2013, but walked away from 
negotiations.  He said: 
 “I think it's a mistake for us to have an internal battle in the Republican Party this year about 
immigration reform … I think when we take back the Senate in 2014 one of the first things we 
should do next year after we do certain economic issues, I think we should address the 
immigration issue.”   211
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Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) expressed his doubt for immigration 
legislation in 2014: 
 “I don't see how you get to an outcome this year with the two bodies in such a different 
place … [It’s an] irresolvable conflict.”   212
The key difference between comprehensive immigration that the Senate favors and the bill-by-
bill approach House Republicans want to enact is a major point of contention.  With elections 
hanging in the balance, the GOP aims to secure their seats before drafting any legislation that 
would show a divide in the party or upset the American people.   
 Despite serious disagreements, there must be an objective analysis done on S.744.  What 
is in the bill?  While each side of the aisle has their own opinions on how the bill will affect the 
economy, workforce, and national debt, one must look at the bill itself.   
!
!
II.  S.744 and its Potential 
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act 
(BSEOIM) was passed by the Senate on June 27, 2013.  The bill is extensive, attempting to 
drastically change the broken immigration system.  Border enforcement would continue to see a 
dramatic surge while visa appropriations and other issues are tackled in an attempt to fix current 
backlogs.  Each part of the bill is vital to understand how “The Gang of Eight” (the eight 
Senators who sponsored the bill) attempted to comprehensively reform immigration.  One 
   Ibid., p.1.212
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provision does not stand alone.  Instead, border security is affected by new legal immigration 
channels. 
!
A. The Militarization of and Exorbitant Spending on Border Security 
 S.744 not only increases border enforcement, it militarizes it.  Despite evidence that 
border enforcement played a significant role in the increased levels of illegal immigration, the 
Senate added the Corker-Hoeven amendment.  Senate leaders believe the Corker-Hoeven 
amendment would change past issues with border security through a comprehensive approach.  
With improved channels of legal immigration and the elimination of backlogs, border 
enforcement would not be the cause of reduced “circularity.”  This claim is disputed by several 
Congresspeople and outside actors.  Circularity refers to the process by which immigrants come 
to the United States, and then leave, repeating the process.  This was most efficient during the 
Bracero Program; however, with border security funneling illegal immigrants through the most 
dangerous parts of the border and making it more difficult to return back to the United States, it 
has unintentionally caused more illegal immigrants to stay in the United States.  Thus, the 
reduced circularity of immigration.  This amendment would lead to unprecedented levels of 
financial appropriations for border security; however, several Republican senators — members 
of the party that is most in favor of robust border security efforts — are against the Corker-
Hoeven amendment.  Tom Coburn (R-OK) said:  
“The biggest deficit that the Senate has in my mind is failure to put teeth into things they know 
will actually fix the problems in this country … This bill has no teeth.  This bill has $48 billion 
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thrown up against the wall to buy the vote to say we are going to have a secure border, when in 
fact we will not.”     213
Similarly, Senator David Vitter (R-LA) asserted: 
“I think this amendment is designed to pass the bill, but not to fix the bill … I say the amendment 
is designed that way for two reasons.  First of all, as has been noted, it’s all about inputs.  
There’s no metric, there’s no measure of actual achievement.” 
The lack of metric-based achievement records is an area of significant concern.  Democrats in 
the House of Representatives made sure to add this to their proposed bill, H.R.15, discussed later 
in this chapter.   
 The Heritage Foundation released a report entitled “Corker–Hoeven Immigration 
Amendment: Far from a Game Changer,” which criticized the Corker-Hoeven amendment as 
weak and unable to create meaningful change in border protection and security.  The think tank 
says that the triggers in the bill are “false” and “would allow millions of illegal immigrants to 
receive amnesty now, and then maybe we will get to securing the border somewhere down the 
road.”    Additionally, Heritage does not believe the bill would do much to stop illegal 214
immigrants overstaying their visas — which accounts for “about 40 percent of illegal 
immigrants.”     215
 The Center for American Progress (CAP) disagrees with this analysis.  The think tank 
provided its full support of the bill.  In a report on June 27, 2013 entitled “The Top 5 Things the 
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Senate Immigration Reform Bill Accomplishes,” CAP detailed the major improvements to 
border security, paths to citizenship and legal status, family reunification, and the economic 
impact.  While CAP recognizes that S.744 “militarizes the border,” it provides reasons why the 
Senate’s resolution created a more objective metric.  According to the Immigration Team at CAP, 
the Corker-Hoeven amendment “blocked other efforts” that are more subjective.    CAP argues 216
that since the amendment is based on assigned numbers, — i.e. the number of Border Patrol 
agents hired, miles of fence built, technology deployed, etc. — it removes the possibility for 
future “manipulation” by an administration.    It is clear that the House and Senate disagree on a 217
metric that would adequately result in — and track — success.  This disunity will be 
demonstrated later in the chapter with the analysis of House Democrats’ proposal of H.R.15.   
 CAP also praises the Senate for their enhanced paths to citizenship and removal of 
unnecessary restrictions on DREAMers.  According to the think tank, S.744 provides an 
“achievable path to citizenship” while protecting the United States.  Amnesty is not easily 
granted, as an illegal immigrant must jump through several hurdles.  However, CAP estimates 
that over nine million people will be eligible for the new Registered Provisional Immigrant 
status.    The report also details improvements to the process of granting DREAMers LPR 218
status.  “S. 744 contains no age cap, which means that even DREAMers who have been waiting 
for more than a decade and are now in their 30s or older can still qualify.”   219
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 CAP asserts its support for one of the most important provisions of the bill: Section 2302.  
“Section 2302 of the bill clears out this long backlog over a period of nine years by dividing up 
the number of people waiting each year and granting that many additional visas each year.”    220
The elimination of family-based backlogs is a crucial issue as many reports have indicated 
undocumented immigrants have entered the United States illegally because they cannot wait to 
be allowed legally.  Therefore, Senate leaders implemented Section 2302 to complement other 
legal channels in order provide a disincentive to cross the border illegally.  
 Finally, CAP issues its support for the CBO’s scoring of the bill.  “With the 
Congressional Budget Office scoring of the bill, it is clear that reform has powerful economic 
benefits.”    CAP clearly disagrees with Heritage in this regard.  While Heritage warns of 221
serious economic burdens, objective sources such as the CBO have demonstrated positive effects 
stemming from S.744. 
 Despite disagreements inside and outside the Senate, S.744 was passed with the Corker-
Hoeven amendment.  BSEOIM allots $46.3 billion in initial funding in order to implement the 
act.    In addition to the funding by Congress, visa and other user fees will help provide 222
financial support.  The Senate also included a $30 billion dedication for over the next ten years in 
order to hire and deploy an additional 19,200 Border Patrol agents.    Of the $30 billion, $8 223
billion will be allotted for the Southern Border Fencing Strategy, of which $7.5 billion will be 
dedicated to the deployment and maintenance of fencing and $750 million will be allocated to 
   Ibid., p.1.220
   Ibid., p.1.221
   Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S.744) 2013, § 6(a)(3)(A)222
   Ibid., § 6(a)(3)(A)(i)223
!112
the implementation and expansion of E-Verify.    $4.5 billion will be proportioned out for the 224
Comprehensive Southern Border Security Strategy, and — if necessary — $2 billion will be 
dedicated to the implementation of recommendations made by the Southern Border Security 
Commission.    The investments in border security are as follows: deploying a minimum of 225
38,405 full-time Border Patrol agents along the southern border (19,200 more than currently 
stationed there); an electronic exit system at all ports where Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) agents are deployed; at least 700 miles of new fencing that includes double fencing; an 
increase in mobile surveillance; the deployment of more aircraft and radio communications; 
construction of additional Border Patrol stations and operating bases; the hiring of more 
prosecutors, judges, and relevant staff; an improved and additional training program for border 
officers; and an increase in prosecutions of illegal border crossings.    The Corker-Hoeven 226
amendment mandates area-specific technology and infrastructure that mimics militarization.  
Watch towers, camera systems, mobile surveillance systems, ground sensors, fiber-optic tank 
inspection scopes, portable contraband detectors, radiation isotope identification devices, mobile 
automated targeting systems, unmanned aircraft, radar systems, helicopters, and marine vessels 
are all detailed in the amendment.    Surveillance must be 24 hours a day using mobile, video, 227
and portable systems, as well as unmanned aircraft such as drones.  The amendment clearly 
attempts to use vast resources to stop illegal immigration.  The additional training for Border 
Patrol agents is necessary in order to be properly equipped to handle such militarization.   
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 The border is not the only place enforcement is amped up.  Interior enforcement against 
those who choose to over stay their visas is a focus of S.744.  This is a major focal point for 
Republicans in regards to immigration reform, as noted in their principles outline on January 30, 
2014.  In the bill, a pilot program is mandated in order to notify immigrants that their visa will 
expire soon.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is required to initiate deportation 
proceedings if the immigrants do not heed the warnings of the government program.  Similarly, 
DHS must confirm that removal is either pending or granted, “or otherwise close 90 percent of 
the cases of immigrants who have overstayed their visas by more than 180 days in the last 12 
months.”    The next section details the provisions that attempt to make interior enforcement 228
more effective.  
!
B. Interior Enforcement and E-Verify 
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act goes to 
great lengths to ensure immigration laws are strictly enforced and procedural issues are 
corrected.  S.744 would require all employers to use E-Verify — the employment eligibility 
verification program.  E-Verify uses the Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 and data 
from the U.S. government in order to determine if an employer’s employee can legally work for 
their business.  S.744 aims to make the usage of the program mandatory, in an effort to better 
prevent illegal immigrants from working.  E-Verify would be mandatory for all employers five 
years after the bill passed.  In addition, fraud-proof documents — enhanced with tamper-and 
identity-theft resistant materials — and photo tools would be used.  Social security cards would 
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be the primary target of this improvement.  The employer must use the mechanisms available in 
order to confirm the identity and employment authorization within three business days after an 
applicant accepts an offer of employment. 
 At all air and sea ports, an entry and exit system will be put in place in order to confirm 
immigrants are leaving when they are required to.  All local and state laws related to the hiring of 
foreign nationals will be superseded by the systems outlined in S.744.  With a uniform national 
standard, the authors of the bill believe it will be easier to track foreign nationals in the country.  
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act also 
increases the severity of the penalty for an employer who does not comply with the requirements 
set forth in the bill.  Any employer who knowingly hires, recruits, refers, or employs an illegal 
immigrant or does not follow the requirements of E-Verify can be criminally or civilly 
prosecuted.  S.744 sets civil fines at $25,000 per violation, and a criminal violation could land an 
employer in jail for two years with a fine of up to $10,000.    Similarly, every employer is 229
subject to frequent assessments and audits to determine if the E-Verify system has been misused 
in a discriminatory way — fraud, identity theft, civil rights, or privacy.  An appeals process will 
be implemented, and the employer may view their information in the system at any time.   
!
C. Immigrant Protections 
 S.744 attempts to enhance due-process protections in immigration courts and detention 
facilities as well as toughen the penalties for gang-related convictions and other serious offenses.  
Current immigration law dictates that immigrants do not have the right to appointed counsel if 
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they do not have the financial means to hire a lawyer.  S.744 requires unaccompanied minor 
children, immigrants with severe mental disabilities, and other vulnerable individuals to be 
granted appointed counsel.  Additionally, the act would dictate that immigrants are allowed 
access to government-stored evidence.  Immigration judges, court staff, and training programs 
for both the staff and judges will be increased in order to make the process more efficient.   
 S.744 prohibits the use of solitary confinement with children and those deemed seriously 
mentally ill.  The bill also enhances oversight of detention facilities, requires efficient custody 
determination and bond hears, and outlines how to detain the parents or guardians of a child.  
The emphasis put on mending the immigration court system comes from the concern of the bill’s 
supporters that due-process protections have deteriorated.  Inhumane treatment, insufficient 
alternatives to detention, and a lack of adequate resources for immigration courts to process 
cases has led to critical questioning of the current system for several years.  The measures taken 
in S.744 attempt to create a more efficient and cost-effective way to manage a highly complex 
system.   
!
D. The Controversial “Amnesty” Programs  
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act details 
the ways in which an illegal immigrant can gain lawful residency in the United States.  The first 
path is through the Registered Provisional Immigrant Program.  S.744 permits undocumented 
immigrants to apply for Registered Provisional Immigrant (RPI) status if they have resided in the 
United States since December 31, 2011.  Additionally, the illegal alien must be clean of any 
felonies or three or more misdemeanors and paid their taxes.  The application fee must be paid 
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along with a $1,000 penalty for their illegal stay in the United States.  Spouses and children of 
RPIs would also be eligible, much like the current Lawful Permanent Residency policy.  
However, the RPI program has a greater flexibility in judging case-by-case.  While many RPI 
applicants can be denied based solely on immigration status-related offenses, other factors, for 
example, the current three and ten year bars, would not apply.  Therefore, an illegal immigrant 
who currently would violate the bars set would receive a better chance for admission.  Similarly, 
the judges that would handle the cases would be given greater flexibility in determining if an 
applicant would promote and strive for the public interest.  However, the RPI program would 
restrict several public benefits of those admitted, such as Medicaid, food stamps, and new 
provisions under the Affordable Care Act.  RPI status would be given for six years; however, it 
can be renewed based on two criteria: employment and income.  If the immigrant can prove that 
he or she has remained consistently employed (with gaps between work of 60 days or less), then 
RPI status will be granted once again.  However, without this criteria being met, the immigrant 
must demonstrate that his or her income or resources accrue to more than 100 percent of the 
poverty level.    The RPI status employment requirement has several exceptions: school, 230
maternity leave, medical leave, physical or mental disabilities, children under 21, and extreme 
hardship (if able to prove).  In addition to the base criteria, the immigrant must undergo another 
background check, pay taxes required, and pay the remaining balance of the $1,000 penalty if 
they had not already done so. 
 S.744 details the transition from Registered Provisional Immigrant status to Lawful 
Permanent Residence (LPR) status.  Lawful Permanent Residency, commonly known as a “green 
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card,” will continue to be used in the immigration system.  RPIs can be granted eligibility for 
LPR status, but RPIs would be put in the back of the line to wait and must be an RPI for a 
minimum of 10 years.    All applications for LPR status prior to the enactment of S.744 would 231
need to be processed before RPIs can be afforded the status, as well.  LPR status requirements 
would be similar to that of RPI status — regular employment or average income or resources 
above 125 percent (25 percent higher that RPI status).    Additionally, applicants would have to 232
show they maintained RPI status and paid taxes, pass an additional background check and 
English proficiency requirement test, and pay the application fee and an additional $1,000 as a 
penalty for prior illegal status.  Eventually, RPIs can apply for U.S. citizenship.  If an immigrant 
has been present for ten years before LPR status and a LPR for at least three years, he or she may 
apply.  The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act 
attempts to create a track to citizenship that is bipartisan.  Amnesty, supported more by 
Democrats, is achieved, but with a long wait.  Illegal immigrants who choose the RPI track to 
legalization would wait at least 13 years before attaining citizenship.  This long timeline satisfies 
both Republican worries over economic issues of amnesty and the overwhelming economic 
positives of tax revenue from immigrants currently evading taxes.  Additionally, the RPI program 
would address the issue of children brought to the United States illegally.   
 Undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children, “DREAMers” as 
defined by the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, are 
incorporated into the RPI program through the language of S.744.  The RPI program would 
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address the special situation of the DREAMers and put them on an accelerated path to LPR 
status, and thereafter, to citizenship.  DREAMers would apply for the RPI track the same as other 
illegal aliens that have resided in the United States; however, they may apply for LPR status after 
five years in RPI status, rather than the normal ten years.  Additionally, DREAMers may apply 
for citizenship as soon as they receive their green card, as opposed to the three year wait for 
regular RPIs.  In order to qualify for this accelerated path, the DREAMer must have entered the 
U.S. before he or she turned the age of 16, have been in RPI status for the required five years, 
have earned either a high school diploma or GED, have completed at least two years of college 
or four years of military service, and have passed the necessary English test and background 
checks for verification.  The bill would use also implement a new program for current holes in 
the U.S. agricultural workforce.   
 To combat the employment gap in the agricultural sector while helping to prevent illegal 
immigration into low-skilled areas such as agriculture, S.744 would create a path to legalization 
based on legislation in the AgJOBS bill.  S.744 would allow agricultural workers to apply for an 
immigrant status called a “blue card.”  An agricultural worker must have worked 575 hours or 
100 work days of agricultural employment throughout a two-year period ending December 31, 
2012 in order to be eligible.    Similarly to other statuses, a penalty would be incurred and a 233
background check required through the same admissibility conditions as RPIs.  A blue card 
would be active for up to eight years, and those under the status would be denied federal means-
tested public benefits.  After five years, blue-card holders could apply for LPR status if they have 
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continually worked in agriculture and paid all required taxes and fines.  Five years after LPR 
status is granted, they may apply for citizenship.  
!
E. The Reconstruction of Nonimmigrant Visa Programs 
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act alters 
nonimmigrant visa programs to provide a wider range of programs and to eliminate a “one-size-
fits-all” model that impaired the entrance of the “best and brightest” into the United States.  
Among the alterations and additions are programs for skilled workers, less-skilled workers, 
investors, and visitors.  The H-1B skilled-worker program is maintained; however, its visa cap is 
increased and so are its worker protections.  An addition to the nonimmigrant visa programs is 
the new W-visa.  The W-visa is intended for less-skilled workers, an area of great concern when 
dealing with illegal inflows.  Similarly, a new investor visa for nonimmigrants would be created 
in order to aid investors in their contributions to the economy of the United States.  All of the 
alterations and additions are aimed at helping the U.S. economy and labor force while providing 
pathways for investments, innovation, and fair worker conditions.   
 The H-1B and L-1 visas, as previously explained in the previous chapter, are intended for 
foreign workers that are highly skilled.  Science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) are 
the fields in which the United States currently has a critical need.  In order to make it easier for 
people who can contribute in these categories to enter the United States, the H-1B and L-1 visas 
were improved.  S.744 raises the annual H-1B visa cap, a problem that previously caused 
backlogs in areas that the United States could not afford to be short in.  The cap of 65,000 would 
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be replaced by a fluctuating cap of 115,000 and 180,000.    The variation in the cap would allow 234
a formula based on the market (employer demand and unemployment statistics) to determine 
what level of inflow is best for the economy.  In addition to an increase in the visa cap, wage 
requirements would be elevated and the range that employers must pay H-1B workers would be 
shrunk.  Similarly, employers would need to make extraordinary efforts to recruit U.S. workers 
before foreign ones.  Furthermore, “dependent employers” on the H-1B program would have 
significant obligations including: a U.S. worker must be offered the job first and no more than 50 
percent of the employer’s workforce may be H-1B or L-1 workers.  Additionally, a separate and 
new visa aimed at curbing illegal immigration through low-skilled demand would be introduced 
with S.744.    
 S.744 would implement a new W nonimmigrant visa program for less-skilled workers 
who were non-seasonal and non-agricultural (due to the “blue card”).  These workers would 
include, for example, janitors, maids, etc.  The visa would allow admittance for three years 
(renewable for an additional three years at the end of the first three) and require employment in a 
non-agricultural sectors.  The Bureau of Immigration and Labor Market Research (created by S.
744), would conduct the oversight of the W-visa program — working conditions and workers’ 
wages — as well as create a complaint process.  The key differences between past low-skilled 
worker visa programs and the new W-visa is the simplification and improved efficiency that 
increases worker wages, enhances working conditions, and provides for mobility for visa holders 
in response to labor market needs.  These workers, according to S.744, apply for LPR status 
using “Tier 2” of the new “Track 1” merit-based point system outlined in the next section 
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(“Reforms to Legal Immigration”).  S.744 goes further in attempting to create jobs by allowing a 
visa for investors. 
 Another goal of S.744 is to create a nonimmigrant visa for investors so that they can 
come to the United States, make good faith investments, and create jobs.  These investors help 
provide jobs in a struggling job market while aiding the overall economy.  The new visa, the X-
visa, would be given to investors who are able to attract “at least $100,000 in investment, or have 
created no fewer than three jobs during a two-year period prior to the application and generated 
$250,000 in annual revenue.”    The X-visa is granted for three years with possibility of 235
continuing to attain LPR status.  The EB-6 visa allows for certain entrepreneurs, those who have 
businesses that “have created at least five jobs … received at least $500,000 in venture capital or 
investment, or have created at least five jobs and generated $750,000 in annual revenues in the 
prior two years,” to apply for LPR status.    Like the nonimmigrant visa programs, legal 236
immigration is an important area in need of reform.  Experts argue that broken channels are the 
root of the illegal immigration problem.  Creating efficient and fair avenues for those waiting to 
enter the United States is attempted in S.744. 
!
F. Reforms to Legal Immigration 
 An important change to legal immigration would be the addition of the merit-based point 
system that has two paths — or “tracks” — to obtain Lawful Permanent Residence (LPR) status.  
Track one is designed to allow foreign nationals to accrue points based on several factors: their 
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skills, employment history, and education.  This new program would dissolve and replace both 
the siblings and adult married children of U.S. citizens visa and the diversity program.  The 
merit-based point system will be allotted between 120,000 and 250,000 visas each year based on 
a formula that considers the number of visas requested in the previous year and the 
unemployment rate.    In this system, there would be two tiers.  Tier one visas would be given to 237
higher-skilled immigrants who demonstrate advanced educational skills as well as experience; 
and tier two visas would be given to less-skilled immigrants.  The most important factor is how 
points will be awarded to foreign nationals.  Points are based on several factors, including: 
employment history, education, ability to speak the English language, family ties in the United 
States, age, and nationality.  Each immigrant would be prioritized based on their score, which 
favors young people with a good education, high-skills, and a proficiency in English.  
Proponents of the new merit-based point system argue that a shift away from family-based 
immigration is necessary.  In place of the old emphasis, supporters assert that a system related to 
economic needs and overall benefit to the future of the United States is a better option.  
However, a system such as this has never been used in the United States, and therefore it remains 
to be seen if it could work to the advantage of the United States.  
 Track two of the merit-based system has the purpose of clearing the extensive backlogs 
that have negatively affected the immigration system.  If the bill is passed (although it most 
likely will not), starting October 1, 2014, family- or employment-based applicants who have had 
applications pending for five years or more will become eligible for track two of the merit-based 
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system.    To do this, an allocation of visas would be given to applicants with pending 238
applications over the course of seven years starting in 2015.  Therefore, these immigrants would 
qualify for LPR status by 2021.  Similarly, RPIs who have maintained their RPI status for at least 
ten years would qualify.  S.744 places an emphasis on eliminating backlogs in order to promote 
legal immigration.  Consequently, RPIs would qualify for green cards after those who followed 
the current system’s rules are granted visas.  
  
G. Essential Reforms to Family-Based Immigration 
 S.744 would begin the shift away from the emphasis on family-based immigration.  
Merit-based immigration would take center stage, promoting economic incentives in 
immigration.  The bill would eliminate backlogs by 2021, recapture unused visas from previous 
years, and allow parents of U.S. citizens to bring their minor children when they immigrate.  
Spouses and children of LPRs under the current family-based system would be exempt from 
current visa caps and immediately eligible for green cards.  However, S.744 would eliminate the 
visa category for siblings of U.S. citizens, and married children of U.S. citizens who are above 
the age of thirty would have to follow the new merit-based point system in order to be granted a 
visa.  The annual worldwide cap for family-based immigration would remain at 480,000, minus 
the visas that would be given to the spouses and children of LPRs.     239
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H. Reforms to Employment-Based Immigration 
 The per-country limits on employment-based immigrant visas would be eliminated.  
These limits have caused substantial backlogs for applicants from countries with higher 
population, such as China and India.  Effectively, employment-based immigration will grant 
equal access to all foreigners who wish to immigrate.  Therefore, the immigrant who 
demonstrates the best skills would be admitted, regardless of origin.  Additionally, specific 
highly skilled and exceptionally talented immigrants would be exempt from the worldwide cap, 
such as those who demonstrate “extraordinary ability” or “advanced degrees” in science, 
technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields from United States universities.  The 
spouses and children of cap-exempt immigrants would also not be counted against the limit, 
ensuring that each person allowed into the country on the basis of employment will have a job.  
The annual worldwide limit on employment-based immigration would stay at 140,000.     240
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I. Refugee Protections and Increased Flexibility 
 S.744 makes several changes to the refugee system in the current immigration system.  
Under current immigration law set forth by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act of 1996, a refugee must apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the 
United States.    However, the authors of S.744 removed this provision due to evidence that it 241
could hinder a refugee with legitimate claims from being granted protection.  Certain refugees 
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who fear persecution, lack sufficient information, or are affected by other issues beyond their 
control may miss the one year deadline; and therefore, the bill aims to increase flexibility.  S.744 
also allows an admitted refugee to bring their spouse and child under a refugee visa.    242
Additionally, S.744 allows asylum officers to interview refugees at or near U.S. borders and 
grant asylum if it is deemed they are fleeing due to a credible fear.  This method is designed to 
eliminate the immediate action of sending a refugee to immigration courts.  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) would be required to “issue work authorization to asylum applicants 
after 180 days.”    Furthermore, the President, along with the Secretary of State and DHS, may 243
allow specific persecuted groups to be admitted to the United States due to an extraordinary 
humanitarian concern or national interest.  
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act creates 
new mechanisms to “tighten refugee and asylum laws and would be especially aimed at national 
security concerns.”    For example, Section 3411(a) states:  244
“Any alien who is granted asylum or refugee status under this Act or the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), who, without good cause as determined by the Secretary 
or the Attorney General, subsequently returns to the country of such alien’s nationality or, in the 
case of an alien having no nationality, returns to any country in which such alien last habitually 
resided, and who applied for such status because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution in that country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
   Ibid., p.54.242
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   Ibid., p.54.244
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social group, or political opinion, shall have his or her refugee or asylum status terminated.”    245
Furthermore, Section 3409 requires increased law enforcement and national security measures 
for the refugee application process.  
 Although S.744 has failed to pass the House of Representatives, the provisions proposed 
attempt to fix problems in current policy that have been detailed in the past by influential 
politicians and political institutes.  Several think tanks, including the American Immigration 
Council (politically liberal), the Migration Policy Institute (politically independent), and the 
Center for Immigration Studies (politically conservative), have weighed in.  According to the 
American Immigration Council, “The U.S. must ensure that the systems used to integrate 
refugees into the United States also afford these refugees adequate legal protections … [and] 
protect refugees in the difficult process of becoming permanent residents.”    The Migration 246
Policy Institute echoed the same issues with current refugee policy, stating:  
“The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), a mainstay of this system, faces significant 
challenges.  Security reviews have left refugees in dangerous conditions for lengthy periods and 
prevented the entry of persons who do not pose security risks.  The government entities and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that comprise USRAP often coordinate poorly with one 
another, and U.S. policymakers have not come to terms with the tension between USRAP’s goals 
   Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S.744) 2013, § 3411(a)245
   “Senators Introduce the Refugee Protection Act of 2010,” March 2010, American Immigration !246
Council, http://immigrationimpact.com/2010/03/16/senators-introduce-the-refugee-protection-act-of-2010/.
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of protecting the most vulnerable and of refugee integration.  The diverse needs of new refugee 
populations have underscored limitations in the standard approaches to resettlement.”     247
Both the American Immigration Council and the Migration Policy Institute have pointed to the 
lack of protections refugees have received, the inconsistent treatment of refugee groups, and the 
inefficient process of adjudicating on refugee applications.  The Senate took the first step in 
creating provisions aimed at enhanced efficiency and fairness; however, the Center for 
Immigration Studies, argues for reform to current policy from a different angle and disagrees 
with S.744’s approach.  According to the conservative think tank, “Policy about who is admitted 
as a refugee to the United States has been surrendered to the U.N. and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that stand to benefit from the program.  In recent years, up to 95 percent of 
the refugees coming to the United States were referred by the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) or were putative relatives of U.N.-selected refugees.”    In addition to its 248
criticisms of the United States losing control of its refugee admittance policy, the Center for 
Immigration Studies cites insufficient background checks that have allowed dangerous criminals 
and terrorists to enter the United States and an inflated number for accepted refugees as glaring 
issues in current policy.  S.744 would increase the number of refugees with the new provision 
that allows the spouse and children of a refugee to also enter;, yet, many policy institutes, such as 
the Center for Immigration Studies, stand for lower immigration numbers.  While all three think 
   Donald M. Kerwin, The Faltering U.S. Refugee Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to 247
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Others in Need of Protection, (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy 
Institute, 2011), p.1. 
   Don Barnett, “Refugee Resettlement: A System Badly in Need of Review,” May 2011, Center for 248
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tanks are in favor of reform, the method of approaching the number of admitted refugees and the 
way they are screened are very different.   
!
!
III.  House-Proposed Changes to S.744 in H.R.15  
 While S.744 was an important accomplishment to get immigration reform moving 
forward, H.R.15 begins the process of compromise.  Democrats in the House of Representatives 
proposed H.R.15 on October 2, 2013, basing it on S.744.  The largest change between S.744 and 
H.R.15 is the removal of the Corker-Hoeven border security amendment, replacing it with the 
bipartisan border security bill — H.R.1417 — which was unanimously passed by the Homeland 
Security Committee.  The removal of the Corker-Hoeven amendment stems from Democrat and 
Republican concern that it does not adequately approach border security issues.  While more 
conservative Republicans want a border security plan with “more teeth,” House Democrats argue 
that a better metric to track progress and provide detailed reports is more important than simply 
increasing spending.  This argument has been rejected by Senate members who voted for S.744.  
The bipartisan voting bloc argues that the Corker-Hoeven amendment allots incredible resources 
to border and interior enforcement through effective means.  In H.R.15, the approach to border 
enforcement is significantly different.  The metric-based system implements far more oversight; 
and according to House Democrats who proposed the bill, it is clearer with fewer loopholes and 
less subjective bureaucratic implementation.   
!
A. The McCaul Bill (H.R.1417) 
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 The removal of the Corker-Hoeven amendment was the main focus of the House 
Democrats when proposing H.R.15.  According to the Democrats, the Corker-Hoeven 
amendment allotted resources to border security in a militaristic fashion.  In place of the Senate-
passed amendment, H.R.15 incorporates H.R.1417 — the McCaul bill.  H.R.1417 attempts to 
tackle border security in a more measured manner.  This includes the requirement for more 
extensive reports to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and advanced metrics to 
measure the progress and accountability of all programs associated with border security.  House 
Democrats argue that the McCaul bill does not simply throw money at border enforcement to fix 
illegal immigration problems like the Corker-Hoeven amendment; yet, it uses effective number-
crunching and increased reporting to prove what resources are needed.  The McCaul bill includes 
the following: First, frequent and scheduled reports will be done by the Department of Homeland 
Security (and all of its sub-departments such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement and 
Customs and Border Protection) on current surveillance of the borders as well as efforts to 
prevent illegal immigration, importation of drugs, terrorist threats, and human rights violations.  
Second, a strategy to achieve situational awareness and control of the Southwestern border 
within five years after the bill’s passage would be created.  This strategy must produce a report 
that includes threat assessments and proven metrics on effectiveness.  Third, a plan to create and 
install a biometric entry and exit system at all ports of entry would be done immediately.  If it is 
concluded that the biometric system is not economically or systematically feasible, a substitute 
plan would be required to be created in order to provide an equal level of security.   
 The McCaul Bill removes key provisions from the Corker-Hoeven amendment, which 
was included in S.744 to gain Republican support.  The Corker-Hoeven provisions cut out 
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include: First, a requirement to spend over $30 billion on border security.  The McCaul bill uses 
more flexibility through statistical analysis to determine the amount and means necessary to 
secure the border.  Second, H.R.15 removes the specification to increase the number of Border 
Patrol agents to at least 38,405, or more than 19,200 more than currently employed.  Third, the 
House bill discards the mandatory minimum technology requirements at all border stations — 
towers, mobile surveillance systems, hand-held devices, ground sensors, fiber-optic tank 
inspection scopes, camera systems, contraband detectors, mobile targeting system, unmanned 
aircraft, and radar systems.    Fourth, H.R.15 eliminates the Southern Border Fencing Strategy 249
and Comprehensive Southern Border Security Strategy.  In place of these two initiatives is the 
metrics and reporting requirements set forth in the H.R.1417.  The McCaul bill gives the duty to 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to determine what fencing and technology are 
needed at the border.  However, H.R.15 includes these provisions from S.744 as a backup plan to 
be used if DHS believes it is a more effective strategy.  
 The McCaul bill is far more extensive in its use of metrics and requirements on reporting.  
For example, reports to the Government Accountability Office and the necessary congressional 
committees must be submitted 90 days after the bill is enacted.  The bill requires these detailed 
reports on “situational awareness” and “operational control” to be submitted frequently.  “Such 
reports shall include an identification of the high traffic areas and the illegal border crossing 
effectiveness rate for each sector along the northern and southern borders of the United States 
that are within the responsibility of the Border Patrol.”    “Situational awareness” is defined in 250
   A Guide to H.R.15: Understanding the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill, (Washington, D.C.: !249
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H.R.15 as gaining “knowledge and an understanding of current illicit cross-border activity, 
including cross-border threats and trends concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful crossings 
along the international borders of the United States and in the maritime environment, and the 
ability to forecast future shifts in such threats and trends.”    “Operational Control” means “a 251
condition in which there is a not lower than 90 percent illegal border crossing effectiveness rate, 
informed by situational awareness, and a significant reduction in the movement of illicit drugs 
and other contraband through such areas is being achieved.”    The bill also dictates within 120 252
days after the bill is enacted, DHS is required to enforce a metric system that will measure 
effectiveness of border enforcement at ports of entry.  The metrics will include statistical analysis 
of illegal border crossing rates, the rate of drug raids, and habitual illegal reentries.  Two years 
after the metric system plan is put in place, DHS must have achieved “situational awareness” and 
“operational control”  in high-traffic areas.  Five years after the strategy is enacted, DHS must be 
able to provide evidence that both have been achieved for the entire Southwest border.  
Following that certification, annual reports must be filed to prove both “situational awareness” 
and “operational control” continue to be maintained. 
 H.R.15 includes a provision to create the Southern Border Security Commission if 
“situational awareness” and “operational control” are not achieved and maintained within five 
years.  In order to ensure security goals are met, the commission will be composed of members 
appointed by the President, Senate, House, and Southern border states.  The commission will aid 
DHS in accomplishing goals set forth in H.R.15.  The bill also creates the Border Security 
   Ibid., § 4(a)(10)251
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Results Strategy, which requires a plan of action to be submitted by DHS 180 days after the bill’s 
enactment.  The strategy must include ways to maintain “situational awareness” and “operational 
control” in high-traffic areas within two years, and five years for the entire southwest border.  
Additionally, threats, technology integration, DHS cooperation, and necessary employment must 
be assessed and reported.  These requests and the analysis will be reviewed by the Government 
Accountability Office.   
 The Border Security Results Strategy must implement the Comprehensive Southern 
Border Strategy and the Southern Border Fencing Strategy before applicants for the Registered 
Provisional Immigrant Status (RPI) are permitted to enter the United States.  The Comprehensive 
Southern Border Strategy will attempt to realize an effectiveness rate of 90 percent in deterrence 
at all border sectors.  DHS will also include the  Southern Border Fencing Strategy, which aims 
to decide where to place additional fencing, double-fencing, advanced technology, and improved 
infrastructure.  The bill also restricts RPIs from adjusting to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) 
status until the following are accomplished: the Comprehensive Southern Border Strategy is 
operational, the Southern Border Fencing Strategy is at a minimum near completion, the E-
Verify employment authorization and verification program is mandatory for all employers in the 
United States, and an electronic exit system at air and sea ports is active. 
 Although H.R.15 uses the McCaul bill to replace the Corker-Hoeven amendment from S.
744, the act would still make substantial investments in border security.  The bill outlines billions 
of dollars for the advancement and security of border and interior immigration enforcement.  
These investments include: $3 billion for the Border Security Results Strategy; $2 billion allotted 
for necessary actions as prescribed by the Southern Border Security Commission; $1.5 billion for 
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the construction of fencing and infrastructure, and the addition of personnel and technology; an 
undisclosed amount on 24-hour surveillance of the Southwest border region using video, 
unmanned aircraft, helicopters, and watercraft; and $750 million for the E-Verify program and its 
implementation.  Additional funds will be given to DHS to hire and train 3,500 Customs and 
Border Protection agents.  Similarly, H.R.15 provides capital for the increased prosecution of 
border crossing violations and the improvements to state law-enforcement that will aid federal 
law-enforcement in fighting illegal immigration and drug smuggling.   
 In order to ensure the achievement of the provisions in H.R.15, the bill creates the Border 
Oversight Task Force.  The Task Force will be under DHS and will have 33 members appointed 
by the President, including 19 members from the southern border region and 14 members from 
the northern border region.  The goal of the Task Force is to recommend policies for border 
enforcement, training of personnel, and to assess the impact of such policies on border 
communities and the protection of due-process rights and civil rights.  The Task Force will be 
required to submit reports on these matters, as well as address humanitarian and physical safety 
concerns for immigrants.   
!!
B. The Six Floor Amendments 
 In addition to removing the Corker-Hoeven amendment, the House added six floor 
amendments, which include: the Landrieu Amendment, the Tester amendment, the Manchin 
amendment, the Pryor amendment, the Hellner amendment, and the Merkley amendment.  The 
Landrieu amendment — Section 4607(c)(1) — repeals the pre-adoption parental visitation 
requirement for automatic citizenship and amends Section 320 of the Immigration and 
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Nationality Act to read: “The child is physically present in the United States in the legal custody 
of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission.’’    Therefore, children born abroad who 253
have a U.S. citizen for a parent do not receive automatic citizenship as previously allowed.  The 
Tester amendment — Section 113(a)(3)(A)(i)(III) — includes two tribal government officials 
onto the Border Oversight Task Force.  The Manchin amendment — Section 1122 — puts a 
“limit on the costs of compensation of all executives and employees of contractors … [to be] the 
annual amount payable under the aggregate limitation on pay as established by the Office of 
Management and Budget (currently $230,700).”    The Pryor amendment — Section 1102(e)(1) 254
— calls upon “the Secretary [of Homeland Security], in conjunction with the Secretary of 
Defense, [to] establish a program to actively recruit members of the reserve components of the 
Armed Forces and former members of the Armed Forces, including the reserve components, to 
serve in United States Customs and Border Protection and United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement.”    The Heller amendment — Section 5(b)(1)(D) — removes the 255
representative from Nevada on the Southern Border Security Commission and leaves only 
California, New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas with representatives.  The Merkley amendment — 
Section 4607(d) — states: “The Secretary of Labor may not grant a temporary labor certification 
to a prospective H–2B employer seeking to employ H–2B nonimmigrants in forestry until after 
the Director of the State workforce agency” has completed all the active recruiting of Americans 
set forth in Section 4607(c) and “makes a formal determination that nationals of the United 
States are not qualified or avail- able to fill the employment opportunities offered by the 
   Ibid., § 4607(c)(1)253
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prospective H–2B employer.”    Each of the floor amendments was aimed at helping H.R.15’s 256
overall goal of limiting bureaucratic subjective decision-making and ensuring the absolute 
preference shown to American workers before immigrants.   
!
!
IV.  Congressional Budget Office Cost-Benefit Analysis of S.744 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released two reports on June 18, 2013 entitled 
“The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act” and “S. 744: Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act” to give its assessment of the fiscal and economic effects of the bill.  The 
CBO is an objective government body that seeks to present the best statistical analysis; and 
therefore, the numbers presented in the reports should be used as the base, rather than ones done 
by a private research institute — such as Center for American Progress or Heritage.  The reports 
detail overwhelmingly positive findings.  According to the CBO, if the bill was enacted, it would 
“reduce the federal budget deficit by approximately $1 trillion over 20 years, would boost the 
U.S. economy as a whole without negatively affecting U.S. workers, and would greatly reduce 
future undocumented immigration.”    “S. 744: Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 257
Immigration Modernization Act” reports on the fiscal impact of the bill over the next 20 years 
while “The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act” details the effects S.744 would have on the U.S. economy.  A 
   Ibid., § 4607 (d)256
   A Guide to H.R.15: Understanding the 2013 Senate Immigration Bill, (Washington, D.C.: !257
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third report was released on July 3 after the Senate passed S.744 with the Corker-Hoeven 
amendment added in the act.   
 S.744 would implement provisions that would allow millions of undocumented 
immigrants to earn legal status while creating better efficiency in the legal immigration system.  
Similarly, border enforcement and interior enforcement would be granted substantial amounts of 
money from the act.  The reports released by the CBO attempt to break down each component of 
the bill and how they will affect government finances as well as the U.S. economy.  Since the bill 
would result in additional public expenses along with new government revenue, the CBO has an 
important job in creating a cost-benefit analysis that could shape amendments, program structure, 
and support and opposition to the bill. 
!
A. Budget Deficit Savings 
 The CBO concluded that 10 years after the enactment (2023) of S.744, the federal budget 
would have a net savings of about $135 billion.  According to the CBO, the implementation of S.
744 would cost the federal government $23 billion; and therefore, the federal budget’s deficit 
would decrease a net $158 billion.  The big savings would come over the 2024-2033 period.  The 
second ten-year period after the bill’s enactment would result in at least $905 billion in net 
savings for the federal budget.  The CBO estimate $905 billion by using several factors.  Two 
reports detail how the CBO came to the conclusion.  The report on July 3 details the costs of 
implementing the legislation from 2024-2033 — “projected to total between $75 billion and $80 
billion” — and the estimated decline in the federal budget deficit — “$685 billion (or 0.2 percent 
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of gross domestic product).”    Therefore, a net savings of between $605 billion and $610 258
billion will be accrued.  In the report, “The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,” the CBO approximates that $300 
billion will be saved according to its “central estimates (within a range that reflects the 
uncertainty about two key economic relationships in CBO’s analysis).”    These net fiscal gains 259
would be caused by an increase in number of legalized undocumented aliens, and therefore a 
surge in income and payroll taxes. 
!
B. The Effects on the Economy 
 The CBO estimates S.744 would increase the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
United States by 3.3 percent in 2023 and 5.4 percent in 2033.    The following figure illustrates 260
how S.744 would positively affect real GDP more than current immigration law.  
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In addition to the positive effects S.744 would have on real GDP, the bill would create an 
increase in average wages by 2025.  The boost would not happen overnight.  According to the 
CBO, “average wages for the entire labor force would be 0.1 percent lower in 2023 and 0.5 
percent higher in 2033 under the legislation than under the current law.”    The 0.1 percent drop 262
is an extremely small loss in average wages, and would produce a better percentage over a 
twenty-year period than current law.  The CBO asserts that the small reduction would be caused 
by an inflow of new immigrant workers into the labor force who “would be less skilled and have 
lower wages, on average, than the labor force under current law.”     263
                     !!!
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CBO
Figure 1.
Estimated Effects of S. 744 on Real GDP
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The central estimate incorporates CBO’s central assumptions about the effect of deficits on 
investment and the effect of wage rates on the labor supply.
Current-law projections are made under the assumption that current laws and policies 
generally remain in place. 
Projections are annual and are plotted through 2033.
S. 744 = the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act; 
real GDP = inflation-adjusted gross domestic product.
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Similarly, the unemployment rate would see a slight increase until 2020 by 0.1 percent.  The 
small initial increase is a result of “the economy adjust[ing] to the increased inflow of 
immigrants.”     265
!
C. Deterring Illegal Immigration 
 The CBO demonstrates confidence, to an extent, in S.744’s ability to deter illegal 
immigration.  According to the report released on July 3, 2013, the CBO estimates that the net 
annual inflow of undocumented aliens “would be reduced by between one-third and one-half 
compared with the projected net inflow under current law.  That effect would not be immediate, 
as it would take several years before DHS could hire the full number of Border Patrol agents 
called for in the act.”    While the CBO’s claim is positive, it does not provide the reader with a 266
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CBO
Figure 2.
Estimated Effects of S. 744 on 
Per Capita Real GNP and on Average Wages
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: Central estimates incorporate CBO’s central assumptions about the effect of deficits on 
investment and the effect of wage rates on the labor upply. 
Current-law projections are made under the assumption that current laws and policies 
generally remain in place. 
Projections are annual and are plotted through 2033.
GNP is a measure of output that differs from gross domestic product primarily by including 
the capital income that residents earn from investments abroad and excluding the capital 
income that nonresidents earn from domestic investment. Changes in GNP are therefore a 
better measure of the effects of policies on U.S. residents’ income than are changes in gross 
domestic product.
S. 744 = the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act; 
GNP = gross national product. 
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formula or explanation of how the numbers were reached.  However, the CBO clearly looked at 
how S.744 would deter illegal immigration through enforcement measures and E-Verify’s impact 
in reducing illegal employment in the United States.  Therefore, by only looking at these two 
provisions, the American Immigration Council asserts that the CBO “fails to account for the 
incentives built into future-flow programs to encourage people to migrate legally and to depart 
on time.  Taking these incentives into account, illegal immigration should decline significantly as 
new worker programs become fully implemented.”   267
 There are four provisions in S.744 that would help stem the tide of unauthorized 
immigration in conjunction with border enforcement and E-Verify.  With these additional 
provisions, S.744 would hypothetically do more to prevent illegal immigration than the CBO 
estimate.  The provisions are: First, the improved process for lower-skilled workers which 
enables them to immigrate into the United States with the new W-visa.  The W-visa only allows 
for these workers to enter while the economy is growing because the authors of the bill used 
“past trends [which] show[ed] illegal immigration increases when the economy is expanding.”    268
Second, additional channels for workers on nonimmigrant visas can apply for a green card 
through the merit-based point system (Tier 2).  This new system makes it less likely that they 
would overstay their visa.  The Tier 2 track system also allocates “between 60,000 and 125,000 
visas each fiscal year for immigrants in high-demand less-skilled occupations.”    Third, S.744 269
increases the number of employment-based visas for less-skilled workers and improves 
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protections for U.S. workers.  These changes would promote fair but necessary immigration.  
Fourth, there would be an acceleration of accepting spouses and minor children of LPRs.  This 
would help prevent illegal inflows in family-based immigration.  If these relatives gain visa 
status quicker, they would have less incentive to risk entering and staying illegally.  
!
!
V.  STEM Reform in H.R.459 and S.303 
 The fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) are essential to 
the future success of the United States.  The complexity of creating immigration law that 
regulates these fields makes it difficult to put it in a comprehensive bill such as S.744.  
Therefore, Congress has separated STEM regulation in two recent bill proposals: S.303 and H.R.
459.  These bills focus on how to make it easier for those who hold degrees in these fields to fill 
holes in the U.S. workforce and make significant contributions to the U.S. economy.  However, 
neither bill has been voted on.  STEM reform has taken a backseat to comprehensive 
immigration reform currently capturing the spotlight.  Nonetheless, STEM reform is necessary 
and requires the full attention of Congress.   
!
A. H.R.459 
 The STEM Visa Act of 2013 (H.R.459) was introduced to the House of Representatives on 
February 4, 2013.  The bill would amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 by 
allotting 55,000 visas beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2015 for immigrants qualified with:  
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“(1) a doctorate degree in a field of science, technology, engineering, or mathematics [STEM 
degree] from a United States doctoral institution of higher education; and (2) have taken all 
doctoral courses in a field of science, technology, engineering, or mathematics, including all 
courses taken by correspondence … or by distance education, while physically present in the 
United States.”     270
H.R.459 defines the term “a United States doctoral institution of higher education” as an 
institution that:  
“(1) is defined under the Higher Education Act of 1965 … or is a proprietary institution of 
higher education; (2) was classified by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching on January 1, 2012, as a doctorate-granting university with a very high or high level of 
research activity or classified by the National Science Foundation … as having research activity 
equivalent to such institutions; and (3) is accredited by an accrediting body that is itself 
accredited either by the Department of Education or the Council for Higher Education 
Accreditation.”     271
The bill creates a plan to reallocate unfilled visas to be available to applicants who:  
“(1) hold a master's degree in a field of science, technology, engineering, or mathematics from a 
United States doctoral institution of higher education that was either part of a master's program 
that required at least two years of enrollment or part of a five-year combined baccalaureate-
master's degree program in such field; and (2) have taken all master's degree courses in a field 
   STEM Visa Act of 2013 (H.R.459) (2013), § 2(c)(2)(A)270
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of science, technology, engineering, or mathematics, including all courses taken by 
correspondence … or by distance education, while physically present in the United States.”   272
 H.R.459 is designed to be faster than current STEM regulation for applicants.  An 
important criticism of the current system is immigrants with needed skills are waiting extensive 
amounts of time.  Therefore, the authors of the bill inserted a requirement for the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to decide on a petition made by a STEM applicant within 60 days of 
filing.    Similarly, DHS must notify a petitioner within 30 days if they are not approved.    273 274
Additionally, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) role would be more efficient.  DOL would be 
required to decide on a STEM application within 180 days of the file date and 60 days if the 
application does no meet approval standards.  Most importantly, H.R.459 would eliminate the 
Diversity Immigrant Program (DIP).  DIP had long been seen as an unnecessary way to force 
diversity.  The 55,000 LPR visas would instead be granted to the advancement of science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics in immigration.    
 The bill would also revise foreign student visas (the F-visa) to create four sub-categories.  
The F-1 visa would be for “a foreign student who is pursuing a full course of STEM field study 
at a U.S. institution of higher education or a proprietary institution of higher education which has 
agreed to report the attendance termination of each nonimmigrant student to DHS, or who is 
participating in related temporary optional practical training following completion of such 
   Ibid., § 2 (c)(7)(A)272
   Library of Congress, “H.R.459 - STEM Visa Act of 2013,” 2013, United States Legislative Information, 273
http://beta.congress.gov.
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studies.”    The F-2 visa is for a foreign student “who has an actual residence in a foreign 275
country and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely to pursue a course of 
study at an established college, university, seminary, conservatory, academic high school, 
elementary school, or in a language training program in the United States, which has agreed to 
report the attendance termination of each nonimmigrant student to DHS.”    The F-3 visa is for 276
“the spouse or minor child of an F-1 or F-2 foreign student.”    Lastly, the F-4 visa is for “a 277
Canadian or Mexican foreign student who maintains an actual residence in such country and 
commutes to a U.S. institution for full or part-time (F-1 or F-2 related) study.”    The variety in 278
student visas allow for more flexibility for the United States to recruit the best and brightest; and 
works in conjunction with other provisions to create policy that urges STEM degree recipients to 
stay in the United States for the foreseeable future. 
!
B. S.303 
 S.303 is slightly different from H.R.459.  The bill keeps the main provisions intact, only 
adding one category and four minor provisions.  In defining eligibility for STEM visa, S.303 
adds a third level.  The bill allows for those “who hold a baccalaureate degree in a STEM field or 
in a field included in the Department of Education's Classification of Instructional Programs 
taxonomy within the summary group of biological and biomedical sciences” to be granted a 
   Ibid., p.1.275
   Ibid., p.1.276
   Ibid., p.1.277
   Ibid., p.1.278
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STEM visa, unlike H.R.459.    There are four provisions added: First, DHS would be required 279
to post specified information regarding STEM employers on their website which details the 
number of aliens granted STEM visas and their occupations.  Second, the National Science 
Foundation would be obligated to report to Congress every five years on the status and progress 
of the STEM workforce in the United States.  Third, the spouse and minor children (V-visa) of a 
LPR would be permitted to “wait in the United States (without work authorization) for the 
availability of an immigrant visa.”    Lastly, S.303 requires a reduction in federal discretionary 280
spending in order to offset expenses carried out by the bill.  S.303 uses the base of H.R.459, but 
pursues expanded options, better oversight, and more efficiency in the STEM immigration 
programs.   
!
!
VI.  Refugee Policy Reform 
 The United States has maintained an active role in the protection of refugees seeking 
asylum due to persecution.  However, according to several experts such as Senator Patrick 
Leahy, the United States refugee policy is in need of serious reform.  While BSEOIM contains 
provisions to tackle issues in the refugee policy, it does not go to the lengths the Refugee 
Protection Act or the Domestic Refugee Resettlement Reform and Modernization Act do.  These 
two bills have received little support, perhaps due to other important issues such as the economy 
or healthcare.  Republicans and Tea Partiers are against an increase in refugee admittance, 
   Library of Congress, “S.303 - STEM Visa Act of 2013,” 2013, United States Legislative Information, 279
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   Ibid., p.1.280
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arguing the fact that “the United States will admit nearly three times the number of refugees as 
the rest of the developed world combined” is evidence refugee policy needs reform.    281
Democrats emphasize the importance in protecting new refugee groups, such as Syrians, and call 
for reform that increases efficiency and flexibility based on dynamic global changes. 
 President Obama granted an exemption in February to the United States’ antiterrorism 
laws to help Syrians who aided the rebel cause and have no affiliation with terrorist groups.  
Republican leaders were unconvinced these exemptions were not given to Syrians who had aided 
terrorists, contending the President had abused his power and compromised the integrity of 
United States immigration law.  John Cornyn (R-TX), the top Republican on the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, argued: 
“We are a nation of laws, and the executive branch should not be allowed to unilaterally suspend 
our immigration laws to provide benefits to those who have supported terrorists.”   282
The exemption continues a series of decisions made by the Obama Administration that has left 
many Republicans to “not trust [President] Obama to carry out enforcement measures they 
would enact.”    This distrust has also affected the overall discussion of immigration reform, 283
which Republicans argue is their main reason to wait until after the 2014 midterm elections to 
begin a dialogue on reform.  However, whenever immigration reform becomes the priority of 
   Don Barnett, “Refugee Resettlement: A System Badly in Need of Review,” May 2011, Center for 281
Immigration Studies, http://www.cis.org/refugee-system-needs-review.
   Julia Preston, “Republicans Criticize Rules to Aid Syrians Seeking Asylum,” February 2014, The New 282
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/us/rules-to-aid-asylum-seeking-refugees-are-called-
security-threat.html?_r=0.
   Ibid., p.1. 283
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Congress, it must decide if the refugee policy will be a separate compromise, or part of a 
comprehensive strategy. 
!
A. The Refugee Protection Act of 2010 
 The Refugee Protection Act (S.3113), was introduced to the Senate on March 15, 2010.  
The bill attempts to improve protections for refugees who seek asylum in the United States who 
have genuine claims.  The concern of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the bill’s sponsor, was that 
current law requires unnecessary hurdles to jump through that can put refugees with legitimate 
claims in harmful situations.  Senator Leahy is the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
which monitors immigration and refugee related issues.  He urged support for the bill and said:  
“It is time to renew America’s commitment to the Refugee Convention, and to bring our law back 
into compliance with the Convention’s promise of protection.  The Refugee Protection Act of 
2010 contains provisions of a bipartisan bill that … [would] repeal the most harsh and 
unnecessary elements of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, a law that had tragic consequences for asylum seekers.  It also corrects agency and court 
misinterpretations of law that limit access to safety in the United States for asylum seekers.  
Finally, it modifies the immigration statute to ensure that innocent persons with valid claims are 
not unfairly barred from the United States by laws enacted after September 11, 2001, while 
leaving in place provisions that prevent dangerous terrorists from manipulating our immigration 
system.”   284
   David Carle, “Leahy Introduces Landmark Refugee Protection Act,” March 2010, The United States 284
Senate, http://www.leahy.senate.gov. 
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 The bill would attempt to fix protections for asylum seekers where Senator Leahy and 
other Democratic sponsors believe the refugee program is broken.  Senator Leahy stressed that 
the United States must be at the forefront in its commitment to protecting refugees with 
legitimate claims.  The bill would eliminate the requirement for a refugee to file a claim within 
one year of arrival.  This is due to certain refugees believing that they could be in danger if they 
do it within one year.  Additionally, the bill would eliminate the one year required waiting period 
for refugees to apply for a green card.  S.3113 also attempts to protect the children and family 
members of refugees who might be in danger.  These “derivative applicants” would go through 
the same security checks.  S.3113 allows the Secretary of State to review global situations and 
determine if there is a specific group that is eligible for expedited adjudication.  The bill also 
includes economic protections.  The “per capita refugee resettlement grant level” would be 
adjusted each year to ensure that newly resettled refugees do not “slip into poverty.”    285
 The bill failed to be voted on and was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee.  The same 
bill was re-introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy in 2011 as S.1202 and in 2013 as S.645.  Each 
time the bill was referred to the committee.  The 113th Congress has proposed three bills that are 
very similar to each other; however, none of the bills have gathered enough support. 
!
B. Refugee Reform Bills Proposed in the 113th Congress 
 The 113th Congress has had three refugee reform bills — all known as the Domestic 
Refugee Resettlement Reform and Modernization Act of 2013 — proposed: S.883, H.R.1784, and 
S.1850.  S.883, the first, was proposed on May 5, 2013.  The bill would require the Comptroller 
   Ibid., p.1.285
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General to conduct a study on the current effectiveness of the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
refugee programs.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 would be amended to establish 
“as head of the Office [of Refugee Resettlement] an Assistant Secretary of Health and Human 
Services [HHS] for Refugee and Asylee Resettlement.”    The Assistant Secretary would be in 286
charge of: (1) reporting to Congress which states experience departures and arrivals due to 
secondary migration; and (2) expanding “the Office’s data analysis, collection, and sharing 
activities to include data on mental and physical medical cases, housing needs, and refugee 
employment.”    Lastly, the bill would instruct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of HHS 287
to supply “refugee resettlement guidance to appropriate national, state, and local entities.”    288
Clearly, S.883 is significantly different than Senator Leahy’s proposed bill from the previous 
section.  S.883, along with H.R.1784 and S.1850, attempt to find the genesis of the issues in the 
refugee and resettlement programs rather than patch what is believed to be a problem.   
 H.R.1784 was proposed on June 14, 2013, and only adds a provision that calls for the 
revision of the refugee grant and contract assistance allocation formula.    Senator Debbie 289
Stabenow (D-MI) proposed S.1850 on December 18, 2013 as its sponsor.  The bill combined 
previous provisions and omitted others.  However, the same basic framework was kept.  Each 
attempt at reforming the refugee program has been halted.  Perhaps Congress is waiting for 
comprehensive immigration reform to pass before acting on a thorough reform to refugee policy.  
   Library of Congress, “S.883 - Domestic Refugee Resettlement Reform and Modernization Act of 286
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Although S.744 contains provisions to protect refugees, bills such as S.3113 are more in-depth 
and must be considered to fully solve issues facing refugees.   
!
!
VII.  The Road Ahead 
 This chapter has laid out the current reform efforts, the support and opposition for such 
efforts, and the potential moves of important political actors moving forward.  Comprehensive 
reform in the House of Representatives is doubtful.  House Republicans refuse to overhaul the 
immigration system all at once, and instead aim to take a bill-by-bill approach.  House 
Democrats are against a robust enforcement strategy without a strict metric that analyzes 
achievement and for a path to citizenship.  Both sides are far apart; and with conservative 
Republicans in the House stating there will be no reform in 2014, this issue may take a back seat 
for political motivations.   
 Despite the political rhetoric and misguided methodology used in several areas, the next 
chapter of the thesis will provide an objective approach to immigration reform.  A reform 
proposal will be given, detailing how each major section of immigration should be handled.  
Should STEM and refugee reform be separate?  How should Congress allocate money to border 
security?  There will be a heavy reliance on the Congressional Research Service, the 
Congressional Budget Office, and other key objective actors in order to produce the most fact-
based proposal possible.  Therefore, the next chapter will be an objective conclusion to the 
history, contemporary issues, and possible reforms of the United States immigration system.   
!
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CHAPTER V: The Impossible Compromise 
Why Immigration Reform Won’t Happen As It Should 
!
I.  Blocking Reform 
 In the last chapter on reform, I described the strained discussions in Congress involving 
immigration reform.  Overarching ideological alignments of the Democratic and Republican 
parties have prevented action in the House of Representatives.  A more moderate Senate was able 
to compromise on amnesty and border enforcement, the two glaring issues that cause such 
tension in the House.  With the announcement by conservative Republicans in the House that 
immigration reform would not come in 2014, once again the issue has been put on the back 
burner.  The political implications of the 2014 midterm elections have taken over, halting the 
progress made on reform.  Republicans want to regain the Senate, and misstepping on 
immigration reform could cost them seats in November.  Despite the Republican party 
announcing its principles on a bill-by-bill approach to immigration reform on January 30, 2014, 
the party stands divided on undertaking reform discussions in 2014; and therefore, significant 
issues for the economy and workforce will be left without action.  The Center for American 
Progress (CAP), a liberal think tank, estimates, using a Congressional Budget Office cost-benefit 
report on S.744, the United States misses out on $37 million dollars per day in revenue without 
the enactment of S.744.    It has now been nearly nine months since the Senate passed their 290
version of immigration reform, yet Congress has stayed in a stalemate unlike any other in recent 
   Crystal Patterson, “RELEASE: $37 Million in Revenue Lost Each Day Without Immigration Reform,” 290
Center for American Progress, November 7, 2013, http://www.americanprogress.org/. 
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history.  Congress has lost the faith of the American people, and many are calling it the Congress 
of “inaction.”   
 Clearly, the United States needs immigration reform.  STEM immigrants who could fill 
serious holes in our workforce are blocked from entry; and those that receive STEM degrees 
from U.S. institutions tend to leave once they finish.  Low-skilled immigrants help fill thousands 
of jobs in agriculture while risking inhumane working conditions and less-than minimum wage 
pay.  Millions of undocumented immigrants live in the United States without paying full taxes, a 
benefit the United States needs with more than $17 trillion in national debt.  Senate leaders 
realized this, and garnered support that put aside political agendas for a bill that they believe 
solves major gaps in current policy.  The current system is inefficient and insufficient, and flaws 
are burdening the economy and workforce.  The future of the United States economy relies on 
several factors, such as education and healthcare; however, the immigration system is in charge 
of controlling the incredibly high number of illegals that don’t pay full taxes and the future 
workforce in STEM areas.  The cultural and economic impact of inaction with the U.S. 
immigration system cannot be left to the whims of political implications and midterm elections.   
 The Senate took the first step, but what would it take to pass a bill?  Right now, 
Democrats and Republicans are impossibly apart on several issues.  To make matters more 
complicated, Tea Party Republicans, the libertarian members of the party, and the more moderate 
Republicans disagree on amnesty and border security.  The Senate was able to compromise on 
immigration reform, something that Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) is urging House Tea Partiers to 
prevent in its current form.  Senator Cruz, an influential Tea Party leader, has argued the Tea 
Party’s stance against any legislation that allows undocumented immigrants to receive legal 
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status if they meet specific requirements.  Senator Cruz stated to Bloomberg News on January 
31, 2014, one day after House Republicans released their principles on immigration:  
“I think it would be a mistake if House Republicans were to support amnesty for those here 
illegally.”   291
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL), agreed with Senator Cruz, stating: 
“Once again, we have the same recycled talking points — crafted, it would appear, with the help 
of the same consultants and special interests … Each time, the talking points are followed by 
legislation that fails to match the promises — legislation that, at bottom, ensures only the 
amnesty and not the enforcement.”   292
Both Senators echo the sentiments of Tea Partiers — the majority of whom are in the House — 
that immigration reform by the Senate was “written behind closed doors in confusing legalese 
and code, released with little time to review and analyze the bill, with so much complexity that 
regular Americans have no chance of understanding all of the implications and ramifications.  
Congress also uses these enormous bills to hide unpopular provisions and crony, corruptive deals 
because they know they will pass it before we can see what’s in it.  Real reform would be broken 
into pieces that are manageable and understandable to the American people – no more 
comprehensive bills.”    These Tea Partiers have stated that they will reject an proposals that 293
provide a break to immigrants who entered the United States illegally.  House Republicans will 
   “Tea Party Republicans Blast House GOP Immigration Plan As Unacceptable ‘Amnesty,’” Fox News 291
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not stay by such strict rules.  Their principles, clearly opposed by a caucus of Tea Partiers, allow 
for a path to legal status.  Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI) defended the principles, asserting: 
“That is the kind of broad brush here — that is the kind of process we envision that is not a 
special pathway to citizenship, and it is not automatically, in any way, giving an undocumented 
immigrant citizenship.”   294
Republican leaders claim that their principles break off the Senate’s comprehensive bill and call 
for stricter border security and enforcement measures, while Tea Partiers believe the principles 
still favor undocumented immigrants over “those that have followed the law and are waiting to 
enter the country legally.”   295
 Similarly, Tea Partiers and more moderate Republicans in the House disagree on border 
security.  The Grand Old Party’s (GOP) principles called for more border security as the top 
priority, which they assert S.744 does not do.  The GOP wants to implement a robust border 
security plan, while only allowing a path to legal status for undocumented workers when 
necessary “triggers” are met.  The Tea Party staunchly rejects this stance.  The far-right group 
declares that any break for illegal immigrants who broke immigration laws is unacceptable.  
Additionally, the Tea Party disagrees with the GOP’s approach to border security.  The Cato 
Institute, an American libertarian think tank that several Tea Partiers are members of, has argued 
that border security continues to be a method of wasting money, and only furthering immigration 
problems.  The Tea Party concurs with this message, stating: 
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“As of right now, the amnesty bill [Senate-passed S.744] does not require any real border 
security measures.  The bill only requires a plan to do so. An amendment by Sen. Ted Cruz was 
defeated in committee by all of the Democrats and two Republicans — Jeff Flake (R-AZ) and 
Lindsay Graham (R-SC) — that simply would have added a guarantee that the border be secured 
before any legalization.  It was voted down.”   296
Therefore, not only do Democrats and Republicans disagree on how to implement reformed 
border security measures, but the Republican Party is divided as well.  Currently, Republicans do 
not have the number of votes to constitute a majority to pass an immigration bill in the House.  
This situation will only change if Tea Partiers lose seats, and a more moderate Republican Party 
emerges after the 2014 midterm elections.  With such a significant divide on the two most 
important issues in immigration reform — amnesty and border security — there is little hope that 
a bill will be passed in the near future. 
 On February 5, 2014, House Republican leaders changed their tone from their January 30 
principles to reflect the difficulties in the immigration reform debate.  While optimism had 
grown after President Obama’s State of the Union address and the release of the principles, it 
was quickly halted.  Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) stated:  
“There’s widespread doubt about whether this administration can be trusted to enforce our laws, 
and it’s going to be difficult to move any immigration legislation until that changes.”     297
   Ibid., p.1.296
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The GOP quickly shifted the focus to the Obama Administration, but critics saw right through 
the Speaker’s comments.  Speaker Boehner’s comments were portrayed as an “attempt to place 
the burden on Obama illustrated the mounting opposition from hard-line conservatives and laid 
the groundwork for blaming the White House if a deal fails.”    The political implications for 298
the Republican Party and Speaker Boehner are incredibly important.  With Democrats seemingly 
unanimous and united on immigration reform, their bloc is set; and Republicans need to make 
smart political moves before the 2014 midterm elections.  Representative Paul Ryan expressed 
doubt that the divided Congress could compromise on an immigration bill; and Representative 
Raúl R. Labrador (R-ID), “suggested that Boehner could lose his speakership if he pursues a bill 
in a midterm election year.”    Clearly, Speaker Boehner is in a difficult predicament.  Senator 299
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), an influential sponsor of S.744, believes that Speaker Boehner is 
attempting to move forward on immigration without “many in his caucus rebelling.”    300
However, several Democrats believe that Republicans will charge into the 2014 midterm 
elections with an “anti-Obamacare” message, rather than “muddl[ing] the message [on 
immigration] before[hand].”   301
!
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II.  The “Perfect” Bill   
 With the realization that any bill Congress passes will be incomplete, I will detail my 
“perfect bill.”  Before I dive into the provisions I believe are most important, I feel it is pertinent 
to describe the “perfect” immigration bills for each political group, including my version of what 
a “perfect” bill constitutes.  My bill will never pass, but it is important to know the key 
differences I am arguing.  I will present each group’s bill category-by-category, visually 
demonstrating the major differences in the most important parts of immigration reform.  My 
“perfect” bill is a comprehensive strategy, incorporating all areas of immigration.  Therefore, 
STEM immigration and refugee protection are included.  S.744 includes provisions for both 
categories, yet does not extensively address them like the STEM Visa Act of 2013 and the 
Domestic Refugee Resettlement Reform and Modernization Act of 2013 would.  Therefore, the 
bill I propose is truly comprehensive, leaving nothing out in order to let all of the provisions 
work harmoniously.  States must respect the comprehensive immigration reform bill, therefore 
eliminating contradictory state laws that have hindered overall progress by the federal 
immigration system.  Section A is the presentation of the “perfect” bills for Republicans, Tea 
Partiers, and Democrats.  Republicans favor robust border security spending and militarization, 
and are against a path to citizenship.  Democrats are the opposite, favoring a path to citizenship 
and rejecting “throwing money at the border.”  While the Senate was able to compromise on 
these two issues, a more conservative Congress will not.  Several representatives are in favor of a 
metric-based system to measure success in border security, in place of simply increasing 
spending.  Tea Partiers disagree with both groups.  The Tea Party values low immigration 
numbers, with emphasis on securing the border in an efficient manner.  Tea Partiers reject robust 
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spending and comprehensive bills, calling for a focus on preventing terrorism and drug 
smuggling at the border.  I believe my bill is the best option (beginning with Section B), but 
presenting the differences in each group’s reforms reflects the ideological gaps that are currently 
preventing meaningful discussions.  
!
A. The Array of “Perfect” Bills 
Thesis Proposal Republicans Tea Party Democrats
Comprehensive 
Bill
Yes,!
Immigration is 
intertwined with 
various issues, 
not able to 
separate them
No,!
A bill-by-bill 
approach allows 
focus on each 
area of 
immigration
No,!
A bill-by-bill 
approach allows 
focus on each area 
of immigration
Yes,!
A gridlocked 
Congress will 
never be able to 
follow through on a 
bill-by-bill approach
Temporary 
Worker Program
Top Priority,!
Substitutes S.
744’s low-skilled 
visa program (W- 
Visa)
No priority,!
Restricted 
immigration will 
help native-born 
workers
No Priority,!
Restricted 
immigration will 
help native-born 
workers
 W-Visa,!
S.744 implements 
the W-Visa that 
allows for long-
term legal status in 
U.S.
Border Security
High Priority,!
Temporary worker 
program and legal 
pathways will 
drastically reduce 
illegal immigration 
and soften border 
security issues
Top priority,!
Robust spending,!
Enhanced 
militaristic 
technology
Top priority,!
Shifted focus onto 
terrorism and drug 
smuggling
Second priority,!
Metric-Based 
determination of 
success and 
appropriations 
“Amnesty”
Second priority,!
Efficient and 
effective pathways 
to legal status, 
Elimination of 
backlogs
Second priority,!
Pathways to legal 
status
No priority,!
No help for those 
who broke the law
Top priority,!
Pathways to 
citizenship, 
Elimination of 
backlogs
Visa Numbers
Restricted,!
Employment-
based visa priority
Restricted,!
Employment-
based visa 
priority
Severely 
Restricted/
Possible Freeze,!
Reduced 
immigration helps 
solve U.S. 
unemployment
High, !
Family reunification 
is important
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B. Temporary Worker Program 
 A new, modern temporary migrant worker program — similar to the Bracero Program — 
is a necessity.  I firmly disagree with any bill that excludes such a program and replaces it with 
an insufficient worker visa.  S.744 does little to combat the issue of low-skilled labor as the 
primary source of illegal immigration.  I propose a temporary migrant worker program that 
would allow those who wish to work in seasonal industries where employers cannot find 
sufficient U.S. worker interest (according to the guidelines laid out in S.744), to be permitted to 
enter for the duration of the season under strict rules.  These workers must be paid at least the 
real average wage or higher of U.S. citizens in the similar industry, and have access to human 
resources to file grievances.  Additionally, incredibly strict background tests must be done.  The 
workers in this program would need to pay the minimum taxes on their paychecks, just as 
seasonal U.S. citizen workers do; however, the temporary migrant worker would receive no 
benefit from social security.  Similarly, they would have no right to education, and their families 
would not be permitted to enter.  Temporary guest workers would be eligible for services at 
migrant health clinics, although employers would not be required to provide health insurance.  A 
sufficient number of migrant health clinics would be developed if the guest worker program 
demands more than currently available.  Similarly, temporary guest program workers would 
receive workers’ compensation coverage.  If an illness or injury is work-related, workers’ 
compensation would cover all necessary healthcare and reimburse the worker for some of the 
wages lost.  The guest worker must return home once the season has ended; and if a migrant 
overstays the temporary worker visa, they would be barred from reentry and must pay a $1,000 
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fine once apprehended.  Migrants enrolled in the program would be placed in a work-verification 
system — such as E-Verify in S.744 — in order to be tracked, and employers would be required 
to prove each month that the migrant worker was on site.  Once the season was over, migrants 
would report to assigned stations to be deported through a specific protocol for the temporary 
migrant worker program. 
 This program, which I will call Bracero 2.0, would reduce future illegal immigration 
better than any other provision in S.744, while preventing injury to U.S. workers.  A Bracero-like 
program is far more difficult to develop in 2014 than the original Bracero Program days; 
nonetheless, the key motivation for illegal immigration, the economic incentive, would be 
formed in a way that helped the United States and migrants.  S.744 requires those who attain a 
W-visa, its version of the temporary worker visa, to remain in the United States for a year.  The 
most important part of my proposal is that the temporary worker would be able to return home to 
their families who they are attempting to provide for.  Therefore, the migrant fulfills their 
objective to earn money and can be with their family, and the U.S. workforce fills a gap.  The 
temporary migrant worker program would remove the W-visa provision from S.744, yet would 
leave the same number of visas for the merit-based point system (detailed in the previous 
chapter).  My “perfect” bill would allot between 40,000 and 70,000 visas for the temporary 
migrant worker program, based on the previous year’s visas filled and the unemployment rate. 
!
C. Border Security 
 I have presented statistics in earlier chapters to demonstrate that increased spending on 
border security does not result in decreased illegal immigration.  Border security has no effect on 
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the motive behind immigration flows.  The economic push-pull factors between Central America 
and the United States provide incentives for people to come to the United States.  For example, 
with the economic stability of the United States and the problems in Mexico, there have been a 
high number of Mexican immigrants inflowing to the United States for decades.  When the U.S. 
economy went into deep recession in 2008, the inflow of illegal immigrants dropped 
significantly, as the incentive to enter had been removed.  During the Bracero Program, illegal 
immigration was almost nonexistent.  There was no reason to immigrate illegally, since Central 
Americans who needed the money would come to the United States to work, then return home 
once the agriculture season was over.  Braceros could support themselves and their families and 
then go back to their home country.  This temporary worker program was the most efficient for 
gaps in the U.S. workforce, and allowed for circularity in immigration.  The removal of a 
temporary worker program that was similar in structure to the Bracero Program, matched with 
increased and intensified border security, has lead to unprecedented numbers of illegal 
immigrants residing in the United States.  Border security has militarized, and made a more 
dangerous border.  Aliens have been funneled through the most dangerous parts of the border, 
and deaths have skyrocketed in cases involving illegal crossings.  This intensified border security 
has also led to undocumented immigrants being more willing to risk deportation and stay in the 
United States.  Illegal immigrants would rather settle and provide for their families than go back 
and take the chance of not being able to reenter.  Consequently, circularity has decreased, with an 
incredible number of undocumented immigrants living in the United States.  This has led to other 
problems.  For example, the children of these illegal aliens are entitled to citizenship and public 
benefits.  Since many of the undocumented immigrants are below the poverty line, their children 
!162
are more likely to receive welfare.  Additionally, there are millions of people residing in the 
United States who do not pay full taxes, such as income tax.  Thus, border security is far more 
intertwined than a piecemeal approach to immigration reform would account for.  Republicans 
fail to see militarization of the border would do nothing but exacerbate the problem.  There is no 
doubt that border security is important.  Terrorism and drug trafficking are a constant threat; 
however, these two areas should be the target of border enforcement.  Sufficient funds are needed 
to focus on these two issues, as well as to regulate immigration laws.  Nonetheless, border 
security should not be the centerpiece of any reform bill.  Efficient programs for necessary 
temporary work and adequate legal pathways for those who can contribute to important sectors, 
such as STEM areas, would help fix border security issues much better than throwing money at 
the border.   
!
D. Amnesty 
 Republicans are against amnesty more than any other provision proposed in immigration 
reform.  Citing the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, Republicans believe that amnesty 
does nothing to help illegal immigration and sends a message that the United States will not 
enforce its immigration law strictly.  I agree with the Republicans on this matter to an extent.  
While I believe the current immigration system has proven to be inefficient and unfair, that does 
not excuse crossing a border illegally and residing in a country without documentation.  I do not 
fault the immigrant who choses to do so out of desperation; however, the United States must 
maintain strong enforcement of its laws.  My reform proposal would contain a path to legal 
status for these immigrants.  The most conservative members of Congress and non-political 
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actors, Libertarians, reject even a path to legal status, which is impossible.  Over 11 million 
people reside in the United States illegally, a problem that must be fixed.  My path to legal status 
would mimic S.744 — a fine, payment of back taxes, etc. —, yet would stop short of citizenship.  
Rewarding those who stepped in front of others in line with citizenship is a message I refuse to 
send.  Nonetheless, creating efficient programs to convert illegals into tax-paying citizens is 
essential for the economy of the United States as well as the federal deficit.   
!
E. Family-Based Immigration 
 Family-based immigration, the focal point of the United States immigration system since 
the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, needs to be put behind employment-
based immigration.  Merit-based immigration must take top priority, promoting economic 
incentives in immigration and the future economy.  S.744 has an excellent system to remove 
backlogs by 2021; however, 480,000 family-based visas is an incredibly high number.  I agree 
with S.744’s layout of family-based immigration, allowing for the family of an admitted 
immigrant to follow, thereby creating a new life in the United States.  However, I disagree with 
S.744’s refusal to reduce immigration in its entirety.  Between family- and employment-based 
immigration, S.744 dedicates 620,000 visas each fiscal year.  This number is unacceptable.  
While I am in favor of immigrants helping fill serious gaps in the U.S. workforce, immigration 
should not contribute to overpopulation.  Therefore, my “perfect” bill would remove 100,000 
family-based visas from S.744’s number, leaving it at 380,000.  Similarly, I would remove the 
family-based visa categories other than for the spouse or child of a current Lawful Permanent 
Resident (LPR) or U.S. citizen.  As a result, all 380,000 appropriated visas would go to the 
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spouses or children of admitted immigrants.  The nucleus of the immigrant’s family is sufficient, 
and those outside of it would not be allowed to enter under the family-based immigration system. 
!
F. Employment-Based Immigration 
 Employment-based immigration must become the focus of the United States in 
immigration reform.  The current per-country limits are a hinderance on the acceptance of the 
most qualified people.  Therefore, S.744 rightfully would eliminate the inappropriate provision, 
allowing those from China and India in backlogs that have higher skills than immigrants from 
other countries to be permitted to enter.  As a result, those seeking employment would finally be 
put on a level playing field.  With the elimination of per-country limits, the United States would 
receive the best talent.  Two other provisions from S.744 are incredibly important: First, specific 
highly skilled and exceptionally talented immigrants would be exempt from the worldwide cap.  
This would apply to those who demonstrate “extraordinary ability” or “advanced degrees” in 
science, technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields from United States universities.  
Second, the spouses and children of cap-exempt immigrants would also not be counted against 
the limit.  This provision would not only ensure that every immigrant allowed into the U.S. 
through employment-based immigration would be employed, but it would also remove issues 
with family members be permitted to enter over important skilled workers.  My “perfect” bill 
would call for a fluctuating visa cap of 100,000 to 120,000 for employment-based immigration.  
Therefore, if one immigrant is admitted under employment-based immigration, they would be 
allowed 3.17 to 3.8 persons to enter with them, as opposed to S.744’s ratio of 3.43 persons per 
immigrant.  My “perfect” bill would also have a provision that called for a “Soft Cap,” detailing 
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that if the number of spouses or children of admitted employment-based immigrants exceeds the 
cap, those spouses and children would be allowed to enter in order to keep the family unified.  
Overall, my worldwide cap for visas between employment- and family-based immigration would 
be 480,000 to 500,000, as opposed to S.744 and H.R.15’s proposed 620,000.  While I agree with 
several provisions that came out of the bipartisan S.744 and the House Democrat-proposed H.R.
15, I do not agree with the extremely high number of visas allotted.  I am in favor of reduced 
numbers in total visas allowed in the U.S. immigration system, while implementing more 
efficient programs to promote legal immigration.  Eliminating the family-based backlogs would 
take longer than S.744’s estimation of 2021, but less visas with more efficiency is what the 
United States needs.  Economic incentives drive immigrants to the United States, therefore U.S. 
immigration policy should reflect there importance.   
!
G. STEM 
 Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) reform must be included in a 
comprehensive immigration reform bill.  I strongly disagree with the current path of the House to 
separate the issue from immigration reform efforts.  STEM immigration is vital to the future of 
the United States’ economy and workforce and currently boost booming STEM sectors in the 
United States.  While I will not dive into the subject of the United States education system and 
its subpar output of STEM degree holders, it is evident that several STEM industries are not met 
with sufficient American workers.  For the United States to maintain its global dominance, it 
must create incentives for immigrants to immigrate and stay in the United States.  Until the 
United States can foster a domestic education system that provides sufficient numbers of STEM 
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degree holders at the caliber of foreign ones, U.S. immigration policy should reflect the need for 
STEM immigration.  STEM occupations are the future of the global economy, and therefore it 
should be integrated into immigration reform.  My “perfect” bill would give a fluctuating visa 
cap of 55,000 to 75,000 to STEM immigration, while mandating the requirements detailed in S.
744 for employers and verification of STEM degree.   
!
H. Refugees 
 Refugee settlement reform must be incorporated into comprehensive immigration reform 
as well.  Several attempts at separate bills have failed, and weak and unspecific provisions have 
been added to bills such as S.744 and H.R.15.  Refugees are an important part of U.S. 
immigration.  Vietnamese citizens from the Vietnam War have made strong contributions to the 
United States, which cannot be ignored.  Future groups could potentially do the same, and the 
United States must commit to providing asylum to those who are in desperate need.  Religious or 
racially discriminatory-based fears must be eliminated, ensuring objective treatment of all 
refugees.  My “perfect” bill would use the provisions found in the Domestic Refugee 
Resettlement Reform and Modernization Act (version H.R.1784), which calls for an investigation 
into provisions to better handle future groups that are in danger.  H.R.1784 also mandates an 
analysis of the genesis of the issues surrounding the refugee program, as detailed in the previous 
chapter.  I would add a provision that called for a council to evaluate racial or religious 
motivations in the refugee program, thereby creating the fairest refugee policy the United States 
can formulate.  
!
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!
III.  Conclusion 
! I have demonstrated through a historical overview, contemporary analysis, and future 
reform breakdown that an immigration system is extremely complex.  Mix in politics, and the 
system becomes harder to compromise on.  Congress will not pass reform in 2014; and when it 
does, the reform bill will be incomplete, riddled with political bias and insufficient provisions.  
Americans should not be surprised.  Every bill that leaves Congress is imperfect, although they 
could be better if those who voted would act in a more bipartisan manner.  This thesis provided 
the background necessary for one to understand the difficulties in agreeing on immigration 
reform in an attempt to help the reader comprehend why Congress is currently gridlocked.  
Strong ideological differences will make it problematic for reform to pass; nonetheless, my thesis 
attempted to provide an objective look at the facts.  Finally, I proposed these facts through a 
hypothetical bill that cut through political bias and focused on what unbiased experts — the 
Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service — point to as best 
possible solutions.   
 The simple truth is that immigration is much more than policy.  Our identity, our national 
character, feels threatened when we debate immigration.  History shows us that immigration 
causes fear that we might lose that identity we hold so dear, so we reject and discriminate against 
those who wish to immigrate.  Italians, Irish, Asians, and many more have felt the sting of hate, 
yet have come to be influential groups in the United States.  Do we initially reject new cultures, 
races, and religions, only to accept them over time?  Several aspects of Italian, Irish, and Asian 
cultures have become popular, but when did they become so ingrained in U.S. culture?  Is it 
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possible Central Americans can assimilate eventually as well?  Much like Central Americans, 
earlier immigrants created their own communities, spoke their native languages, and separated 
themselves from other Americans.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was part of the 
Civil Rights Movement, attempting to ease this separation and the cultural discrimination against 
such groups.  Samuel P. Huntington, as detailed in the introductory chapter, asserts that 
Hispanics will not integrate into U.S. culture unless political institutions become less hostile.  
What would it take?  It is possible that another reform bill could aid Central Americans in their 
integration? 
 The overarching question that each wave of immigrants challenges is: who are we?  Upon 
completing this thesis, I can unequivocally say that we are a nation of immigrants.  I am French 
Canadian, Irish, and Italian, and each part of my heritage has had an incredible impact on the 
United States.  I feel no discrimination based on my heritage, although my great-grandfather did.  
So, is this an inherent part of the immigration debate?  I believe it is.  Racial, ethnic, and 
religious biases will continue to charge debates on immigration.  There are Americans whose 
family members were discriminated against, put into sub-par working conditions, and forced to 
live on the bare minimum, but will argue Mexicans (in the same situation) are stealing America.  
This “robbery” is the feeling of a shift in identity, not so much that Mexicans are bad people.  
Some argue the American identity had been diluted, but shall we let our minds be clouded by the 
same discriminatory thoughts of those who showed prejudice against our ancestors?  Our 
decisions will affect generations to come, shaping the future identity of the United States.  We 
must be accepting, realizing that the sustainability of the United States does not come in its race 
or its religion, but on its ability to create a unified nation, working as one.   
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